THE STANDARD EDITION
OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF

SIGMUND FREUD

Translated from the German under the General Editorship of

JAMES STRACHEY

In Collaboration with

ANNA FREUD

Assisted by

ALIX STRACHEY and ALAN TYSON

VOLUME XI

(1910)

Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis
Leonardo da Vinci
and
Other Works

LONDON
THE HOGARTH PRESS
AND THE INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

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VOLUME XI

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LEONARDO'S MADONNA AND CHILD WITH ST. ANNE

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FIVE LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

(1910 [1909])

EDITOR'S NOTE

ÜBER PSYCHOANALYSE

(*a*) GERMAN EDITIONS:

1910 Leipzig and Vienna: Deuticke. Pp. 62. (2nd ed. 1912, 3rd ed. 1916, 4th ed. 1919, 5th ed. 1920, 6th ed. 1922, 7th ed. 1924, 8th ed. 1930, all unchanged.)
1924 *G.S.*, **4**, 349–406. (Slightly changed.)
1943 *G.W.*, **8**, 3–60. (Unchanged from *G.S.*)

(*b*) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

'The Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis'
1910 *Am. J. Psychol.*, **21** (2 and 3), 181 218. (Tr. H. W. Chase.)
1910 In *Lectures and Addresses Delivered before the Departments of Psychology and Pedagogy in Celebration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Opening of Clark University*, Worcester, Mass., Part I, pp. 1 38. (Reprint of above.)
1924 In *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Van Teslaar, New York: Boni and Liveright. Pp. 21–70. (Re-issue of above.)

The present, entirely new translation, with the different title *Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, is by James Strachey.

In 1909, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, celebrated the twentieth year of its foundation, and its President, Dr. G. Stanley Hall, invited Freud and some of his principal followers (C. G. Jung, S Ferenczi, Ernest Jones, and A. A. Brill) to take part in the occasion and to be awarded honorary degrees. It was in December, 1908, that Freud first received the invitation, but it was not until the following autumn that the event took place, and Freud's five lectures were delivered on Monday, September 6, 1909, and the four following days. This, as Freud himself declared at the time, was the first official recognition of the young science, and he has described in his

Autobiographical Study (1925*d*, Chapter V) how, as he stepped on to the platform to deliver his lectures, 'it seemed like the realization of some incredible day-dream'.[1]

The lectures (in German, of course) were, according to Freud's almost universal practice, delivered extempore and, as we learn from Dr. Jones, without notes and after very little preparation. It was only after his return to Vienna that he was induced unwillingly to write them out. This work was not finished till the second week of December, but his verbal memory was so good that, as Dr. Jones assures us, the printed version 'did not depart much from the original delivery'. Their first publication was in an English translation in the *American Journal of Psychology* early in 1910, but the original German appeared soon afterwards as a pamphlet in Vienna.[2] The work proved a popular one and it passed through several editions; in none of these, however, was any alteration of substance made, except for the footnote added in 1923 at the very beginning, and appearing in the *Gesammelte Schriften* and *Gesammelte Werke* only, in which Freud retracted his expressions of indebtedness to Breuer. Some discussion of Freud's varying attitude to Breuer will be found in the Editor's Introduction to *Studies on Hysteria*, *Standard Ed.*, 2, xxvi ff.

All through his career Freud was constantly ready to give expositions of his discoveries. (A list of these will be found below, on p. 56.) He had already published some short accounts of psycho-analysis, but this set of lectures was the first on an extended scale. These expositions naturally varied in difficulty according to the audience for which they were designed, and this must be reckoned among the simplest ones, especially when compared with the great series of *Introductory Lectures* delivered a few years later (1916-17). Nevertheless, in spite of all the additions that were to be made to the structure of psycho-analysis during the following quarter of a century, these lectures

[1] Another account of the occasion will be found in the 'History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement' (1914*d*). A fuller description, from which most of the details given here are derived, is contained in Ernest Jones's biography (1955, 59 ff.).

[2] During Freud's lifetime the lectures were translated into many other languages: Polish (1911), Russian (1911), Hungarian (1912), Dutch (1912), Italian (1915), Danish (1920), French (1921), Spanish (1923), Portuguese (1931), and Japanese (1933).

still provide an admirable preliminary picture which calls for very little correction. And they give an excellent idea of the ease and clarity of style and the unconstrained sense of form which made Freud such a remarkable expository lecturer.

Considerable extracts from the earlier (1910) translation of this work were included in Rickman's *General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud* (1937, 3–43).

FIVE LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

Delivered on the Occasion of the Celebration
of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Foundation
of
CLARK UNIVERSITY, WORCESTER
MASSACHUSETTS

September 1909

To

DR. G. STANLEY HALL, PH.D., LL.D.

President of Clark University

Professor of Psychology and Pedagogics

This Work is Gratefully Dedicated

FIRST LECTURE

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—It is with novel and bewildering feelings that I find myself in the New World, lecturing before an audience of expectant enquirers. No doubt I owe this honour only to the fact that my name is linked with the topic of psycho-analysis; and it is of psycho-analysis, therefore, that I intend to speak to you. I shall attempt to give you, as succinctly as possible, a survey of the history and subsequent development of this new method of examination and treatment.

If it is a merit to have brought psycho-analysis into being, that merit is not mine.[1] I had no share in its earliest beginnings. I was a student and working for my final examinations at the time when another Viennese physician, Dr. Josef Breuer,[2] first (in 1880–2) made use of this procedure on a girl who was suffering from hysteria. Let us turn our attention straightaway to the history of this case and its treatment, which you will find set out in detail in the *Studies on Hysteria* [1895*d*] [3] which were published later by Breuer and myself.

But I should like to make one preliminary remark. It is not without satisfaction that I have learnt that the majority of my audience are not members of the medical profession. You have no need to be afraid that any special medical knowledge will be required for following what I have to say. It is true that we

[1] (*Footnote added* 1923:) See, however, in this connection my remarks in 'A History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement' (1914*d*), where I assumed the entire responsibility for psycho-analysis.

[2] Dr. Josef Breuer, born in 1842, a Corresponding Member of the Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften [Imperial Academy of Sciences], is well known for his work on respiration and on the physiology of the sense of equilibrium. [His obituary by Freud (1925*g*) included a more detailed account of his career.]

[3] Some of my contributions to this book have been translated into English by Dr. A. A. Brill of New York (*Selected Papers on Hysteria*, New York, 1909). [This was the first Freud book to appear in English. The complete Breuer and Freud *Studies* were translated by Brill later (New York, 1936). A new translation appeared in 1955, forming the second volume of the Freud *Standard Edition*, where the case history of this patient (Fraulein Anna O.) will be found on p. 21 ff.]

shall go along with the doctors on the first stage of our journey, but we shall soon part company with them and, with Dr. Breuer, shall pursue a quite individual path.

Dr. Breuer's patient was a girl of twenty-one, of high intellectual gifts. Her illness lasted for over two years, and in the course of it she developed a series of physical and psychological disturbances which decidedly deserved to be taken seriously. She suffered from a rigid paralysis, accompanied by loss of sensation, of both extremities on the right side of her body; and the same trouble from time to time affected her on her left side. Her eye movements were disturbed and her power of vision was subject to numerous restrictions. She had difficulties over the posture of her head; she had a severe nervous cough. She had an aversion to taking nourishment, and on one occasion she was for several weeks unable to drink in spite of a tormenting thirst. Her powers of speech were reduced, even to the point of her being unable to speak or understand her native language. Finally, she was subject to conditions of '*absence*',[1] of confusion, of delirium, and of alteration of her whole personality, to which we shall have presently to turn our attention.

When you hear such an enumeration of symptoms, you will be inclined to think it safe to assume, even though you are not doctors, that what we have before us is a severe illness, probably affecting the brain, that it offers small prospect of recovery and will probably lead to the patient's early decease. You must be prepared to learn from the doctors, however, that, in a number of cases which display severe symptoms such as these, it is justifiable to take a different and a far more favourable view. If a picture of this kind is presented by a young patient of the female sex, whose vital internal organs (heart, kidneys, etc.) are shown on objective examination to be normal, but who has been subjected to violent *emotional* shocks – if, moreover, her various symptoms differ in certain matters of detail from what would have been expected – then doctors are not inclined to take the case too seriously. They decide that what they have before them is not an organic disease of the brain, but the enigmatic condition which, from the time of ancient Greek medicine, has been known as 'hysteria' and which has the power of producing illusory pictures of a whole number of serious diseases. They

[1] [The French term.]

consider that there is then no risk to life but that a return to health—even a complete one—is probable. It is not always quite easy to distinguish a hysteria like this from a severe organic illness. There is no need for us to know, however, how a differential diagnosis of that kind is made; it will suffice to have an assurance that the case of Breuer's patient was precisely of a kind in which no competent physician could fail to make a diagnosis of hysteria. And here we may quote from the report of the patient's illness the further fact that it made its appearance at a time when she was nursing her father, of whom she was devotedly fond, through the grave illness which led to his death, and that, as a result of her own illness, she was obliged to give up nursing him.

So far it has been an advantage to us to accompany the doctors; but the moment of parting is at hand. For you must not suppose that a patient's prospects of medical assistance are improved in essentials by the fact that a diagnosis of hysteria has been substituted for one of severe organic disease of the brain. Medical skill is in most cases powerless against severe diseases of the brain, but neither can the doctor do anything against hysterical disorders. He must leave it to kindly Nature to decide when and how his optimistic prognosis shall be fulfilled.[1]

Thus the recognition of the illness as hysteria makes little difference to the patient; but to the doctor quite the reverse. It is noticeable that his attitude towards hysterical patients is quite other than towards sufferers from organic diseases. He does not have the same sympathy for the former as for the latter: for the hysteric's ailment is in fact far less serious and yet it seems to claim to be regarded as equally so. And there is a further factor at work. Through his studies, the doctor has learnt many things that remain a sealed book to the layman. he has been able to form ideas on the causes of illness and on the changes it brings about—e.g. in the brain of a person suffering from apoplexy or from a malignant growth—ideas which must to some degree meet the case, since they allow him to understand

[1] I am aware that this is no longer the case, but in my lecture I am putting myself and my hearers back into the period before 1880. If things are different now, that is to a great extent the result of the activities whose history I am now sketching.

the details of the illness. But all his knowledge—his training in anatomy, in physiology and in pathology—leaves him in the lurch when he is confronted by the details of hysterical phenomena. He cannot understand hysteria, and in the face of it he is himself a layman. This is not a pleasant situation for anyone who as a rule sets so much store by his knowledge. So it comes about that hysterical patients forfeit his sympathy. He regards them as people who are transgressing the laws of his science—like heretics in the eyes of the orthodox. He attributes every kind of wickedness to them, accuses them of exaggeration, of deliberate deceit, of malingering. And he punishes them by withdrawing his interest from them.

Dr. Breuer's attitude towards his patient deserved no such reproach. He gave her both sympathy and interest, even though, to begin with, he did not know how to help her. It seems likely that she herself made his task easier by the admirable qualities of intellect and character to which he has testified in her case history. Soon, moreover, his benevolent scrutiny showed him the means of bringing her a first instalment of help.

It was observed that, while the patient was in her states of '*absence*' (altered personality accompanied by confusion), she was in the habit of muttering a few words to herself which seemed as though they arose from some train of thought that was occupying her mind. The doctor, after getting a report of these words, used to put her into a kind of hypnosis and then repeat them to her so as to induce her to use them as a starting-point. The patient complied with the plan, and in this way reproduced in his presence the mental creations which had been occupying her mind during the '*absences*' and which had betrayed their existence by the fragmentary words which she had uttered. They were profoundly melancholy phantasies—'day-dreams' we should call them—sometimes characterized by poetic beauty, and their starting-point was as a rule the position of a girl at her father's sick-bed. When she had related a number of these phantasies, she was as if set free, and she was brought back to normal mental life. The improvement in her condition, which would last for several hours, would be succeeded next day by a further attack of '*absence*'; and this in turn would be removed in the same way by getting her to put into

words her freshly constructed phantasies. It was impossible to escape the conclusion that the alteration in her mental state which was expressed in the '*absences*' was a result of the stimulus proceeding from these highly emotional phantasies. The patient herself, who, strange to say, could at this time only speak and understand English, christened this novel kind of treatment the 'talking cure' [1] or used to refer to it jokingly as 'chimney-sweeping'.[1]

It soon emerged, as though by chance, that this process of sweeping the mind clean could accomplish more than the merely temporary relief of her ever-recurring mental confusion. It was actually possible to bring about the disappearance of the painful symptoms of her illness, if she could be brought to remember under hypnosis, with an accompanying expression of affect, on what occasion and in what connection the symptoms had first appeared. 'It was in the summer during a period of extreme heat, and the patient was suffering very badly from thirst; for, without being able to account for it in any way, she suddenly found it impossible to drink. She would take up the glass of water that she longed for, but as soon as it touched her lips she would push it away like someone suffering from hydrophobia. As she did this, she was obviously in an *absence* for a couple of seconds. She lived only on fruit, such as melons, etc., so as to lessen her tormenting thirst. This had lasted for some six weeks, when one day during hypnosis she grumbled about her English "lady-companion", whom she did not care for, and went on to describe, with every sign of disgust, how she had once gone into this lady's room and how her little dog—horrid creature!—had drunk out of a glass there. The patient had said nothing, as she had wanted to be polite. After giving further energetic expression to the anger she had held back, she asked for something to drink, drank a large quantity of water without any difficulty, and awoke from her hypnosis with the glass at her lips, and thereupon the disturbance vanished, never to return.' [2]

With your permission, I should like to pause a moment over this event. Never before had anyone removed a hysterical symptom by such a method or had thus gained so deep an insight into its causation. It could not fail to prove a momentous

[1] [These phrases are in English in the original.]

[2] *Studies on Hysteria* [*Standard Ed.*, **2**, 34].

discovery if the expectation were confirmed that others of the patient's symptoms - perhaps the majority of them - had arisen and could be removed in this same manner. Breuer spared no pains in convincing himself that this was so, and he proceeded to a systematic investigation of the pathogenesis of the other and more serious symptoms of the patient's illness. And it really *was* so. Almost all the symptoms had arisen in this way as residues —'precipitates' they might be called—of emotional experiences. To these experiences, therefore, we later gave the name of 'psychical traumas', while the particular nature of the symptoms was explained by their relation to the traumatic scenes which were their cause. They were, to use a technical term, 'determined' by the scenes of whose recollection they represented residues, and it was no longer necessary to describe them as capricious or enigmatic products of the neurosis. One unexpected point, however, must be noticed. What left the symptom behind was not always a *single* experience. On the contrary, the result was usually brought about by the convergence of several traumas, and often by the repetition of a great number of similar ones. Thus it was necessary to reproduce the whole chain of pathogenic memories in chronological order, or rather in reversed order, the latest ones first and the earliest ones last; and it was quite impossible to jump over the later traumas in order to get back more quickly to the first, which was often the most potent one.

No doubt you will now ask me for some further instances of the causation of hysterical symptoms besides the one I have already given you of a fear of water produced by disgust at a dog drinking out of a glass. But if I am to keep to my programme I shall have to restrict myself to very few examples. In regard to the patient's disturbances of vision, for instance, Breuer describes how they were traced back to occasions such as one on which, 'when she was sitting by her father's bedside with tears in her eyes, he suddenly asked her what time it was. She could not see clearly; she made a great effort, and brought her watch near to her eyes. The face of the watch now seemed very big - thus accounting for her macropsia and convergent squint. Or again, she tried hard to suppress her tears so that the sick man should not see them'.[1] Moreover, all of the patho-

[1] *Studies on Hysteria* [*Standard Ed.*, **2**, 39-40].

genic impressions came from the period during which she was helping to nurse her sick father. 'She once woke up during the night in great anxiety about the patient, who was in a high fever; and she was under the strain of expecting the arrival of a surgeon from Vienna who was to operate. Her mother had gone away for a short time and Anna was sitting at the bedside with her right arm over the back of her chair. She fell into a waking dream and saw a black snake coming towards the sick man from the wall to bite him. (It is most likely that there were in fact snakes in the field behind the house and that these had previously given the girl a fright; they would thus have provided the material for her hallucination.) She tried to keep the snake off, but it was as though she was paralysed. Her right arm, over the back of the chair, had gone to sleep, and had become anaesthetic and paretic; and when she looked at it the fingers turned into little snakes with death's heads (the nails). (It seems probable that she had tried to use her paralysed right hand to drive off the snake and that its anaesthesia and paralysis had consequently become associated with the hallucination of the snake.) When the snake vanished, in her terror she tried to pray. But language failed her: she could find no tongue in which to speak, till at last she thought of some children's verses in English and then found herself able to think and pray in that language.'[1] When the patient had recollected this scene in hypnosis, the rigid paralysis of her left arm, which had persisted since the beginning of her illness, disappeared, and the treatment was brought to an end.

When, some years later, I began to employ Breuer's method of examination and treatment on patients of my own, my experiences agreed entirely with his. A lady, aged about forty, suffered from a *tic* consisting of a peculiar 'clucking' sound which she produced whenever she was excited, or sometimes for no visible reason. It had its origin in two experiences, whose common element lay in the fact that at the moment of their occurrence she had formed a determination not to make any noise, and in the fact that on both these occasions a kind of counter-will led her to break the silence with this same sound. On the first of these occasions one of her children had been ill, and, when she had at last with great difficulty succeeded in getting it off to

[1] *Studies on Hysteria* [*Standard Ed.*, **2**, 38–9].

sleep, she had said to herself that she must keep absolutely still so as not to wake it. On the other occasion, while she was driving with her two children in a thunderstorm, the horses had bolted and she had carefully tried to avoid making any noise for fear of frightening them even more.[1] I give you this one example out of a number of others which are reported in the *Studies on Hysteria*.[2]

Ladies and Gentlemen, if I may be allowed to generalize—which is unavoidable in so condensed an account as this—I should like to formulate what we have learned so far as follows: *our hysterical patients suffer from reminiscences*. Their symptoms are residues and mnemic symbols of particular (traumatic) experiences. We may perhaps obtain a deeper understanding of this kind of symbolism if we compare them with other mnemic symbols in other fields. The monuments and memorials with which large cities are adorned are also mnemic symbols. If you take a walk through the streets of London, you will find, in front of one of the great railway termini, a richly carved Gothic column—Charing Cross. One of the old Plantagenet kings of the thirteenth century ordered the body of his beloved Queen Eleanor to be carried to Westminster; and at every stage at which the coffin rested he erected a Gothic cross. Charing Cross is the last of the monuments that commemorate the funeral cortège.[3] At another point in the same town, not far from London Bridge, you will find a towering, and more modern, column, which is simply known as 'The Monument'. It was designed as a memorial of the Great Fire, which broke out in that neighbourhood in 1666 and destroyed a large part of the city. These monuments, then, resemble hysterical symptoms in being mnemic symbols, up to that point the comparison seems justifiable. But what should we think of a Londoner who paused

[1] *Studies on Hysteria* [*Standard Ed.*, **2**, 54 and 58].

[2] Extracts from that volume, together with some later writings of mine on hysteria, are now to be had in an English translation prepared by Dr. A. A. Brill of New York. [See footnote p. 9. The case here reported is that of Frau Emmy von N., the second in *Studies on Hysteria*, *Standard Ed.*, **2**, 48 ff.]

[3] Or rather, it is a modern copy of one of these monuments. As Dr. Ernest Jones tells us, the name 'Charing' is believed to be derived from the words '*chère reine*'.

to-day in deep melancholy before the memorial of Queen Eleanor's funeral instead of going about his business in the hurry that modern working conditions demand or instead of feeling joy over the youthful queen of his own heart? Or again what should we think of a Londoner who shed tears before the Monument that commemorates the reduction of his beloved metropolis to ashes although it has long since risen again in far greater brilliance? Yet every single hysteric and neurotic behaves like these two unpractical Londoners. Not only do they remember painful experiences of the remote past, but they still cling to them emotionally; they cannot get free of the past and for its sake they neglect what is real and immediate. This fixation of mental life to pathogenic traumas is one of the most significant and practically important characteristics of neurosis.

I am quite ready to allow the justice of an objection that you are probably raising at this moment on the basis of the case history of Breuer's patient. It is quite true that all her traumas dated from the period when she was nursing her sick father and that her symptoms can only be regarded as mnemic signs of his illness and death. Thus they correspond to a display of mourning, and there is certainly nothing pathological in being fixated to the memory of a dead person so short a time after his decease; on the contrary, it would be a normal emotional process. I grant you that in the case of Breuer's patient there is nothing striking in her fixation to her trauma. But in other cases such as that of the *tic* that I treated myself, where the determinants dated back more than fifteen and ten years the feature of an abnormal attachment to the past is very clear, and it seems likely that Breuer's patient would have developed a similar feature if she had not received cathartic treatment so soon after experiencing the traumas and developing the symptoms.

So far we have only been discussing the relations between a patient's hysterical symptoms and the events of her life. There are, however, two further factors in Breuer's observation which enable us to form some notion of how the processes of falling ill and of recovering occur.

In the first place, it must be emphasized that Breuer's patient, in almost all her pathogenic situations, was obliged to *suppress* a powerful emotion instead of allowing its discharge in

the appropriate signs of emotion, words or actions. In the episode of her lady-companion's dog, she suppressed any manifestation of her very intense disgust, out of consideration for the woman's feelings, while she watched at her father's bedside she was constantly on the alert to prevent the sick man from observing her anxiety and her painful depression. When subsequently she reproduced these scenes in her doctor's presence the affect which had been inhibited at the time emerged with peculiar violence, as though it had been saved up for a long time. Indeed, the symptom which was left over from one of these scenes would reach its highest pitch of intensity at the time when its determining cause was being approached, only to vanish when that cause had been fully ventilated. On the other hand, it was found that no result was produced by the recollection of a scene in the doctor's presence if for some reason the recollection took place without any generation of affect. Thus it was what happened to these affects, which might be regarded as displaceable magnitudes, that was the decisive factor both for the onset of illness and for recovery. One was driven to assume that the illness occurred because the affects generated in the pathogenic situations had their normal outlet blocked, and that the essence of the illness lay in the fact that these 'strangulated' affects were then put to an abnormal use. In part they remained as a permanent burden upon the patient's mental life and a source of constant excitation for it, and in part they underwent a transformation into unusual somatic innervations and inhibitions, which manifested themselves as the physical symptoms of the case. For this latter process we coined the term 'hysterical conversion'. Quite apart from this, a certain portion of our mental excitation is normally directed along the paths of somatic innervation and produces what we know as an 'expression of the emotions'. Hysterical conversion exaggerates this portion of the discharge of an emotionally cathected mental process, it represents a far more intense expression of the emotions, which has entered upon a new path. When the bed of a stream is divided into two channels, then, if the current in one of them is brought up against an obstacle, the other will at once be overfilled. As you see, we are on the point of arriving at a purely psychological theory of hysteria, with affective processes in the front rank.

A second observation of Breuer's, again, compels us to attach great importance, among the characteristics of the pathological chain of events, to states of consciousness. Breuer's patient exhibited, alongside of her normal state, a number of mental peculiarities: conditions of '*absence*', confusion, and alterations of character. In her normal state she knew nothing of the pathogenic scenes or their connection with her symptoms, she had forgotten the scenes, or at all events had severed the pathogenic link. When she was put under hypnosis, it was possible, at the expense of a considerable amount of labour, to recall the scenes to her memory; and, through this work of recollecting, the symptoms were removed. The explanation of this fact would be a most awkward business, were it not that the way is pointed by experiences and experiments in hypnotism. The study of hypnotic phenomena has accustomed us to what was at first a bewildering realization that in one and the same individual there can be several mental groupings, which can remain more or less independent of one another, which can 'know nothing' of one another and which can alternate with one another in their hold upon consciousness. Cases of this kind, too, occasionally appear spontaneously, and are then described as examples of '*double conscience*'.[1] If, where a splitting of the personality such as this has occurred, consciousness remains attached regularly to one of the two states, we call it the *conscious* mental state and the other, which is detached from it, the *unconscious* one. In the familiar condition known as 'post-hypnotic suggestion', a command given under hypnosis is slavishly carried out subsequently in the normal state. This phenomenon affords an admirable example of the influences which the unconscious state can exercise over the conscious one; moreover, it provides a pattern upon which we can account for the phenomena of hysteria. Breuer adopted a hypothesis that hysterical symptoms arise in peculiar mental conditions to which he gave the name of 'hypnoid'. On this view, excitations occurring during these hypnoid states can easily become pathogenic because such states do not provide opportunities for the normal discharge of the process of excitation. There consequently arises from the process of excitation an unusual product – the symptom. This finds its way, like a foreign body, into the normal state, which

[1] [The French term for 'dual consciousness'.]

in turn is in ignorance of the hypnoid pathogenic situation. Wherever there is a symptom there is also an amnesia, a gap in the memory, and filling up this gap implies the removal of the conditions which led to the production of the symptom.

This last part of my account will not, I fear, strike you as particularly clear. But you should bear in mind that we are dealing with novel and difficult considerations, and it may well be that it is not possible to make them much clearer which shows that we still have a long way to go in our knowledge of the subject. Moreover, Breuer's theory of 'hypnoid states' turned out to be impeding and unnecessary, and it has been dropped by psycho-analysis to-day. Later on, you will at least have a hint of the influences and processes that were to be discovered behind the screen of hypnoid states erected by Breuer. You will have rightly formed the opinion, too, that Breuer's investigation has only succeeded in offering you a very incomplete theory and an unsatisfying explanation of the phenomena observed. But complete theories do not fall ready-made from the sky and you would have even better grounds for suspicion if anyone presented you with a flawless and complete theory at the very beginning of his observations. Such a theory could only be a child of his speculation and could not be the fruit of an unprejudiced examination of the facts.

SECOND LECTURE

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—At about the same time at which Breuer was carrying on the 'talking cure' with his patient, the great Charcot in Paris had begun the researches into hysterical patients at the Salpêtrière which were to lead to a new understanding of the disease. There was no possibility of his findings being known in Vienna at that time. But when, some ten years later, Breuer and I published our 'Preliminary Communication' on the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena [1893*a*], we were completely under the spell of Charcot's researches. We regarded the pathogenic experiences of our patients as psychical traumas, and equated them with the somatic traumas whose influence on hysterical paralyses had been established by Charcot; and Breuer's hypothesis of hypnoid states was itself nothing but a reflection of the fact that Charcot had reproduced those traumatic paralyses artificially under hypnosis.

The great French observer, whose pupil I became in 1885–6, was not himself inclined to adopt a psychological outlook. It was his pupil, Pierre Janet, who first attempted a deeper approach to the peculiar psychical processes present in hysteria, and we followed his example when we took the splitting of the mind and dissociation of the personality as the centre of our position. You will find in Janet a theory of hysteria which takes into account the prevailing views in France on the part played by heredity and degeneracy. According to him, hysteria is a form of degenerate modification of the nervous system, which shows itself in an innate weakness in the power of psychical synthesis. Hysterical patients, he believes, are inherently incapable of holding together the multiplicity of mental processes into a unity, and hence arises the tendency to mental dissociation. If I may be allowed to draw a homely but clear analogy, Janet's hysterical patient reminds one of a feeble woman who has gone out shopping and is now returning home laden with a multitude of parcels and boxes. She cannot contain the whole heap of them with her two arms and ten fingers. So first of all one object slips from her grasp, and when she stoops to pick it up, another

one escapes her in its place, and so on. This supposed mental weakness of hysterical patients is not confirmed when we find that, alongside these phenomena of diminished capacity, examples are also to be observed of a partial increase in efficiency, as though by way of compensation. At the time when Breuer's patient had forgotten her mother tongue and every other language but English, her grasp of English reached such heights that, if she was handed a German book, she was able straight away to read out a correct and fluent translation of it.

When, later on, I set about continuing on my own account the investigations that had been begun by Breuer, I soon arrived at another view of the origin of hysterical dissociation (the splitting of consciousness A divergence of this kind, which was to be decisive for everything that followed, was inevitable, since I did not start out, like Janet, from laboratory experiments, but with therapeutic aims in mind.

I was driven forward above all by practical necessity. The cathartic procedure, as carried out by Breuer, presupposed putting the patient into a state of deep hypnosis, for it was only in a state of hypnosis that he attained a knowledge of the pathogenic connections which escaped him in his normal state. But I soon came to dislike hypnosis, for it was a temperamental and, one might almost say, a mystical ally. When I found that, in spite of all my efforts, I could not succeed in bringing more than a fraction of my patients into a hypnotic state, I determined to give up hypnosis and to make the cathartic procedure independent of it. Since I was not able at will to alter the mental state of the majority of my patients, I set about working with them in their *normal* state. At first, I must confess, this seemed a senseless and hopeless undertaking. I was set the task of learning from the patient something that I did not know and that he did not know himself. How could one hope to elicit it? But there came to my help a recollection of a most remarkable and instructive experiment which I had witnessed when I was with Bernheim at Nancy [in 1889]. Bernheim showed us that people whom he had put into a state of hypnotic somnambulism, and who had had all kinds of experiences while they were in that state, only *appeared* to have lost the memory of what they had experienced during somnambulism, it was possible to revive

these memories in their normal state. It is true that, when he questioned them about their somnambulistic experiences, they began by maintaining that they knew nothing about them; but if he refused to give way, and insisted, and assured them that they *did* know about them, the forgotten experiences always reappeared.

So I did the same thing with my patients. When I reached a point with them at which they maintained that they knew nothing more, I assured them that they *did* know it all the same, and that they had only to say it, and I ventured to declare that the right memory would occur to them at the moment at which I laid my hand on their forehead. In that way I succeeded, without using hypnosis, in obtaining from the patients whatever was required for establishing the connection between the pathogenic scenes they had forgotten and the symptoms left over from those scenes. But it was a laborious procedure, and in the long run an exhausting one; and it was unsuited to serve as a permanent technique.

I did not abandon it, however, before the observations I made during my use of it afforded me decisive evidence. I found confirmation of the fact that the forgotten memories were not lost. They were in the patient's possession and were ready to emerge in association to what was still known by him, but there was some force that prevented them from becoming conscious and compelled them to remain unconscious. The existence of this force could be assumed with certainty, since one became aware of an effort corresponding to it if, in opposition to it, one tried to introduce the unconscious memories into the patient's consciousness. The force which was maintaining the pathological condition became apparent in the form of *resistance* on the part of the patient.

It was on this idea of resistance, then, that I based my view of the course of psychical events in hysteria. In order to effect a recovery, it had proved necessary to remove these resistances. Starting out from the mechanism of cure, it now became possible to construct quite definite ideas of the origin of the illness. The same forces which, in the form of resistance, were now offering opposition to the forgotten material's being made conscious, must formerly have brought about the forgetting and

must have pushed the pathogenic experiences in question out of consciousness. I gave the name of '*repression*' to this hypothetical process, and I considered that it was proved by the undeniable existence of resistance.

The further question could then be raised as to what these forces were and what the determinants were of the repression in which we now recognized the pathogenic mechanism of hysteria. A comparative study of the pathogenic situations which we had come to know through the cathartic procedure made it possible to answer this question. All these experiences had involved the emergence of a wishful impulse which was in sharp contrast to the subject's other wishes and which proved incompatible with the ethical and aesthetic standards of his personality. There had been a short conflict, and the end of this internal struggle was that the idea which had appeared before consciousness as the vehicle of this irreconcilable wish fell a victim to repression, was pushed out of consciousness with all its attached memories, and was forgotten. Thus the incompatibility of the wish in question with the patient's ego was the motive for the repression; the subject's ethical and other standards were the repressing forces. An acceptance of the incompatible wishful impulse or a prolongation of the conflict would have produced a high degree of unpleasure; this unpleasure was avoided by means of repression, which was thus revealed as one of the devices serving to protect the mental personality.

To take the place of a number of instances, I will relate a single one of my cases, in which the determinants and advantages of repression are sufficiently evident. For my present purpose I shall have once again to abridge the case history and omit some important underlying material. The patient was a girl,[1] who had lost her beloved father after she had taken a share in nursing him — a situation analogous to that of Breuer's patient. Soon afterwards her elder sister married, and her new brother-in-law aroused in her a peculiar feeling of sympathy which was easily masked under a disguise of family affection. Not long afterwards her sister fell ill and died, in the absence of the patient and her mother. They were summoned in all haste

[1] [This is the case of Fraulein Elisabeth von R., the fifth of the case histories fully reported in *Studies on Hysteria*, *Standard Ed.*, 2, 135 ff.]

without being given any definite information of the tragic event. When the girl reached the bedside of her dead sister, there came to her for a brief moment an idea that might be expressed in these words. 'Now he is free and can marry me.' We may assume with certainty that this idea, which betrayed to her consciousness the intense love for her brother-in-law of which she had not herself been conscious, was surrendered to repression a moment later, owing to the revolt of her feelings. The girl fell ill with severe hysterical symptoms; and while she was under my treatment it turned out that she had completely forgotten the scene by her sister's bedside and the odious egoistic impulse that had emerged in her. She remembered it during the treatment and reproduced the pathogenic moment with signs of the most violent emotion, and, as a result of the treatment, she became healthy once more.

Perhaps I may give you a more vivid picture of repression and of its necessary relation to resistance, by a rough analogy derived from our actual situation at the present moment. Let us suppose that in this lecture-room and among this audience, whose exemplary quiet and attentiveness I cannot sufficiently commend, there is nevertheless someone who is causing a disturbance and whose ill-mannered laughter, chattering and shuffling with his feet are distracting my attention from my task. I have to announce that I cannot proceed with my lecture; and thereupon three or four of you who are strong men stand up and, after a short struggle, put the interrupter outside the door. So now he is 'repressed', and I can continue my lecture. But in order that the interruption shall not be repeated, in case the individual who has been expelled should try to enter the room once more, the gentlemen who have put my will into effect place their chairs up against the door and thus establish a 'resistance' after the repression has been accomplished. If you will now translate the two localities concerned into psychical terms as the 'conscious' and the 'unconscious', you will have before you a fairly good picture of the process of repression.

You will now see in what it is that the difference lies between our view and Janet's. We do not derive the psychical splitting from an innate incapacity for synthesis on the part of the mental

apparatus; we explain it dynamically, from the conflict of opposing mental forces and recognize it as the outcome of an active struggling on the part of the two psychical groupings against each other. But our view gives rise to a large number of fresh problems. Situations of mental conflict are, of course, exceedingly common; efforts by the ego to ward off painful memories are quite regularly to be observed without their producing the result of a mental split. The reflection cannot be escaped that further determinants must be present if the conflict is to lead to dissociation. I will also readily grant you that the hypothesis of repression leaves us not at the end but at the beginning of a psychological theory. We can only go forward step by step however, and complete knowledge must await the results of further and deeper researches.

Nor is it advisable to attempt to explain the case of Breuer's patient from the point of view of repression. That case history is not suited to this purpose, because its findings were reached with the help of hypnotic influence. It is only if you exclude hypnosis that you can observe resistances and repressions and form an adequate idea of the truly pathogenic course of events. Hypnosis conceals the resistance and renders a certain area of the mind accessible; but, as against this, it builds up the resistance at the frontiers of this area into a wall that makes everything beyond it inaccessible.

Our most valuable lesson from Breuer's observation was what it proved concerning the relation between symptoms and pathogenic experiences or psychical traumas, and we must not omit now to consider these discoveries from the standpoint of the theory of repression. At first sight it really seems impossible to trace a path from repression to the formation of symptoms. Instead of giving a complicated theoretical account, I will return here to the analogy which I employed earlier for my explanation of repression. If you come to think of it, the removal of the interrupter and the posting of the guardians at the door may not mean the end of the story. It may very well be that the individual who has been expelled, and who has now become embittered and reckless, will cause us further trouble. It is true that he is no longer among us, we are free from his presence, from his insulting laughter and his *sotto voce* comments. But in

some respects, nevertheless, the repression has been unsuccessful, for now he is making an intolerable exhibition of himself outside the room, and his shouting and banging on the door with his fists interfere with my lecture even more than his bad behaviour did before. In these circumstances we could not fail to be delighted if our respected president, Dr. Stanley Hall, should be willing to assume the role of mediator and peacemaker. He would have a talk with the unruly person outside and would then come to us with a request that he should be re-admitted after all he himself would guarantee that the man would now behave better On Dr Hall's authority we decide to lift the repression, and peace and quiet are restored. This presents what is really no bad picture of the physician's task in the psycho-analytic treatment of the neuroses.

To put the matter more directly The investigation of hysterical patients and of other neurotics leads us to the conclusion that their repression of the idea to which the intolerable wish is attached has been a *failure* It is true that they have driven it out of consciousness and out of memory and have apparently saved themselves a large amount of unpleasure *But the repressed unconscious impulse continues to exist in the unconscious* It is on the look-out for an opportunity of being activated, and when that happens it succeeds in sending into consciousness a disguised and unrecognizable *substitute* for what had been repressed, and to this there soon become attached the same feelings of unpleasure which it was hoped had been saved by the repression This substitute for the repressed idea the *symptom* is proof against further attacks from the defensive ego, and in place of the short conflict an ailment now appears which is not brought to an end by the passage of time. Alongside the indication of distortion in the symptom, we can trace in it the remains of some kind of indirect resemblance to the idea that was originally repressed The paths along which the substitution was effected can be traced in the course of the patient's psychoanalytic treatment, and in order to bring about recovery, the symptom must be led back along the same paths and once more turned into the repressed idea If what was repressed is brought back again into conscious mental activity a process which presupposes the overcoming of considerable resistances the resulting psychical conflict, which the patient had tried to avoid,

THIRD LECTURE

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—It is not always easy to tell the truth, especially when one has to be concise, and I am thus to-day obliged to correct a wrong statement that I made in my last lecture. I said to you that, having dispensed with hypnosis, I insisted on my patients nevertheless telling me what occurred to them in connection with the subject under discussion, and assured them that they really knew everything that they had ostensibly forgotten and that the idea that occurred to them [1] would infallibly contain what we were in search of, and I went on to say to you that I found that the first idea occurring to my patients did in fact produce the right thing and turned out to be the forgotten continuation of the memory. This, however, is not in general the case, and I only put the matter so simply for the sake of brevity. Actually it was only for the first few times that the right thing which had been forgotten turned up as a result of simple insistence on my part. When the procedure was carried further, ideas kept on emerging that could not be the right ones, since they were not appropriate and were rejected as being wrong by the patients themselves. Insistence was of no further help at this point, and I found myself once more regretting my abandonment of hypnosis.

While I was thus at a loss, I clung to a prejudice the scientific justification for which was proved years later by my friend C. G. Jung and his pupils in Zurich. I am bound to say that it is sometimes most useful to have prejudices. I cherished a high opinion of the strictness with which mental processes are determined, and I found it impossible to believe that an idea produced by a patient while his attention was on the stretch could be an arbitrary one and unrelated to the idea we were in search of. The fact that the two ideas were not identical could be satisfactorily explained from the postulated psychological state

[1] [The German word here is '*Einfall*', which is often translated 'association'; but the latter is a question-begging word and is avoided here as far as possible, even at the price of such long paraphrases as the present one. Later, however, we come to '*freier Einfall*', 'free association' (though still objectionable) is hardly to be escaped.]

can, under the physician's guidance, reach a better outcome than was offered by repression. There are a number of such opportune solutions, which may bring the conflict and the neurosis to a happy end, and which may in certain instances be combined. The patient's personality may be convinced that it has been wrong in rejecting the pathogenic wish and may be led into accepting it wholly or in part; or the wish itself may be directed to a higher and consequently unobjectionable aim (this is what we call its 'sublimation'); or the rejection of the wish may be recognized as a justifiable one, but the automatic and therefore inefficient mechanism of repression may be replaced by a condemning judgement with the help of the highest human mental functions—conscious control of the wish is attained.

You must forgive me if I have not succeeded in giving you a more clearly intelligible account of these basic positions adopted by the method of treatment that is now described as 'psychoanalysis'. The difficulties have not lain only in the novelty of the subject. The nature of the incompatible wishes which, in spite of repression, succeed in making their existence in the unconscious perceptible, and the subjective and constitutional determinants which must be present in anyone before a failure of repression can occur and a substitute or symptom be formed—on all this I shall have more light to throw in some of my later observations.

of affairs. In the patient under treatment two forces were in operation against each other: on the one hand, his conscious endeavour to bring into consciousness the forgotten idea in his unconscious, and on the other hand, the resistance we already know about, which was striving to prevent what was repressed or its derivatives from thus becoming conscious. If this resistance amounted to little or nothing, what had been forgotten became conscious without distortion. It was accordingly plausible to suppose that the greater the resistance against what we were in search of becoming conscious, the greater would be its distortion. The idea which occurred to the patient in place of what we were in search of had thus itself originated like a symptom: it was a new, artificial and ephemeral substitute for what had been repressed, and was dissimilar to it in proportion to the degree of distortion it had undergone under the influence of the resistance. But, owing to its nature as a symptom, it must nevertheless have a certain similarity to what we were in search of; and if the resistance were not too great, we ought to be able to guess the latter from the former. The idea occurring to the patient must be in the nature of an *allusion* to the repressed element, like a representation of it in indirect speech.

We know cases in the field of normal mental life in which situations analogous to the one we have just assumed produce similar results. One such case is that of jokes. The problems of psycho-analytic technique have compelled me to investigate the technique of making jokes. I will give you one example of this — incidentally, a joke in English.

This is the anecdote.[1] Two not particularly scrupulous business men had succeeded, by dint of a series of highly risky enterprises, in amassing a large fortune, and they were now making efforts to push their way into good society. One method, which struck them as a likely one, was to have their portraits painted by the most celebrated and highly-paid artist in the city, whose pictures had an immense reputation. The precious canvases were shown for the first time at a large evening party, and the

[1] Cf. *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*, 1905*c* [Chapter II, Section 11, where the story is discussed at greater length and, incidentally, described as an American one].

two hosts themselves led the most influential connoisseur and art critic up to the wall on which the portraits were hanging side by side. He studied the works for a long time, and then, shaking his head, as though there was something he had missed, pointed to the gap between the pictures and asked quietly: 'But where's the Saviour?' [1] I see you are all much amused at this joke. Let us now proceed to examine it. Clearly what the connoisseur meant to say was, 'You are a couple of rogues, like the two thieves between whom the Saviour was crucified.' But he did not say this. Instead he made a remark which seems at first sight strangely inappropriate and irrelevant, but which we recognize a moment later as an *allusion* to the insult that he had in mind and as a perfect substitute for it. We cannot expect to find in jokes *all* the characteristics that we have attributed to the ideas occurring to our patients, but we must stress the identity of the *motive* for the joke and for the idea. Why did the critic not tell the rogues straight out what he wanted to say? Because he had excellent counter-motives working against his desire to say it to their faces. There are risks attendant upon insulting people who are one's hosts and who have at their command the fists of a large domestic staff. One might easily meet with the fate which I suggested in my last lecture as an analogy for repression. That was the reason why the critic did not express the insult he had in mind directly but in the form of an 'allusion accompanied by omission' [2], and the same state of things is responsible for our patients' producing a more or less distorted *substitute* instead of the forgotten idea we are in search of.

It is highly convenient, Ladies and Gentlemen, to follow the Zurich school (Bleuler, Jung, etc.) in describing a group of interdependent ideational elements cathected with affect as a 'complex'. We see, then, that if in our search for a repressed complex in one of our patients we start out from the last thing he remembers, we should have every prospect of discovering the complex, provided that the patient puts a sufficient number of his free associations [3] at our disposal. Accordingly, we allow the

[1] [In English in the original.]

[2] [This is one of the particular techniques described in the passage in Freud's book on jokes where the present anecdote occurs.]

[3] [See footnote p. 29.]

patient to say whatever he likes, and hold fast to the postulate that nothing can occur to him which is not in an indirect fashion dependent on the complex we are in search of. If this method of discovering what is repressed strikes you as unduly circumstantial, I can at least assure you that it is the only practicable one.

When we come to putting this procedure into effect, we are subject to yet another interference. For the patient will often pause and come to a stop, and assert that he can think of nothing to say, and that nothing whatever occurs to his mind. If this were so and if the patient were right, then our procedure would once again have proved ineffective. But closer observation shows that such a stoppage of the flow of ideas never in fact occurs. It *appears* to happen only because the patient holds back or gets rid of the idea that he has become aware of, under the influence of the resistances which disguise themselves as various critical judgements about the value of the idea that has occurred to him. We can protect ourselves against this by warning him beforehand of this behaviour and requiring him to take no notice of such criticisms. He must, we tell him, entirely renounce any critical selection of this kind and say whatever comes into his head, even if he considers it incorrect or irrelevant or nonsensical, and above all if he finds it disagreeable to let himself think about what has occurred to him. So long as this ordinance is carried out we are certain of obtaining the material which will put us on the track of the repressed complexes.

This associative material, which the patient contemptuously rejects when he is under the influence of the resistance instead of under the doctor's, serves the psycho-analyst, as it were, as ore from which, with the help of some simple interpretative devices, he extracts its content of precious metal. If you are anxious to gain a rapid and provisional knowledge of a patient's repressed complexes, without as yet entering into their arrangement and interconnection, you will employ as a method of examination the 'association experiment' as it has been developed by Jung (1906) and his pupils. This procedure offers the psycho-analyst what qualitative analysis offers the chemist. In the treatment of neurotic patients it can be dispensed with; but it is indispensable for the objective demonstration of com-

plexes and in the examination of the psychoses, which has been embarked on with so much success by the Zurich school.

Working over the ideas that occur to patients when they submit to the main rule of psycho-analysis is not our only technical method of discovering the unconscious. The same purpose is served by two other procedures: the interpretation of patients' dreams and the exploitation of their faulty and haphazard actions.

I must admit, Ladies and Gentlemen, that I hesitated for a long time whether, instead of giving you this condensed general survey of the whole field of psycho-analysis, it might not be better to present you with a detailed account of dream-interpretation.[1] I was held back by a purely subjective and seemingly secondary motive. It seemed to me almost indecent in a country which is devoted to practical aims to make my appearance as a 'dream-interpreter', before you could possibly know the importance that can attach to that antiquated and derided art. The interpretation of dreams is in fact the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious,[2] it is the securest foundation of psycho-analysis and the field in which every worker must acquire his convictions and seek his training. If I am asked how one can become a psycho-analyst, I reply: 'By studying one's own dreams.' Every opponent of psycho-analysis hitherto has, with a nice discrimination, either evaded any consideration of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, or has sought to skirt over it with the most superficial objections. If, on the contrary, you can accept the solutions of the problems of dream-life, the novelties with which psycho-analysis confronts your minds will offer you no further difficulties.

You should bear in mind that the dreams which we produce at night have, on the one hand, the greatest external similarity and internal kinship with the creations of insanity, and are, on the other hand, compatible with complete health in waking life. There is nothing paradoxical in the assertion that no one who regards these 'normal' illusions, delusions and character-changes

[1] *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900*a*).

[2] [This phrase was introduced in almost identical words into the second (1909) edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (*Standard Ed.*, **5**, 608).]

with astonishment instead of comprehension has the slightest prospect of understanding the abnormal structures of pathological mental states otherwise than as a layman. You may comfortably count almost all psychiatrists among such laymen.

I invite you now to follow me on a brief excursion through the region of dream problems. When we are awake we are in the habit of treating dreams with the same contempt with which patients regard the associations that are demanded of them by the psycho-analyst. We dismiss them, too, by forgetting them as a rule, quickly and completely. Our low opinion of them is based on the strange character even of those dreams that are not confused and meaningless, and on the obvious absurdity and nonsensicalness of other dreams. Our dismissal of them is related to the unmitigated shamelessness and immorality of the tendencies openly exhibited in some dreams. It is well known that the ancient world did not share this low opinion of dreams. Nor are the lower strata of our own society to-day in any doubt about the value of dreams, like the peoples of antiquity, they expect them to reveal the future. I confess that I feel no necessity for making any mystical assumptions in order to fill the gaps in our present knowledge, and accordingly I have never been able to find anything to confirm the prophetic nature of dreams. There are plenty of other things—sufficiently wonderful too—to be said about them.

In the first place, not all dreams are alien to the dreamer, incomprehensible and confused. If you inspect the dreams of very young children, from eighteen months upwards, you will find them perfectly simple and easy to explain. Small children always dream of the fulfilment of wishes that were aroused in them the day before but not satisfied. You will need no interpretative art in order to find this simple solution; all you need do is to enquire into the child's experiences on the previous day—the 'dream-day'. Certainly the most satisfactory solution of the riddle of dreams would be to find that adults' dreams too were like those of children—fulfilments of wishful impulses that had come to them on the dream-day. And such in fact is the case. The difficulties in the way of this solution can be overcome step by step if dreams are analysed more closely.

The first and most serious objection is that the content of adults' dreams is as a rule unintelligible and could not look more

unlike the fulfilment of a wish. And here is the answer. Such dreams have been subjected to distortion, the psychical process underlying them might originally have been expressed in words quite differently. You must distinguish the *manifest content of the dream*, as you vaguely recollect it in the morning and laboriously (and, as it seems, arbitrarily) clothe it in words, and the *latent dream-thoughts*, which you must suppose were present in the unconscious. This distortion in dreams is the same process that you have already come to know in investigating the formation of hysterical symptoms. It indicates, too, that the same interplay of mental forces is at work in the formation of dreams as in that of symptoms. The manifest content of the dream is the distorted substitute for the unconscious dream-thoughts and this distortion is the work of the ego's forces of defence—of resistances. In waking life these resistances altogether prevent the repressed wishes of the unconscious from entering consciousness; and during the lowered state of sleep they are at least strong enough to oblige them to adopt a veil of disguise. Thereafter, the dreamer can no more understand the meaning of his dreams than the hysteric can understand the connection and significance of his symptoms.

You can convince yourself that there are such things as latent dream-thoughts and that the relation between them and the manifest content of the dream is really as I have described it, if you carry out an analysis of dreams, the technique of which is the same as that of psycho-analysis. You entirely disregard the apparent connections between the elements in the manifest dream and collect the ideas that occur to you in connection with each separate element of the dream by free association according to the psycho-analytic rule of procedure. From this material you arrive at the latent dream-thoughts, just as you arrived at the patient's hidden complexes from his associations to his symptoms and memories. The latent dream-thoughts which have been reached in this way will at once show you how completely justified we have been in tracing back adults' dreams to children's dreams. The true meaning of the dream, which has now taken the place of its manifest content, is always clearly intelligible; it has its starting-point in experiences of the previous day, and proves to be a fulfilment of unsatisfied wishes. The manifest dream, which you know from your memory when

you wake up, can therefore only be described as a *disguised* fulfilment of *repressed* wishes.

You can also obtain a view, by a kind of synthetic work, of the process which has brought about the distortion of the unconscious dream-thoughts into the manifest content of the dream. We call this process the 'dream-work'. It deserves our closest theoretical interest, since we are able to study in it, as nowhere else, what unsuspected psychical processes can occur in the unconscious, or rather, to put it more accurately, *between* two separate psychical systems like the conscious and unconscious. Among these freshly discovered psychical processes those of *condensation* and *displacement* are especially remarkable. The dream-work is a special case of the effects produced by two different mental groupings on each other—that is, of the consequences of mental splitting—and it seems identical in all essentials with the process of distortion which transforms the repressed complexes into symptoms where there is unsuccessful repression.

You will also learn with astonishment from the analysis of dreams—and most conveniently from that of your own—what an unsuspectedly great part is played in human development by impressions and experiences of early childhood. In dream-life the child that is in man pursues its existence, as it were, and retains all its characteristics and wishful impulses, even such as have become unserviceable in later life. There will be brought home to you with irresistible force the many developments, repressions, sublimations and reaction-formations, by means of which a child with a quite other innate endowment grows into what we call a normal man, the bearer, and in part the victim, of the civilization that has been so painfully acquired.

I should like you to notice, too, that the analysis of dreams has shown us that the unconscious makes use of a particular symbolism, especially for representing sexual complexes. This symbolism varies partly from individual to individual, but partly it is laid down in a typical form and seems to coincide with the symbolism which, as we suspect, underlies our myths and fairy tales. It seems not impossible that these creations of the popular mind might find an explanation through the help of dreams.

Lastly, I must warn you not to let yourselves be put out by the objection that the occurrence of anxiety-dreams contradicts our view of dreams as the fulfilments of wishes. Apart from the

fact that these anxiety-dreams, like the rest, require interpretation before any judgement can be formed on them, it must be stated quite generally that the anxiety does not depend on the content of the dream in such a simple manner as one might imagine without having more knowledge and taking more account of the determinants of neurotic anxiety. Anxiety is one of the ego's reactions in repudiation of repressed wishes that have become powerful, and its occurrence in dreams as well is very easily explicable when the formation of the dream has been carried out with too much of an eye to the fulfilment of these repressed wishes.

As you see, research in to dreams would be justified for its own sake merely by the information it gives us on matters that can with difficulty be discovered in other ways. But we were in fact led to the subject in connection with the psycho-analytic treatment of neurotics. You will easily understand from what I have already said how it is that dream-interpretation, if it is not made too difficult by the patient's resistances, leads to a knowledge of his hidden and repressed wishes and of the complexes nourished by them, and I can now pass on to the third group of mental phenomena whose study has become one of the technical instruments of psycho-analysis.

The phenomena in question are the small faulty actions performed by both normal and neurotic people, to which as a rule no importance is attached: forgetting things that might be known and sometimes in fact *are* known (e.g. the occasional difficulty in recalling proper names), slips of the tongue in talking, by which we ourselves are so often affected, analogous slips of the pen and misreadings, bungling the performance of actions, losing objects or breaking them. All of these are things for which as a rule no psychological determinants are sought and which are allowed to pass without criticism as consequences of distraction or inattention or similar causes. Besides these there are the actions and gestures which people carry out without noticing them at all, to say nothing of attributing any psychological importance to them: playing about and fiddling with things, humming tunes, fingering parts of one's own body or one's clothing and so on.[1] These small things, faulty actions and symptomatic or haphazard actions alike, are not so insignificant as people, by a sort of conspiracy of silence, are ready to

[1] Cf. *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901*b*).

suppose. They always have a meaning, which can usually be interpreted with ease and certainty from the situation in which they occur. And it turns out that once again they give expression to impulses and intentions which have to be kept back and hidden from one's own consciousness, or that they are actually derived from the same repressed wishful impulses and complexes which we have already come to know as the creators of symptoms and the constructors of dreams. They therefore deserve to be rated as symptoms, and if they are examined they may lead, just as dreams do, to the uncovering of the hidden part of the mind. A man's most intimate secrets are as a rule betrayed by their help. If they occur particularly easily and frequently even in healthy people in whom the repression of unconscious impulses has on the whole been quite successful, they have their triviality and inconspicuousness to thank for it. But they can claim a high theoretical value, since they prove that repression and the formation of substitutes occur even under healthy conditions.

As you already see, psycho-analysts are marked by a particularly strict belief in the determination of mental life. For them there is nothing trivial, nothing arbitrary or haphazard. They expect in every case to find sufficient motives where, as a rule, no such expectation is raised. Indeed, they are prepared to find *several* motives for one and the same mental occurrence, whereas what seems to be our innate craving for causality declares itself satisfied with a *single* psychical cause.

If you will now bring together the means we possess for uncovering what is concealed, forgotten and repressed in the mind—the study of the ideas occurring to patients under free association, of their dreams and of their faulty and symptomatic actions—, and if you will add to these the exploitation of certain other phenomena which occur during psycho-analytic treatment and on which I shall have a few remarks to make later under the heading of 'transference'—if you bear all these in mind, you will agree with me in concluding that our technique is already efficient enough to fulfil its task, to bring the pathogenic psychical material into consciousness and so to get rid of the ailments that have been brought about by the formation of substitutive symptoms. And if, in the course of our therapeutic

endeavours, we extend and deepen our knowledge of the human mind both in health and sickness, that can, of course, only be regarded as a peculiar attraction in our work.

You may have formed an impression that the technique through whose armoury I have just conducted you is particularly difficult. In my opinion that technique is entirely in conformity with the material with which it has to deal. But thus much at least is clear: it is not a self-evident one and it must be learnt just as the techniques of histology or surgery must be learnt. You will perhaps be surprised to hear that in Europe we have heard a large number of judgements on psychoanalysis from people who know nothing of this technique and do not employ it; and who go on to demand with apparent scorn that we shall prove to them the correctness of our findings. Among these adversaries there are no doubt some to whom a scientific mode of thought is not as a rule alien, who, for instance, would not reject the results of a microscopic examination because it could not be confirmed on the anatomical preparation with the naked eye, but who would first form a judgement on the matter themselves with the help of a microscope. But, where psycho-analysis is concerned, the prospects of recognition are in truth less favourable. Psycho-analysis is seeking to bring to conscious recognition the things in mental life which are repressed; and everyone who forms a judgement on it is himself a human being, who possesses similar repressions and may perhaps be maintaining them with difficulty. They are therefore bound to call up the same resistance in him as in our patients; and that resistance finds it easy to disguise itself as an intellectual rejection and to bring up arguments like those which we ward off in our patients by means of the fundamental rule of psycho-analysis. We often become aware in our opponents, just as we do in our patients, that their power of judgement is very noticeably influenced affectively in the sense of being diminished. The arrogance of consciousness in rejecting dreams with such contempt, for instance, is one of the most powerful of the devices with which we are provided as a universal protection against the incursion of unconscious complexes. That is why it is so hard to convince people of the reality of the unconscious and to teach them to recognize something new which is in contradiction to their conscious knowledge.

FOURTH LECTURE

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, You will want to know now what we have found out about the pathogenic complexes and repressed wishful impulses of neurotics with the help of the technical methods I have described.

First and foremost we have found out one thing. Psychoanalytic research traces back the symptoms of patients' illnesses with really surprising regularity to impressions from their *erotic life*. It shows us that the pathogenic wishful impulses are in the nature of erotic instinctual components; and it forces us to suppose that among the influences leading to the illness the predominant significance must be assigned to erotic disturbances, and that this is the case in both sexes.

I am aware that this assertion of mine will not be willingly believed. Even workers who are ready to follow my psychological studies are inclined to think that I over-estimate the part played by sexual factors; they meet me with the question why *other* mental excitations should not lead to the phenomena I have described of repression and the formation of substitutes. I can only answer that I do not know why they should not, and that I should have no objection to their doing so, but experience shows that they do not carry this weight, that at most they *support* the operation of the sexual factors but cannot replace them. Far from this position having been postulated by me theoretically, at the time of the joint publication of the *Studies* with Dr. Breuer in 1895 I had not yet adopted it; and I was only converted to it when my experiences became more numerous and penetrated into the subject more deeply. There are among my present audience a few of my closest friends and followers, who have travelled with me here to Worcester. Enquire from them, and you will hear that they all began by completely disbelieving my assertion that sexual aetiology was of decisive importance, until their own analytic experiences compelled them to accept it.

A conviction of the correctness of this thesis was not precisely made easier by the behaviour of patients Instead of willingly presenting us with information about their sexual life, they try

to conceal it by every means in their power. People are in general not candid over sexual matters. They do not show their sexuality freely, but to conceal it they wear a heavy overcoat woven of a tissue of lies, as though the weather were bad in the world of sexuality. Nor are they mistaken. It is a fact that sun and wind are not favourable to sexual activity in this civilized world of ours; none of us can reveal his erotism freely to others. But when your patients discover that they can feel quite easy about it while they are under your treatment, they discard this veil of lies, and only then are you in a position to form a judgement on this debatable question. Unluckily even doctors are not preferred above other human creatures in their personal relation to questions of sexual life, and many of them are under the spell of the combination of pudery and prurience which governs the attitude of most 'civilized people' in matters of sexuality.

Let me now proceed with my account of our findings. In another set of cases psycho-analytic investigation traces the symptoms back, it is true, not to sexual experiences but to commonplace traumatic ones. But this distinction loses its significance owing to another circumstance. For the work of analysis required for the thorough explanation and complete recovery of a case never comes to a stop at events that occurred at the time of the onset of the illness, but invariably goes back to the patient's puberty and early childhood, and it is only there that it comes upon the impressions and events which determined the later onset of the illness It is only experiences in childhood that explain susceptibility to later traumas and it is only by uncovering these almost invariably forgotten memory-traces and by making them conscious that we acquire the power to get rid of the symptoms And here we reach the same conclusion as in our investigation of dreams the imperishable, repressed wishful impulses of childhood have alone provided the power for the construction of symptoms, and without them the reaction to later traumas would have taken a normal course. But these powerful wishful impulses of childhood may without exception be described as sexual.

And now at last I am quite certain that I have surprised you. 'Is there such a thing, then, as infantile sexuality?' you will ask.

'Is not childhood on the contrary the period of life that is marked by the absence of the sexual instinct?' No, Gentlemen, it is certainly not the case that the sexual instinct enters into children at the age of puberty in the way in which, in the Gospel, the devil entered into the swine. A child has its sexual instincts and activities from the first; it comes into the world with them; and, after an important course of development passing through many stages, they lead to what is known as the normal sexuality of the adult. There is even no difficulty in observing the manifestations of these sexual activities in children, on the contrary, it calls for some skill to overlook them or explain them away.

By a lucky chance I am in a position to call a witness in favour of my assertions from your very midst. I have here in my hand a paper written by a Dr. Sanford Bell, which was published in *The American Journal of Psychology* in 1902. The author is a Fellow of Clark University, of the very institution in whose lecture-room we are now assembled. In this work, which is entitled 'A Preliminary Study of the Emotion of Love between the Sexes', and which appeared three years before my *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* [1905*d*], the author says exactly what I have just told you. 'The emotion of sex-love . . . does not make its appearance for the first time at the period of adolescence, as has been thought.' He carried out his work in what we in Europe would call 'the American manner', collecting no fewer than 2,500 positive observations in the course of fifteen years, among them 600 of his own. Concerning the signs by which these instances of falling in love are revealed he writes as follows: 'The unprejudiced mind in observing these manifestations in hundreds of couples of children cannot escape referring them to sex origin. The most exacting mind is satisfied when to these observations are added the confessions of those who have, as children, experienced the emotion to a marked degree of intensity and whose memories of childhood are relatively distinct.' But those of you who do not wish to believe in infantile sexuality will be most of all surprised to hear that not a few of these children who have fallen in love so early are of the tender age of three, four and five.

It would not astonish me if you were to attach more credence to these observations made by one of your closest neighbours

than to mine. I myself have recently been fortunate enough to obtain a fairly complete picture of the somatic instinctual manifestations and mental products at an early stage of a child's erotic life from the analysis of a five-year-old boy, suffering from anxiety – an analysis carried out with a correct technique by his own father.[1] And I may remind you that only a few hours ago, in this same room, my friend Dr. C. G. Jung reported an observation to you made on a still younger girl who, with a precipitating cause similar to my patient's the birth of a younger child in the family,, made it possible to infer with certainty the presence of almost the same sensual impulses, wishes and complexes. [Cf. Jung, 1910.] I do not despair, therefore, of your becoming reconciled to what seems at first sight the strange idea of infantile sexuality. And I should like to quote to you the praiseworthy example of the Zurich psychiatrist, Dr E. Bleuler, who declared publicly not many years ago that he was 'unable to comprehend my theories of sexuality', and who has since then confirmed the existence of infantile sexuality to its full extent from his own observations. (Cf. Bleuler, 1908.)

It is only too easy to explain why most people whether medical observers or others will hear nothing of the sexual life of children. They have forgotten their own infantile sexual activity under the pressure of their education to a civilized life, and they do not wish to be reminded of what has been repressed. They would arrive at other convictions if they were to begin their enquiry with a self-analysis, a revision and interpretation of their childhood memories.

Put away your doubts, then, and join me in a consideration of infantile sexuality from the earliest age.[2] A child's sexual instinct turns out to be put together out of a number of factors; it is capable of being divided up into numerous components which originate from various sources Above all, it is still independent of the reproductive function, into the service of which it will later be brought It serves for the acquisition of different kinds of pleasurable feeling, which, basing ourselves on analogies and connections, we bring together under the idea of sexual pleasure The chief source of infantile sexual pleasure is the

[1] 'The Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy' [Freud, 1909*b*].

[2] Cf. *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* [1905*d*].

appropriate excitation of certain parts of the body that are especially susceptible to stimulus: apart from the genitals, these are the oral, anal and urethral orifices, as well as the skin and other sensory surfaces. Since at this first phase of infantile sexual life satisfaction is obtained from the subject's own body and extraneous objects are disregarded, we term this phase (from a word coined by Havelock Ellis) that of *auto-erotism*. We call the parts of the body that are important in the acquisition of sexual pleasure 'erotogenic zones'. Thumb-sucking (or sensual sucking), in the youngest infants is a good example of this auto-erotic satisfaction from an erotogenic zone. The first scientific observer of this phenomenon, a paediatrician in Budapest named Lindner (1879), already interpreted it correctly as sexual satisfaction and described exhaustively its transition to other and higher forms of sexual activity. Another sexual satisfaction at this period of life is the masturbatory excitation of the genitals, which retains so much importance in later life and by many people is never completely conquered. Alongside these and other auto-erotic activities, we find in children at a very early age manifestations of those instinctual components of sexual pleasure (or, as we like to say, of libido) which presuppose the taking of an extraneous person as an object. These instincts occur in pairs of opposites, active and passive. I may mention as the most important representatives of this group the desire to cause pain (sadism) with its passive counterpart (masochism) and the active and passive desire for looking, from the former of which curiosity branches off later on and from the latter the impulsion to artistic and theatrical display. Others of a child's sexual activities already imply the making of an 'object-choice', where an extraneous person becomes the main feature, a person who owes his importance in the first instance to considerations arising from the self-preservative instinct. But at this early period of childhood difference in sex plays no decisive part as yet. Thus you can attribute some degree of homosexuality to every child without doing him an injustice. This widespread and copious but dissociated sexual life of children, in which each separate instinct pursues its own acquisition of pleasure independently of all the rest, is now brought together and organized in two main directions, so that by the end of puberty the individual's final sexual character is as a rule com-

pletely formed. On the one hand, the separate instincts become subordinated to the dominance of the genital zone, so that the whole sexual life enters the service of reproduction, and the satisfaction of the separate instincts retains its importance only as preparing for and encouraging the sexual act proper. On the other hand, object-choice pushes auto-erotism into the background, so that in the subject's erotic life all the components of the sexual instinct now seek satisfaction in relation to the person who is loved. Not all of the original sexual components, however, are admitted to take part in this final establishment of sexuality. Even before puberty extremely energetic repressions of certain instincts have been effected under the influence of education, and mental forces such as shame, disgust and morality have been set up, which, like watchmen, maintain these repressions. So that when at puberty the high tide of sexual demands is reached, it is met by these mental reactive or resistant structures like dams, which direct its flow into what are called normal channels and make it impossible for it to reactivate the instincts that have undergone repression. It is in particular the coprophilic impulses of childhood—that is to say, the desires attaching to the excreta—which are submitted the most rigorously to repression, and the same is true, furthermore, of fixation to the figures to which the child's original object-choice was attached.

There is a dictum in general pathology, Gentlemen, which asserts that every developmental process carries with it the seed of a pathological disposition, in so far as that process may be inhibited, delayed, or may run its course incompletely. The same thing is true of the highly complicated development of the sexual function. It does not occur smoothly in every individual; and, if not, it leaves behind it either abnormalities or a predisposition to fall ill later, along the path of involution (i.e. regression). It may happen that not all the component instincts submit to the dominance of the genital zone. An instinct which remains in this way independent leads to what we describe as a *perversion*, and may substitute its own sexual aim for the normal one. It very often happens, as I have already said, that auto-erotism is not completely conquered, and evidence of this is given by a great variety of subsequent disturbances. The originally

equal value attached to the two sexes as sexual objects may persist, and this will lead to a tendency in adult life to homosexual activity, which can in certain circumstances be intensified into exclusive homosexuality. These classes of disturbance represent direct inhibitions in the development of the sexual function; they comprise the perversions and, what is by no means rare, general infantilism in sexual life.

The predisposition to *neurosis* is traceable to impaired sexual development in a different way. Neuroses are related to perversions as negative to positive. The same instinctual components as in the perversions can be observed in the neuroses as vehicles of complexes and constructors of symptoms, but in the latter case they operate from the unconscious. Thus they have undergone repression, but have been able, in defiance of it, to persist in the unconscious. Psycho-analysis makes it clear that an excessively strong manifestation of these instincts at a very early age leads to a kind of partial *fixation*, which then constitutes a weak point in the structure of the sexual function. If in maturity the performance of the normal sexual function comes up against obstacles, the repression that took place during the course of development will be broken through at the precise points at which the infantile fixations occurred.

But here you will perhaps protest that all this is not sexuality. I have been using the word in a far wider sense than that in which you have been accustomed to understand it. So much I am quite ready to grant you. But the question arises whether it is not rather you who have been using the word in far too narrow a sense by restricting it to the sphere of reproduction. It means that you are sacrificing an understanding of the perversions and the connection between the perversions, the neuroses and normal sexual life, and you are making it impossible for you to recognize in its true significance the easily observable beginnings of the somatic and mental erotic life of children. But however you may choose to decide the verbal usage, you should bear firmly in mind that psycho-analysts understand sexuality in the full sense to which one is led by a consideration of infantile sexuality.

Let us return to the sexual development of children. We have some arrears to make up owing to our having paid more atten-

tion to the somatic than to the mental phenomena of sexual life. The child's first choice of an object, which derives from its need for help, claims our further interest. Its choice is directed in the first instance to all those who look after it, but these soon give place to its parents. Children's relations to their parents, as we learn alike from direct observations of children and from later analytic examination of adults, are by no means free from elements of accompanying sexual excitation. The child takes both of its parents, and more particularly one of them, as the object of its erotic wishes. In so doing, it usually follows some indication from its parents, whose affection bears the clearest characteristics of a sexual activity, even though of one that is inhibited in its aims. As a rule a father prefers his daughter and a mother her son, the child reacts to this by wishing, if he is a son, to take his father's place, and, if she is a daughter, her mother's. The feelings which are aroused in these relations between parents and children and in the resulting ones between brothers and sisters are not only of a positive or affectionate kind but also of a negative or hostile one. The complex which is thus formed is doomed to early repression, but it continues to exercise a great and lasting influence from the unconscious. It is to be suspected that, together with its extensions, it constitutes the *nuclear complex* of every neurosis, and we may expect to find it no less actively at work in other regions of mental life. The myth of King Oedipus, who killed his father and took his mother to wife, reveals, with little modification, the infantile wish, which is later opposed and repudiated by the *barrier against incest*. Shakespeare's *Hamlet* is equally rooted in the soil of the incest-complex, but under a better disguise.[1]

During the time when the child is dominated by the still unrepressed nuclear complex, an important part of his intellectual activity is brought into the service of his sexual interests. He begins to enquire where babies come from, and, on the basis of the evidence presented to him, guesses more of the true facts than the grown-ups imagine. His interest in these researches is usually set going by the very real threat offered to him by the arrival of a new baby, which to begin with he regards merely as

[1] [I recall adopted the term 'Oedipus complex' for the first time shortly after these lectures were delivered, in the first of his 'Contributions to the Psychology of Love' (1910*h*). See below, p. 171.]

a competitor. Under the influence of the component instincts that are active in himself, he arrives at a number of 'infantile sexual theories'—such as attributing a male genital organ to both sexes alike, or supposing that babies are conceived by eating and born through the end of the bowel, or regarding sexual intercourse as a hostile act, a kind of violent subjugation. But as a result precisely of the incompleteness of his sexual constitution, and of the gap in his knowledge due to the hidden nature of the female sexual channel, the young investigator is obliged to abandon his work as a failure. The fact of this childish research itself, as well as the different infantile sexual theories that it brings to light, remain of importance in determining the formation of the child's character and the content of any later neurotic illness.

It is inevitable and perfectly normal that a child should take his parents as the first objects of his love. But his libido should not remain fixated to these first objects, later on, it should merely take them as a model, and should make a gradual transition from them on to extraneous people when the time for the final choice of an object arrives. The detachment of the child from his parents is thus a task that cannot be evaded if the young individual's sexual fitness is not to be endangered. During the time at which repression is making its selection among the component instincts, and later, when there should be a slackening of the parents' influence, which is essentially responsible for the expenditure of energy on these repressions, the task of education meets with great problems, which at the present time are certainly not always dealt with in an understanding and unobjectionable manner.

You must not suppose, Ladies and Gentlemen, that these discussions on sexual life and the psychosexual development of children have led us too far from psycho-analysis and the problem of curing nervous disorders. You can, if you like, regard psychoanalytic treatment as no more than a prolongation of education for the purpose of overcoming the residues of childhood.

FIFTH LECTURE

Ladies and Gentlemen, With the discovery of infantile sexuality and the tracing back of neurotic symptoms to erotic instinctual components we have arrived at some unexpected formulas concerning the nature and purposes of neurotic illnesses. We see that human beings fall ill when, as a result of external obstacles or of an internal lack of adaptation, the satisfaction of their erotic needs *in reality* is frustrated. We see that they then take flight into *illness* in order that by its help they may find a satisfaction to take the place of what has been frustrated. We recognize that the pathological symptoms constitute a portion of the subject's sexual activity or even the whole of his sexual life, and we find that the withdrawal from reality is the main purpose of the illness but also the main damage caused by it. We suspect that our patients' resistance to recovery is no simple one, but compounded of several motives. Not only does the patient's ego rebel against giving up the repressions by means of which it has risen above its original disposition, but the sexual instincts are unwilling to renounce their substitutive satisfaction so long as it is uncertain whether reality will offer them anything better.

The flight from unsatisfactory reality into what, on account of the biological damage involved, we call illness, though it is never without an immediate wealth of pleasure to the patient, takes place along the path of *regression*, of a return to earlier phases of sexual life, phases from which at one time satisfaction was not withheld. This regression appears to be a twofold one: a *temporal* one, in so far as the libido, the erotic needs, hark back to stages of development that are earlier in time, and a *formal* one, in that the original and primitive methods of psychical expression are employed in translating those needs. Both these kinds of regression, however, lead back to childhood and unite in bringing about an infantile condition of sexual life.

The deeper you penetrate into the pathogenesis of nervous illness, the more you will find revealed the connection between the neuroses and other productions of the human mind, including the most valuable. You will be taught that we humans, with

the high standards of our civilization and under the pressure of our internal repressions, find reality unsatisfying quite generally, and for that reason entertain a life of phantasy in which we like to make up for the insufficiences of reality by the production of wish-fulfilments. These phantasies include a great deal of the true constitutional essence of the subject's personality as well as of those of his impulses which are repressed where reality is concerned. The energetic and successful man is one who succeeds by his efforts in turning his wishful phantasies into reality. Where this fails, as a result of the resistances of the external world and of the subject's own weakness, he begins to turn away from reality and withdraws into his more satisfying world of phantasy, the content of which is transformed into symptoms should he fall ill. In certain favourable circumstances, it still remains possible for him to find another path leading from these phantasies to reality, instead of becoming permanently estranged from it by regressing to infancy. If a person who is at loggerheads with reality possesses an *artistic gift*—a thing that is still a psychological mystery to us—, he can transform his phantasies into artistic creations instead of into symptoms. In this manner he can escape the doom of neurosis and by this roundabout path regain his contact with reality. (Cf. Rank, 1907.) If there is persistent rebellion against the real world and if this precious gift is absent or insufficient, it is almost inevitable that the libido, keeping to the sources of the phantasies, will follow the path of regression, and will revive infantile wishes and end in neurosis. To-day neurosis takes the place of the monasteries which used to be the refuge of all whom life had disappointed or who felt too weak to face it.

Let me at this point state the principal finding to which we have been led by the psycho-analytic investigation of neurotics. The neuroses have no psychical content that is peculiar to them and that might not equally be found in healthy people. Or, as Jung has expressed it, neurotics fall ill of the same complexes against which we healthy people struggle as well. Whether that struggle ends in health, in neurosis, or in a counterbalancing superiority of achievement, depends on *quantitative* considerations, on the relative strength of the conflicting forces.

I have not yet told you, Ladies and Gentlemen, of the most

important of the observations which confirm our hypotheses of the sexual instinctual forces operating in neuroses. In every psycho-analytic treatment of a neurotic patient the strange phenomenon that is known as 'transference' makes its appearance. The patient, that is to say, directs towards the physician a degree of affectionate feeling, mingled, often enough, with hostility, which is based on no real relation between them and which—as is shewn by every detail of its emergence—can only be traced back to old wishful phantasies of the patient's which have become unconscious. Thus the part of the patient's emotional life which he can no longer recall to memory is re-experienced by him in his relation to the physician; and it is only this re-experiencing in the 'transference' that convinces him of the existence and of the power of these unconscious sexual impulses. His symptoms, to take an analogy from chemistry, are precipitates of earlier experiences in the sphere of love (in the widest sense of the word), and it is only in the raised temperature of his experience of the transference that they can be resolved and reduced to other psychical products. In this reaction the physician, if I may borrow an apt phrase from Ferenczi (1909), plays the part of a catalytic ferment, which temporarily attracts to itself the affects liberated in the process. A study of transference, too, can give you the key to an understanding of hypnotic suggestion, which we employed to begin with as a technical method for investigating the unconscious in our patients. At that time hypnosis was found to be a help therapeutically, but a hindrance to the scientific understanding of the facts, for it cleared away the psychical resistances in a certain area while building them up into an unscalable wall at its frontiers. You must not suppose, moreover, that the phenomenon of transference—of which, unfortunately, I can tell you all too little to-day—is *created* by psycho-analytic influence. Transference arises spontaneously in all human relationships just as it does between the patient and the physician. It is everywhere the true vehicle of therapeutic influence, and the less its presence is suspected, the more powerfully it operates. So psycho-analysis does not create it, but merely reveals it to consciousness and gains control of it in order to guide psychical processes towards the desired goal. I cannot, however, leave the topic of transference without stressing the fact that this

phenomenon plays a decisive part in bringing conviction not only to the patient but also to the physician. I know it to be true of all my followers that they were only convinced of the correctness of my assertions on the pathogenesis of the neuroses by their experiences with transference, and I can very well understand that such certainty of judgment cannot be attained before one has carried out psycho-analyses and has oneself observed the workings of transference.

Ladies and Gentlemen, from the intellectual point of view we must, I think, take into account two special obstacles to recognizing psycho-analytic trains of thought. In the first place, people are unaccustomed to reckoning with a strict and universal application of determinism to mental life, and in the second place, they are ignorant of the peculiarities which distinguish unconscious mental processes from the conscious ones that are familiar to us. One of the most widespread resistances to psycho-analytic work, in the sick and healthy alike, can be traced to the second of these two factors. People are afraid of doing harm by psycho-analysis, they are afraid of bringing the repressed sexual instincts into the patient's consciousness, as though that involved a danger of their overwhelming his higher ethical trends and of their robbing him of his cultural acquisitions.[1] People notice that the patient has sore spots in his mind, but shrink from touching them for fear of increasing his sufferings. We can accept this analogy. It is no doubt kinder not to touch diseased spots if it can do nothing else but cause pain. But, as we know, a surgeon does not refrain from examining and handling a focus of disease, if he is intending to take active measures which he believes will lead to a permanent cure. No one thinks of blaming him for the inevitable suffering caused by the examination or for the reactions to the operation, if only it gains its end and the patient achieves a lasting recovery as a result of the temporary worsening of his state. The case is similar with psycho-analysis. It may make the same claims as surgery: the increase in suffering which it causes the patient during treatment is incomparably less than what a surgeon causes, and is quite negligible in proportion to the severity of

[1] [The last nine words are omitted, probably by an oversight, in the *Gesammelte Schriften* (1924) and *Gesammelte Werke* (1942).]

the underlying ailment. On the other hand, the final outcome that is so much dreaded – the destruction of the patient's cultural character by the instincts which have been set free from repression – is totally impossible. For alarm on this score takes no account of what our experiences have taught us with certainty – namely that the mental and somatic power of a wishful impulse, when once its repression has failed, is far stronger if it is unconscious than if it is conscious; so that to make it conscious can only be to weaken it. An unconscious wish cannot be influenced and it is independent of any contrary tendencies, whereas a conscious one is inhibited by whatever else is conscious and opposed to it. Thus the work of psycho-analysis puts itself at the orders of precisely the highest and most valuable cultural trends, as a better substitute for the unsuccessful repression.

What, then, becomes of the unconscious wishes which have been set free by psycho-analysis? Along what paths do we succeed in making them harmless to the subject's life? There are several such paths. The most frequent outcome is that, while the work is actually going on, these wishes are destroyed by the rational mental activity of the better impulses that are opposed to them. *Repression* is replaced by a *condemning judgement* carried out along the best lines. That is possible because what we have to get rid of is to a great extent only the consequences arising from earlier stages of the ego's development. The subject only succeeded in the past in repressing the unserviceable instinct because he himself was at that time still imperfectly organized and feeble. In his present-day maturity and strength, he will perhaps be able to master what is hostile to him with complete success.

A second outcome of the work of psycho-analysis is that it then becomes possible for the unconscious instincts revealed by it to be employed for the useful purposes which they would have found earlier if development had not been interrupted. For the extirpation of the infantile wishful impulses is by no means the ideal aim of development. Owing to their repressions, neurotics have sacrificed many sources of mental energy whose contributions would have been of great value in the formation of their character and in their activity in life. We know of a far more expedient process of development, called '*sublimation*', in which

the energy of the infantile wishful impulses is not cut off but remains ready for use—the unserviceable aim of the various impulses being replaced by one that is higher, and perhaps no longer sexual. It happens to be precisely the components of the *sexual* instinct that are specially marked by a capacity of this kind for sublimation, for exchanging their sexual aim for another one which is comparatively remote and socially valuable. It is probable that we owe our highest cultural successes to the contributions of energy made in this way to our mental functions. Premature repression makes the sublimation of the repressed instinct impossible, while the repression is lifted, the path to sublimation becomes free once more.

We must not omit to consider the third of the possible outcomes of the work of psycho-analysis. A certain portion of the repressed libidinal impulses has a claim to direct satisfaction and ought to find it in life. Our civilized standards make life too difficult for the majority of human organizations. These standards consequently encourage the retreat from reality and the generating of neuroses, without achieving any surplus of cultural gain by this excess of sexual repression. We ought not to exalt ourselves so high as completely to neglect what was originally animal in our nature. Nor should we forget that the satisfaction of the individual's happiness cannot be erased from among the aims of our civilization. The plasticity of the components of sexuality, shown by their capacity for sublimation, may indeed offer a great temptation to strive for still greater cultural achievements by still further sublimation. But, just as we do not count on our machines converting more than a certain fraction of the heat consumed into useful mechanical work, we ought not to seek to alienate the whole amount of the energy of the sexual instinct from its proper ends. We cannot succeed in doing so, and if the restriction upon sexuality were to be carried too far it would inevitably bring with it all the evils of soil-exhaustion.

It may be that you for your part will regard the warning with which I close as an exaggeration. I shall only venture on an indirect picture of my conviction by telling you an old story and leaving you to make what use you like of it. German literature is familiar with a little town called Schilda, to whose inhabitants clever tricks of every possible sort are attributed.

The citizens of Schilda, so we are told, possessed a horse with whose feats of strength they were highly pleased and against which they had only one objection—that it consumed such a large quantity of expensive oats. They determined to break it of this bad habit very gently by reducing its ration by a few stalks every day, till they had accustomed it to complete abstinence. For a time things went excellently: the horse was weaned to the point of eating only one stalk a day, and on the succeeding day it was at length to work without any oats at all. On the morning of that day the spiteful animal was found dead, and the citizens of Schilda could not make out what it had died of.

We should be inclined to think that the horse was starved and that no work at all could be expected of an animal without a certain modicum of oats.

I must thank you for your invitation and for the attention with which you have listened to me.

APPENDIX

List of Expository Works by Freud

1904*a*	'Freud's Psycho-Analytic Procedure'
1905*a*	'On Psychotherapy'
1906*a*	'My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses'
1910*a*[1909]	*Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*
1913*j*	'The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest'
1913*m*[1911]	'On Psycho-Analysis' (Australasian Medical Congress)
1914*d*	'On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement'
1916-17	*Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*
1923*a*[1922]	Two Encyclopaedia Articles (Marcuse's *Handwörterbuch*)
1924*f*	'A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis' (*These Eventful Years*)
1925*d*	*An Autobiographical Study* and Postscript (1935*a*)
1926*e*	*The Question of Lay Analysis*
1926*f*	'Psycho-Analysis' (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*)
1933*a*[1932]	*New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*
1940*a*[1938]	*An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*
1940*b*[1938]	'Some Elementary Lessons in Psycho-Analysis'

LEONARDO DA VINCI AND A MEMORY OF HIS CHILDHOOD

(1910)

EDITOR'S NOTE

EINE KINDHEITSERINNERUNG DES LEONARDO DA VINCI

(*a*) GERMAN EDITIONS:

1910 Leipzig and Vienna: Deuticke. Pp. 71. (*Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde*, Heft 7)
1919 2nd ed. Same publishers. Pp. 76.
1923 3rd ed. Same publishers. Pp. 78.
1925 *G.S.*, **9**, 371 454.
1943 *G.W.*, **8**, 128–211.

(*b*) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

Leonardo da Vinci

1916 New York. Moffat, Yard. Pp. 130. (Tr. A. A. Brill.)
1922 London: Kegan Paul. Pp. v + 130. (Same translator, with a preface by Ernest Jones.)
1932 New York: Dodd Mead. Pp. 138. (Re-issue of above.)

The present translation, with a modified title, 'Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood', is an entirely new one by Alan Tyson.

That Freud's interest in Leonardo was of long standing is shown by a sentence in a letter to Fliess of October 9, 1898 (Freud, 1950*a*, Letter 98), in which he remarked that 'perhaps the most famous left-handed individual was Leonardo, who is not known to have had any love-affairs'.[1] This interest, furthermore, was not a passing one, for we find in Freud's reply to a 'questionnaire' on his favourite books (1907*d*) that he mentions among them Merezhkovsky's study of Leonardo. But the immediate stimulus to writing the present work appears to have come in the autumn of 1909 from one of his patients who, as he

[1] A connection between bilaterality and bisexuality had been asserted by Fliess but questioned by Freud. An indirect reference to this controversy (which was one of the occasions for their estrangement) will be found on p. 136 below.

remarked in a letter to Jung on October 17, seemed to have the same constitution as Leonardo without his genius. He added that he was obtaining a book on Leonardo's youth from Italy. This was the monograph by Scognamiglio referred to on p. 82*n*. After reading this and some other books on Leonardo, he spoke on the subject to the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on December 1; but it was not until the beginning of April, 1910, that he finished writing his study. It was published at the end of May.

Freud made a number of corrections and additions in the later issues of the book. Among these may be specially mentioned the short footnote on circumcision (pp. 95–6*n*), the excerpt from Reitler (pp. 70–2*n*), and the long quotation from Pfister (pp. 115–16*n*), all of them added in 1919, and the discussion of the London cartoon (pp. 114–15*n*), added in 1923.

This work of Freud's was not the first application of the methods of clinical psycho-analysis to the lives of historical figures in the past. Experiments in this direction had already been made by others, notably by Sadger, who had published studies on Conrad Ferdinand Meyer (1908), Lenau (1909) and Kleist (1909).[1] Freud himself had never before embarked on a full-length biographical study of this kind, though he had previously made a few fragmentary analyses of writers, based on episodes in their works. Long before this, in fact on June 20, 1898, he had sent Fliess a study of one of C. F. Meyer's short stories, 'Die Richterin', which threw light on its author's early life (Freud, 1950*a*, Letter 91). But this monograph on Leonardo was not only the first but the last of Freud's large-scale excursions into the field of biography. The book seems to have been greeted with more than the usual amount of disapproval, and Freud was evidently justified in defending himself in advance with the reflections at the beginning of Chapter VI (p. 130) – reflections which have a general application even to-day to the authors and critics of biographies.

It is a strange fact, however, that until very recently none of

[1] The minutes of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society (which we are unfortunately precluded from quoting) show that at a meeting on December 11, 1907, Freud made some remarks on the subject of psycho-analytic biography. (Cf. Jones, 1955, 353.)

the critics of the present work seem to have lighted upon what is no doubt its weakest point. A prominent part is played by Leonardo's memory or phantasy of being visited in his cradle by a bird of prey. The name applied to this bird in his notebooks is '*nibio*', which (in the modern form of '*nibbio*') is the ordinary Italian word for 'kite'. Freud, however, throughout his study translates the word by the German '*Geier*', for which the English can only be 'vulture'.[1]

Freud's mistake seems to have originated from some of the German translations which he used. Thus Marie Herzfeld (1906) uses the word '*Geier*' in one of her versions of the cradle phantasy instead of '*Milan*', the normal German word for 'kite'. But probably the most important influence was the German translation of Merezhkovsky's Leonardo book which, as may be seen from the marked copy in Freud's library, was the source of a very great deal of his information about Leonardo and in which he probably came across the story for the first time. Here too the German word used in the cradle phantasy is '*Geier*', though Merezhkovsky himself correctly used '*korshun*', the Russian word for 'kite'.

In face of this mistake, some readers may feel an impulse to dismiss the whole study as worthless. It will, however, be a good plan to examine the situation more coolly and consider in detail the exact respects in which Freud's arguments and conclusions are invalidated.

In the first place the 'hidden bird' in Leonardo's picture (p. 116*n*.) must be abandoned. If it is a bird at all, it is a vulture, it bears no resemblance to a kite. This 'discovery', however, was not made by Freud but by Pfister. It was not introduced until the second edition of the work, and Freud received it with considerable reserve.

Next, and more important, comes the Egyptian connection. The hieroglyph for the Egyptian word for 'mother' '*mut*', quite certainly represents a vulture and not a kite. Gardiner in his authoritative *Egyptian Grammar* (2nd ed., 1950, 469) identifies the creature as '*Gyps fulvus*', the griffon vulture. It follows from this

[1] This was pointed out by Irma Richter in a footnote to her recently published selection from Leonardo's Notebooks (1952, 266). Like Pfister (p. 116*n*. below), she refers to Leonardo's childhood memory as a 'dream'.

that Freud's theory that the bird of Leonardo's phantasy stood for his mother cannot claim direct support from the Egyptian myth, and that the question of his acquaintance with that myth ceases to be relevant.[1] The phantasy and the myth seem to have no immediate connection with each other. Nevertheless each of them, taken independently, raises an interesting problem. How was it that the ancient Egyptians came to link up the ideas of 'vulture' and 'mother'? Does the egyptologists' explanation that it is merely a matter of a chance phonetic coincidence meet the question? If not, Freud's discussion of androgynous mother-goddesses must have a value of its own, irrespective of its connection with the case of Leonardo. So too Leonardo's phantasy of the bird visiting him in his cradle and putting its tail into his mouth continues to cry out for an explanation even if the bird was not a vulture. And Freud's psychological analysis of the phantasy is not contradicted by this correction but merely deprived of one piece of corroborative support.

Apart, then, from the consequent irrelevance of the Egyptian discussion – though this nevertheless retains much of its independent value – the main body of Freud's study is unaffected by his mistake, the detailed construction of Leonardo's emotional life from his earliest years, the account of the conflict between his artistic and his scientific impulses, the deep analysis of his psychosexual history. And, in addition to this main topic, the study presents us with a number of not less important side-themes: a more general discussion of the nature and workings of the mind of the creative artist, an outline of the genesis of one particular type of homosexuality, and – of special interest to the history of psycho-analytic theory – the first full emergence of the concept of narcissism.

[1] Nor can the story of the vulture's impregnation of vultures serve as evidence of Leonardo's having had an exclusive bond with his mother in his infancy – though the existence of that bond is not contradicted by the failure of this particular evidence.

LEONARDO DA VINCI AND A MEMORY OF HIS CHILDHOOD

I

When psychiatric research, normally content to draw on frailer men for its material, approaches one who is among the greatest of the human race, it is not doing so for the reasons so frequently ascribed to it by laymen. 'To blacken the radiant and drag the sublime into the dust' is no part of its purpose,[1] and there is no satisfaction for it in narrowing the gulf which separates the perfection of the great from the inadequacy of the objects that are its usual concern. But it cannot help finding worthy of understanding everything that can be recognized in those illustrious models, and it believes there is no one so great as to be disgraced by being subject to the laws which govern both normal and pathological activity with equal cogency.

Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) was admired even by his contemporaries as one of the greatest men of the Italian renaissance, yet in their time he had already begun to seem an enigma, just as he does to us to-day. He was a universal genius 'whose outlines can only be surmised, never defined'.[2] In his own time his most decisive influence was in painting, and it was left to us to recognize the greatness of the natural scientist (and engineer,[3] that was combined in him with the artist. Though he left behind him masterpieces of painting, while his scientific

[1] [Es liebt die Welt, das Strahlende zu schwärzen
Und das Erhabene in den Staub zu ziehn.
(The world loves to blacken the radiant and drag the sublime into the dust.)
From a poem by Schiller, 'Das Mädchen von Orleans' inserted as an extra prologue to the 1st edition of his play *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*. The poem is reported to have been an attack on Voltaire's *La Pucelle*.]

[2] The words are Jacob Burckhardt's, quoted by Konstantinowa (1907, [51]).

[3] [The words in parentheses were added in 1923.]

discoveries remained unpublished and unused, the investigator in him never in the course of his development left the artist entirely free, but often made severe encroachments on him and perhaps in the end suppressed him. In the last hour of his life, according to the words that Vasari gives him, he reproached himself with having offended God and man by his failure to do his duty in his art [1] And even if this story of Vasari's has neither external nor much internal probability but belongs to the legend which began to be woven around the mysterious Master even before his death, it is still of incontestable value as evidence of what men believed at the time.

What was it that prevented Leonardo's personality from being understood by his contemporaries? The cause of this was certainly not the versatility of his talents and the range of his knowledge, which enabled him to introduce himself to the court of the Duke of Milan, Lodovico Sforza, called Il Moro, as a performer on a kind of lute of his own invention, or allowed him to write the remarkable letter to the same duke in which he boasted of his achievements as architect and military engineer. For the days of the renaissance were quite familiar with such a combination of wide and diverse abilities in a single individual — though we must allow that Leonardo himself was one of the most brilliant examples of this. Nor did he belong to the type of genius who has received a niggardly outward endowment from Nature, and who in his turn places no value on the outward forms of life, but in a spirit of partial gloom flies from all dealings with mankind. On the contrary, he was tall and well-proportioned, his features were of consummate beauty and his physical strength unusual, he was charming in his manner, supremely eloquent, and cheerful and amiable to everyone. He loved beauty in the things that surrounded him, he was fond of magnificent clothing and valued every refinement of living. In a passage from the treatise on painting, which reveals his lively capacity for enjoyment, he compares painting with its sister arts

[1] 'Egli per reverenza, rizzossi a sedere su'l letto, contando il male suo e gli accidenti di quello, mostrava tuttavia quanto avea offeso Dio e gli uomini del mondo, non avendo operato nell' arte come si conveniva.' ['He having raised himself out of reverence sat up in bed and giving an account of his illness and its circumstances, yet showed how much he had offended God and mankind in not having worked at his art as he should have done'] Vasari (ed. Poggi, 1919, 15).

and describes the hardships that await the sculptor: 'For his face is smeared and dusted all over with marble powder so that he looks like a baker, and he is completely covered with little chips of marble, so that it seems as if his back had been stowed on, and his house is full of splinters of stone and dust. In the case of the painter it is quite different . . . for the painter sits in front of his work in perfect comfort. He is well-dressed and handles the lightest of brushes which he dips in pleasant colours. He wears the clothes he likes; and his house is full of delightful paintings, and is spotlessly clean. He is often accompanied by music or by men who read from a variety of beautiful works, and he can listen to these with great pleasure and without the din of hammers and other noises.' [1]

It is indeed quite possible that the idea of a radiantly happy and pleasure-loving Leonardo is only applicable to the first and longer period of the artist's life. Afterwards, when the downfall of Lodovico Moro's rule forced him to leave Milan, the city that was the centre of his activity and where his position was assured, and to pursue a life lacking in security and not rich in external successes, until he found his last asylum in France, the sparkle of his temperament may have grown dim and some strange sides of his nature may have been thrown into prominence. Moreover the turning of his interests from his art to science, which increased as time went on, must have played its part in widening the gulf between himself and his contemporaries. All the efforts in which in their opinion he frittered away his time when he could have been industriously painting to order and becoming rich as, for example, his former fellow-student Perugino did seemed to them to be merely capricious trifling or even caused him to be suspected of being in the service of the 'black art'. We are in a position to understand him better, for we know from his notes what were the arts that he practised. In an age which was beginning to replace the authority of the Church by that of antiquity and which was not yet familiar with any form of research not based on preconceptions, Leonardo the forerunner and by no means unworthy rival of Bacon and Copernicus was necessarily isolated. In his dissection of the dead bodies of horses and human beings, in his construction of

[1] *Trattato della Pittura* [Ludwig, I, 53, also Richter, I, N. 1902, 330f.)].

flying machines, and in his studies on the nutrition of plants and their reactions to poisons, he certainly departed widely from the commentators on Aristotle, and came close to the despised alchemists, in whose laboratories experimental research had found some refuge at least in those unfavourable times.

The effect that this had on his painting was that he took up his brush with reluctance, painted less and less, left what he had begun for the most part unfinished and cared little about the ultimate fate of his works. And this was what he was blamed for by his contemporaries, to them his attitude towards his art remained a riddle.

Several of Leonardo's later admirers have made attempts to acquit his character of the flaw of instability. In his defence they claim that he is blamed for what is a general feature of great artists: even the energetic Michelangelo, a man entirely given up to his labours, left many of his works incomplete, and it was no more his fault than it was Leonardo's in the parallel instance. Moreover, in the case of some of the pictures, they urge, it is not so much a question of their being unfinished as of his declaring them to be so. What appears to the layman as a masterpiece is never for the creator of the work of art more than an unsatisfactory embodiment of what he intended, he has some dim notion of a perfection, whose likeness time and again he despairs of reproducing. Least of all, they claim, is it right to make the artist responsible for the ultimate fate of his works.

Valid as some of these excuses may be, they still do not cover the whole state of affairs that confronts us in Leonardo. The same distressing struggle with a work, the final flight from it and the indifference to its future fate may recur in many other artists, but there is no doubt that this behaviour is shown in Leonardo in an extreme degree. Solmi 1910, 12 quotes the remark of one of his pupils: 'Pareva che ad ogni ora tremasse, quando si poneva a dipingere, e però non diede mai fine ad alcuna cosa cominciata, considerando la grandezza dell'arte, tal che egli scorgeva errori in quelle cose, che ad altri parevano miracoli.'[1] His last pictures, he goes on, the Leda, the

[1] ['He appeared to tremble the whole time when he set himself to paint, and yet he never completed any work he had begun, having so high a regard for the greatness of art that he discovered faults in things that to others seemed miracles.']

Madonna di Sant' Onofrio, Bacchus, and the young St. John the Baptist, remained unfinished 'come quasi intervenne di tutte le cose sue . . '[1] Lomazzo, who made a copy of the Last Supper, refers in a sonnet to Leonardo's notorious inability to finish his works:

> Protogen che il pennel di sue pitture
> Non levava, agguaglio il Vinci Divo
> Di cui opra non è finita pure.[2]

The slowness with which Leonardo worked was proverbial. He painted at the Last Supper in the Convent of Santa Maria delle Grazie in Milan, after the most thorough preparatory studies, for three whole years. One of his contemporaries, Matteo Bandelli, the story-writer, who at the time was a young monk in the convent, tells how Leonardo often used to climb up the scaffolding early in the morning and remain there till twilight never once laying his brush aside, and with no thought of eating or drinking. Then days would pass without his putting his hand to it. Sometimes he would remain for hours in front of the painting merely examining it in his mind. At other times he would come straight to the convent from the court in the castle at Milan, where he was making the model of the equestrian statue for Francesco Sforza, in order to add a few strokes of the brush to a figure, and then immediately break off.[3] According to Vasari he spent four years in painting the portrait of Mona Lisa, the wife of the Florentine Francesco del Giocondo, without being able to bring it to final completion. This circumstance may also account for the fact that the picture was never delivered to the man who commissioned it, but instead remained with Leonardo and was taken to France by him.[4] It was bought by King Francis I, and to-day forms one of the greatest treasures of the Louvre.

If these reports of the way in which Leonardo worked are compared with the evidence of the extraordinarily numerous sketches and studies which he left behind him and which exhibit every *motif* appearing in his paintings in a great variety of

[1] ['As happened more or less to all his works.']

[2] 'Protogenes, who never lifted his brush from his work, was the equal of the divine Vinci, who never finished anything at all.' Quoted by Scognamiglio (1900, [112]).

[3] Von Seidlitz 1909, 1, 201.

[4] Von Seidlitz 1909, 2, 48.

forms, we are bound totally to reject the idea that traits of hastiness and unsteadiness acquired the slightest influence over Leonardo's relation to his art. On the contrary, it is possible to observe a quite extraordinary profundity, a wealth of possibilities between which a decision can only be reached with hesitation, demands which can hardly be satisfied, and an inhibition in the actual execution which is not in fact to be explained even by the artist inevitably falling short of his ideal. The slowness which had all along been conspicuous in Leonardo's work is seen to be a symptom of this inhibition and to be the forerunner of his subsequent withdrawal from painting.[1] It was this too which determined the fate of the Last Supper – a fate that was not undeserved. Leonardo could not become reconciled to fresco painting, which demands rapid work while the ground is still moist, and this was the reason why he chose oil colours, the drying of which permitted him to protract the completion of the painting to suit his mood and leisure. These pigments however detached themselves from the ground on which they were applied and which separated them from the wall. Added to this, the defects in the wall, and the later fortunes of the building itself, determined what seems to be the inevitable ruin of the picture.[2]

The miscarriage of a similar technical experiment appears to have caused the destruction of the Battle of Anghiari, the painting which, in competition with Michelangelo, he began to paint some time afterwards on a wall of the Sala del Consiglio in Florence, and which he also abandoned in an unfinished condition. Here it seems as if an alien interest—in experimentation—at first reinforced the artistic one, only to damage the work later on.

The character of Leonardo the man showed some other unusual traits and apparent contradictions. A certain inactivity and indifference seemed obvious in him. At a time when everyone was trying to gain the widest scope for his activity—a goal unattainable without the development of energetic aggressiveness towards other people—Leonardo was notable for his quiet

[1] Pater [1873, 100]: 'But it is certain that at one period of his life he had almost ceased to be an artist.'

[2] See von Seidlitz [1909, 1, 205 ff.]) for the history of the attempts to restore and preserve the picture.

peaceableness and his avoidance of all antagonism and controversy. He was gentle and kindly to everyone; he declined, it is said, to eat meat, since he did not think it justifiable to deprive animals of their lives; and he took particular pleasure in buying birds in the market and setting them free.[1] He condemned war and bloodshed and described man as not so much the king of the animal world but rather the worst of the wild beasts.[2] But this feminine delicacy of feeling did not deter him from accompanying condemned criminals on their way to execution in order to study their features distorted by fear and to sketch them in his notebook. Nor did it stop him from devising the cruellest offensive weapons and from entering the service of Cesare Borgia as chief military engineer. He often gave the appearance of being indifferent to good and evil, or he insisted on measurement by a special standard. He accompanied Cesare in a position of authority during the campaign that brought the Romagna into the possession of that most ruthless and faithless of adversaries. There is not a line in Leonardo's notebooks which reveals any criticism of the events of those days, or any concern in them. A comparison suggests itself here with Goethe during the French campaign.

If a biographical study is really intended to arrive at an understanding of its hero's mental life it must not — as happens in the majority of biographies as a result of discretion or prudishness — silently pass over its subject's sexual activity or sexual individuality. What is known of Leonardo in this respect is little: but that little is full of significance. In an age which saw a struggle between sensuality without restraint and gloomy asceticism, Leonardo represented the cool repudiation of sexuality — a thing that would scarcely be expected of an artist and a portrayer of feminine beauty. Solmi quotes the following sentence of his which is evidence of his frigidity: 'The act of procreation and everything connected with it is so disgusting that mankind would soon die out if it were not an old-established custom and if there were not pretty faces and sensuous natures.'[3] His posthumous writings, which not only deal with

[1] Müntz (1899, 18). A letter of a contemporary from India to one of the Medici alludes to this characteristic behaviour of Leonardo. (See J. P. Richter [1939, 2, 103–4*n*.].)

[2] Bottazzi (1910, 169).

[3] Solmi (1908, [24]).

the greatest scientific problems but also contain trivialities that strike us as scarcely worthy of so great a mind: an allegorical natural history, animal fables, jokes, prophecies,[1] are chaste—one might say even abstinent—to a degree that would cause surprise in a work of *belles lettres* even to-day. So resolutely do they shun everything sexual that it would seem as if Eros alone, the preserver of all living things, was not worthy material for the investigator in his pursuit of knowledge.[2] It is well known how frequently great artists take pleasure in giving vent to their phantasies in erotic and even crudely obscene pictures. In Leonardo's case on the contrary we have only some anatomical sketches of the internal female genitals, the position of the embryo in the womb and so on.[3]

[1] Herzfeld (1906).

[2] An exception to this (though an unimportant one) is perhaps to be found in his collected writings (see Ravaisson) which have not been translated. See Herzfeld (1906, 17). This reference to Eros as 'the preserver of all living things' seems to anticipate Freud's introduction of the name ten years later in almost exactly the same phrase as a general term for the sexual as opposed to the death instincts. See, for instance, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920g), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 50 and 52.]

[3] [*Footnote added* 1919.] Some remarkable errors are visible in a drawing made by Leonardo of the sexual act seen in an anatomical sagittal section, which certainly cannot be called obscene (Fig. 1). They were discovered by Rettler (1907) and discussed by him in the light of the account which I have given here of Leonardo's character.

'It is precisely in the process of portraying the act of procreation that this excessive instinct for research has totally failed—presumably only as a result of his even greater sexual repression. The man's body is drawn in full, the woman's only in part. If the drawing reproduced in Fig. 1 is shown to an unprejudiced onlooker with the head visible but all the lower parts covered up, it may be safely assumed that the head will be taken to be a woman's. The wavy locks on the forehead and the others, which flow down the back approximately to the fourth or fifth dorsal vertebra, mark the head as more of a woman's than a man's.

'The woman's breast reveals two defects. The first noted is an artistic one: its outline gives it the appearance of a breast that is flabby and hangs down unpleasantly. The second defect is anatomical, for Leonardo the researcher had obviously been prevented by his fending off of sexuality from ever making a close examination of a nursing woman's nipples. Had he done so he would have been bound to notice that the milk flows out of a number of separate excretory ducts. Leonardo, however, drew only a single duct extending far down into the abdominal cavity and probably in his view drawing the milk from the *cisterna chyli* and perhaps also connected in some way with the sex

It is doubtful whether Leonardo ever embraced a woman in passion, nor is it known that he had any intimate mental relationship with a woman, such as Michelangelo's with Vittoria Colonna. While he was still an apprentice, living in the house of his master Verrocchio, a charge of forbidden homosexual practices was brought against him, along with some other young

organs. It must of course be taken into consideration that the study of the internal organs of the human body was at that time made extremely difficult, since the dissection of bodies was regarded as desecration of the dead and was most severely punished. Whether Leonardo, who had certainly only very little material for dissection at his disposal, knew anything at all of the existence of a lymph-reservoir in the abdominal cavity is therefore in fact highly questionable, although in his drawing he included a cavity that is no doubt intended to be something of the sort. But from his making the lactiferous duct extend still further downwards till it reaches the internal sex organs we may suspect that he was trying to represent the synchronization of the beginning of the secretion of milk and the end of pregnancy by means of visible anatomical connections as well. However, even if we are ready to excuse the artist's defective knowledge of anatomy by referring it to the circumstances of his time, the striking fact still remains that it is precisely the female genital that Leonardo has treated so carelessly. The vagina and something that looks like the penis were cut through near the middle out, but the lines indicating the uterus itself are completely confused.

FIG. 1

The male genital on the other hand is depicted by Leonardo much more correctly. Thus, for instance, he was not satisfied with drawing

people, which ended in his acquittal. He seems to have fallen under the suspicion, because he had executed a bas-relief [illegible] surrounded himself with handsome boys and women whom he took

the tests but also put in the eyeballs, which he drew with great accuracy.

'What is extraordinary is the posture in which Leonardo makes them take place. Pictures and drawings by famous artists exist which depict [illegible] of the sexual act being performed [illegible] we must conclude that there was a special [illegible] of great artistic strength to have caused it to be represented in this manner [illegible] It is as if Leonardo wanted to make comedies out of the most passionate [illegible] Most of the people [illegible] are less a wish to stay in the desired situation for some time.

'Moreover the [illegible] the temporal head are marked by a resistance that is [illegible] Her brows are wrinkled and his gaze is directed [illegible] with an expression of repugnance. The lips are pressed together and their corners are then drawn down. In this face can be seen neither the pleasure of [illegible] nor the happiness of [illegible] expressions of indignation and aversion.

'The mistake [illegible] however, was made by Leonardo in drawing the two lower extremities. The right foot should in point of fact have been [illegible] because [illegible] the act of union in an [illegible] sexual union it follows of course that the man's left foot would be above the [illegible] the private. Conversely and for the same reason the woman's foot should have been placed to her left side. But in fact Leonardo has represented both feet on the right side. The male figure has a left foot and the [illegible] a right foot. His inner knee is easiest to grasp if one reads [illegible] the two inner sides of the feet.

'[illegible] drawing alone would have made it possible to denounce the representation as a repression which threw the great artist and investigator into [illegible]'

[*Ibid.* 162.] These comments of Rogers have been criticized. It is true, as the present writer has pointed out, that the [illegible] cannot be drawn from a [illegible] sketch, and that it is not even certain whether the different parts of the drawing really belong together.

[According to Scognamiglio, loc. cit., there is a reference to this episode in the [illegible] and even various [illegible] read passage in the Codex Arundel: 'Quando io feci Dio padre mi facesti mettere in prigione, ora sendo io fatto giovane, vo mi farete peggio.' ['When I represented the Lord God as a father, you put me in prison, now that I represent him as an adult you will do worse to me.']

as pupils. The last of these pupils, Francesco Melzi, accompanied him to France, remained with him up to his death and was named by him as his heir. Without sharing in the certainty of his modern biographers, who naturally reject the possibility that there was a sexual relationship between him and his pupils as a baseless insult to the great man, we may take it as much more probable that Leonardo's affectionate relations with the young men who—as was the custom with pupils at that time—shared his existence did not extend to sexual activity. Moreover a high degree of sexual activity is not to be attributed to him.

There is only one way in which the peculiarity of this emotional and sexual life can be understood in connection with Leonardo's double nature as an artist and as a scientific investigator. Among his biographers, to whom a psychological approach is often very alien, there is to my knowledge only one, Edmondo Solmi, who has approached the solution of the problem; but a writer who has chosen Leonardo as the hero of a great historical novel, Dmitry Sergeyevich Merezhkovsky, has made a similar reading of this unusual man the basis of his portrait and has given clear expression to his conception, not indeed in plain language, but (after the way of writers of imagination) in plastic terms.[1] Solmi's verdict on Leonardo is as follows (1908, 46): 'But his insatiable desire to understand everything around him, and to fathom in a spirit of cold superiority the deepest secret of all that is perfect, had condemned Leonardo's work to remain for ever unfinished.'

In an essay in the *Conferenze Fiorentine* the following pronouncement of Leonardo's is quoted, which represents his confession of faith and provides the key to his nature. 'Nessuna cosa si può amare ne odiare, se prima non si ha cognition di quella.' [2] That is to say: One has no right to love or hate anything if one has not acquired a thorough knowledge of its nature. And the same is repeated by Leonardo in a passage in the treatise on painting where he seems to be defending himself against the charge of irreligion: 'But such carping critics would

[1] Merezhkovsky (1902, German trans., 1903). *Leonardo da Vinci* forms the second work of a great historical trilogy entitled *Christ and Antichrist*. The two other volumes are *Julian the Apostate* and *Peter and Alexis*.

[2] Bottazzi (1910, 193) [J. P. Richter (1939), 2, 244.].

do better to keep silent. For that (line of conduct) is the way to become acquainted with the Creator of so many wonderful things, and this is the way to love so great an Inventor. For in truth great love springs from great knowledge of the beloved object, and if you know it but little you will be able to love it only a little or not at all . . .' [1]

The value of these remarks of Leonardo's is not to be looked for in their conveying an important psychological fact; for what they assert is obviously false, and Leonardo must have known this as well as we do. It is not true that human beings delay loving or hating until they have studied and become familiar with the nature of the object to which these affects apply. On the contrary they love impulsively, from emotional motives which have nothing to do with knowledge, and whose operation is at most weakened by reflection and consideration. Leonardo, then, could only have meant that the love practised by human beings was not of the proper and unobjectionable kind: one *should* love in such a way as to hold back the affect, subject it to the process of reflection and only let it take its course when it has stood up to the test of thought. And at the same time we understand that he wishes to tell us that it happens so in his case and that it would be worth while for everyone else to treat love and hatred as he does.

And in his case it really seems to have been so. His affects were controlled and subjected to the instinct for research; he did not love and hate, but asked himself about the origin and significance of what he was to love or hate. Thus he was bound at first to appear indifferent to good and evil, beauty and ugliness. During this work of investigation love and hate threw off their positive or negative signs and were both alike transformed into intellectual interest. In reality Leonardo was not devoid of passion; he did not lack the divine spark which is directly or indirectly the driving force *il primo motore* behind all human activity. He had merely converted his passion into a thirst for knowledge; he then applied himself to investigation with the persistence, constancy and penetration which is derived from passion, and at the climax of intellectual labour, when knowledge had been won, he allowed the long restrained affect to break loose and to flow away freely, as a stream of

[1] *Trattato della Pittura* [Ludwig (1909, 54].

water drawn from a river is allowed to flow away when its work is done. When, at the climax of a discovery, he could survey a large portion of the whole nexus, he was overcome by emotion, and in ecstatic language praised the splendour of the part of creation that he had studied, or in religious phraseology the greatness of his Creator. This process of transformation in Leonardo has been rightly understood by Solmi. After quoting a passage of this sort in which Leonardo celebrates the sublime law of nature 'O mirabile necessità . . .', he writes (1910, 11): 'Tale trasfigurazione della scienza della natura in emozione, quasi direi, religiosa, è uno dei tratti caratteristici de' manoscritti vinciani, e si trova cento e cento volte espressa . . .' [1]

Because of his insatiable and indefatigable thirst for knowledge Leonardo has been called the Italian Faust. But quite apart from doubts about a possible transformation of the instinct to investigate back into an enjoyment of life—a transformation which we must take as fundamental in the tragedy of Faust—the view may be hazarded that Leonardo's development approaches Spinoza's mode of thinking.

A conversion of psychical instinctual force into various forms of activity can perhaps no more be achieved without loss than a conversion of physical forces. The example of Leonardo teaches us how many other things we have to take into account in connection with these processes. The postponement of loving until full knowledge is acquired ends in a substitution of the latter for the former. A man who has won his way to a state of knowledge cannot properly be said to love and hate, he remains beyond love and hatred. He has investigated instead of loving. And that is perhaps why Leonardo's life was so much poorer in love than that of other great men, and of other artists. The stormy passions of a nature that inspires and consumes, passions in which other men have enjoyed their richest experience, appear not to have touched him.

There are some further consequences. Investigating has taken the place of acting and creating as well. A man who has begun to have an inkling of the grandeur of the universe with all its complexities and its laws readily forgets his own insignificant

[1] [Such a transfiguration of natural science into a sort of religious emotion is one of the characteristic features of Leonardo's manuscripts, and there are hundreds and hundreds of examples of it.]

self. Lost in admiration and filled with true humility, he all too easily forgets that he himself is a part of those active forces and that in accordance with the scale of his personal strength the way is open for him to try to alter a small portion of the destined course of the world—a world in which the small is still no less wonderful and significant than the great.

Leonardo's researches had perhaps first begun, as Solmi believes, in the service of his art,[1] he directed his efforts to the properties and laws of light, colours, shadows and perspective in order to ensure mastery in the imitation of nature and to point the same way to others. It is probable that at that time he already overrated the value to the artist of these branches of knowledge. Still constantly following the lead given by the requirements of his painting he was then driven to investigate the painter's subjects, animals and plants, and the proportions of the human body, and, passing from their exterior, to proceed to gain a knowledge of their internal structure and their vital functions, which indeed also find expression in their appearance and have a claim to be depicted in art. And finally the instinct, which had become overwhelming, swept him away until the connection with the demands of his art was severed, so that he discovered the general laws of mechanics and divined the history of the stratification and fossilization in the Arno valley, and until he could enter in large letters in his book the discovery: *Il sole non si move*.[2] His investigations extended to practically every branch of natural science, and in every single one he was a discoverer or at least a prophet and pioneer.[3] Yet his urge for knowledge was always directed to the external world; something kept him far away from the investigation of the human

[1] Solmi (1910, 8): 'Leonardo aveva posto, come regola al pittore, lo studio della natura . . . poi la passione dello studio era divenuta dominante, egli aveva voluto accostare non più la scienza per l'arte, ma la scienza per la scienza' ['Leonardo had prescribed the study of nature as a rule for the painter . . ., then the passion for study had become dominant, he had no longer wished to acquire learning for the sake of art, but learning for the sake of learning'].

[2] 'The sun does not move.' Quaderni d'Anatomia, I–II, Royal Library, Windsor, V, 25.]

[3] See the enumeration of his scientific achievements in the fine biographical introduction by Marie Herzfeld (1904), in the various essays of the *Conferenze Fiorentine* (1910), and elsewhere.

mind. In the 'Academia Vinciana' [p. 128], for which he drew some cleverly intertwined emblems, there was little room for psychology.

Then, when he made the attempt to return from investigation to his starting point, the exercise of his art, he found himself disturbed by the new direction of his interests and the changed nature of his mental activity. What interested him in a picture was above all a problem, and behind the first one he saw countless other problems arising, just as he used to in his endless and inexhaustible investigation of nature. He was no longer able to limit his demands, to see the work of art in isolation and to tear it from the wide context to which he knew it belonged. After the most exhausting efforts to bring to expression in it everything which was connected with it in his thoughts, he was forced to abandon it in an unfinished state or to declare that it was incomplete.

The artist had once taken the investigator into his service to assist him; now the servant had become the stronger and suppressed his master.

When we find that in the picture presented by a person's character a single instinct has developed an excessive strength, as did the craving for knowledge in Leonardo, we look for the explanation in a special disposition — though about its determinants (which are probably organic) scarcely anything is yet known. Our psycho-analytic studies of neurotic people have however led us to form two further expectations which it would be gratifying to find confirmed in each particular case. We consider it probable that an instinct like this of excessive strength was already active in the subject's earliest childhood, and that its supremacy was established by impressions in the child's life. We make the further assumption that it found reinforcement from what were originally sexual instinctual forces, so that later it could take the place of a part of the subject's sexual life. Thus a person of this sort would, for example, pursue research with the same passionate devotion that another would give to his love, and he would be able to investigate instead of loving. We would venture to infer that it is not only in the example of the instinct to investigate that there has been a sexual reinforcement, but also in most other cases where an instinct is of special intensity.

Observation of men's daily lives shows us that most people

succeed in directing very considerable portions of their sexual instinctual forces to their professional activity. The sexual instinct is particularly well fitted to make contributions of this kind since it is endowed with a capacity for sublimation—that is, it has the power to replace its immediate aim by other aims which may be valued more highly and which are not sexual. We accept this process as proved whenever the history of a person's childhood—that is, the history of his mental development—shows that in childhood this over-powerful instinct was in the service of sexual interests. We find further confirmation if a striking atrophy occurs in the sexual life of maturity, as though a portion of sexual activity had now been replaced by the activity of the over-powerful instinct.

There seem to be special difficulties in applying these expectations to the case of an over-powerful instinct for investigation, since precisely in the case of children there is a reluctance to credit them with either this serious instinct or any noteworthy sexual interests. However, these difficulties are easily overcome. The curiosity of small children is manifested in their untiring love of asking questions, this is bewildering to the adult so long as he fails to understand that all these questions are merely circumlocutions and that they cannot come to an end because the child is only trying to make them take the place of a question which he does *not* ask. When he grows bigger and becomes better informed this expression of curiosity often comes to a sudden end. Psycho-analytic investigation provides us with a full explanation by teaching us that many, perhaps most children, or at least the most gifted ones, pass through a period, beginning when they are about three, which may be called the period of *infantile sexual researches*. So far as we know, the curiosity of children of this age does not awaken spontaneously, but is aroused by the impression made by some important event—by the actual birth of a little brother or sister, or by a fear of it based on external experiences—in which the child perceives a threat to his selfish interests. Researches are directed to the question of where babies come from, exactly as if the child were looking for ways and means to avert so undesired an event. In this way we have been astonished to learn that children refuse to believe the bits of information that are given them (for example that they were actually bought at the fair) or the stork with

its wealth of mythological meaning[1], that they date their intellectual independence from this act of disbelief, and that they often feel in serious opposition to adults and in fact never afterwards forgive them for having deceived them here about the true facts of the case. They investigate along their own lines, divine the baby's presence inside its mother's body, and following the lead of the impulses of their own sexuality form theories of babies originating from eating, of their being born through the bowels, and of the obscure part played by the father. By that time they already have a notion of the sexual act, which appears to them to be something hostile and violent. But since their own sexual constitution has not yet reached the point of being able to produce babies, their investigation of where babies come from must inevitably come to nothing too and be abandoned as insoluble. The impression caused by this failure in the first attempt at intellectual independence appears to be of a lasting and deeply depressing kind.[1]

When the period of infantile sexual researches has been terminated by a wave of energetic sexual repression, the instinct for research has three distinct possible vicissitudes open to it owing to its early connection with sexual interests. In the first of these, research shares the fate of sexuality; thenceforward curiosity remains inhibited and the free activity of intelligence may be limited for the whole of the subject's lifetime, especially as shortly after this the powerful religious inhibition of thought is brought into play by education. This is the type characterized by neurotic inhibition. We know very well that the intellectual weakness which has been acquired in this way gives an effective impetus to the outbreak of a neurotic illness. In a second type the intellectual development is sufficiently strong to resist the sexual repression which has hold of it. Some time after the infantile sexual researches have come to an end, the intelligence,

[1] These improbable-sounding assertions can be confirmed from a study of my 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy' [1909*b*] and of similar observations [before 1924 these last words ran 'and of the similar observation in Volume II of the *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen*' – a reference to Jung [1910]]. In a paper on 'The Sexual Theories of Children' [1908*c*] I wrote: 'This brooding and doubting, however, becomes the prototype of all later intellectual work directed towards the solution of problems, and the first failure has a crippling effect on the child's whole future.'

having grown stronger, recalls the old association and offers its help in evading sexual repression, and the suppressed sexual activities of research return from the unconscious in the form of compulsive brooding, naturally in a distorted and unfree form, but sufficiently powerful to sexualize thinking itself and to colour intellectual operations with the pleasure and anxiety that belong to sexual processes proper. Here investigation becomes a sexual activity, often the exclusive one, and the feeling that comes from settling things in one's mind and explaining them replaces sexual satisfaction; but the interminable character of the child's researches is also repeated in the fact that this brooding never ends and that the intellectual feeling, so much desired, of having found a solution recedes more and more into the distance.

In virtue of a special disposition, the third type, which is the rarest and most perfect, escapes both inhibition of thought and neurotic compulsive thinking. It is true that here too sexual repression comes about, but it does not succeed in relegating a component instinct of sexual desire to the unconscious. Instead, the libido evades the fate of repression by being sublimated from the very beginning into curiosity and by becoming attached to the powerful instinct for research as a reinforcement. Here, too, the research becomes to some extent compulsive and a substitute for sexual activity, but owing to the complete difference in the underlying psychical processes sublimation instead of an irruption from the unconscious the quality of neurosis is absent, there is no attachment to the original complexes of infantile sexual research, and the instinct can operate freely in the service of intellectual interest. Sexual repression, which has made the instinct so strong through the addition to it of sublimated libido, is still taken into account by the instinct, in that it avoids any concern with sexual themes.

If we reflect on the concentration in Leonardo of his overpowerful instinct for research and the atrophy of his sexual life which was restricted to what is called [sublimated] homosexuality we shall be disposed to claim him as a model instance of our third type. The core of his nature, and the secret of it, would appear to be that after his curiosity had been activated in infancy in the service of sexual interests he succeeded in sublimating the greater part of his libido into an urge for re-

search. But it is not easy, to be sure, to prove that this view is right. To do so we should need some picture of his mental development in the first years of his childhood, and it seems foolish to hope for material of that sort when the accounts of his life are so meagre and so unreliable, and when moreover it is a question of information about circumstances that escape the attention of observers even in relation to people of our own generation.

About Leonardo's youth we know very little. He was born in 1452 in the little town of Vinci between Florence and Empoli; he was an illegitimate child, which in those days was certainly not considered a grave social stigma, his father was Ser Piero da Vinci, a notary and descended from a family of notaries and farmers who took their name from the locality of Vinci; his mother was a certain Caterina, probably a peasant girl, who later married another native of Vinci. This mother does not occur again in the history of Leonardo's life, and it is only Merezhkovsky the novelist who believes that he has succeeded in finding some trace of her. The only definite piece of information about Leonardo's childhood comes in an official document of the year 1457, it is a Florentine land-register for the purpose of taxation, which mentions Leonardo among the members of the household of the Vinci family as the five-year-old illegitimate child of Ser Piero.[1] The marriage of Ser Piero with a certain Donna Albiera remained childless, and it was therefore possible for the young Leonardo to be brought up in his father's house. He did not leave this house till — at what age is not known — he entered Andrea del Verrocchio's studio as an apprentice. In the year 1472 Leonardo's name was already to be found in the list of members of the '*Compagnia dei Pittori*'. That is all.

[1] Scognamiglio (1900, 15).

II

THERE is, so far as I know, only one place in his scientific notebooks where Leonardo inserts a piece of information about his childhood. In a passage about the flight of vultures he suddenly interrupts himself to pursue a memory from very early years which had sprung to his mind:

'It seems that I was always destined to be so deeply concerned with vultures, for I recall as one of my very earliest memories that while I was in my cradle a vulture came down to me, and opened my mouth with its tail, and struck me many times with its tail against my lips.' [1]

What we have here then is a childhood memory; and certainly one of the strangest sort. It is strange on account of its content and on account of the age to which it is assigned. That a person should be able to retain a memory of his sucking period is perhaps not impossible, but it cannot by any means be regarded as certain. What, however, this memory of Leonardo's asserts—namely that a vulture opened the child's mouth with its tail—sounds so improbable, so fabulous, that another view of it, which at a single stroke puts an end to both difficulties, has more to commend it to our judgement. On this view the scene with the vulture would not be a memory of Leonardo's but a phantasy, which he formed at a later date and transposed to his childhood.[2]

[1] 'Questo scrivere sì distintamente del nibio par che sia mio destino, perchè nella mia prima recordatione della mia infantia e' mi pareva che, essendo io in culla, che un nibio venissi a me e mi aprissi la bocca colla sua coda e molte volte mi percuotessi con tal coda dentro alle labbra.' Codex Atlanticus, F. 65 v., as given by Sabachnikoff (1888, 22). [In the German text Freud quotes Herzfeld's translation of the Italian original and our version above is a rendering of the German. There are in fact two inaccuracies in the German: '*nibio*' should be 'kite' not 'vulture' (see Editor's Note, p. 61, n.), and *dentro*, 'within', is omitted. This last omission is in fact rectified by Freud himself below, p. 86.]

[2] [*Footnote added* 1919.] In a friendly notice of this book Havelock Ellis (1910*a*) has challenged the view put forward above. He objects that this memory of Leonardo's may very well have had a basis of reality, since children's memories often reach very much further back than is commonly supposed; the large bird in question need not of course have been a vulture. This is a point that I will gladly concede, and as a step

This is often the way in which childhood memories originate. Quite unlike conscious memories from the time of maturity, they are not fixed at the moment of being experienced and afterwards repeated, but are only created at a later age when childhood is already past, in the process they are altered and falsified, and are put into the service of later trends, so that generally speaking they cannot be sharply distinguished from phantasies. Their nature is perhaps best illustrated by a comparison with the way in which the writing of history originated among the peoples of antiquity. As long as a nation was small and weak it gave no thought to the writing of its history. Men tilled the soil of their land, fought for their existence against their neighbours, and tried to gain territory from them and to acquire wealth. It was an age of heroes, not of historians. Then came another age, an age of reflection: men felt themselves to be rich and powerful, and now felt a need to learn where they had come from and how they had developed. Historical writing, which had begun to keep a continuous record of the present, now also cast a glance back to the past, gathered traditions and legends, interpreted the traces of antiquity that survived in customs and usages, and in this way created a history of the past. It was inevitable that this early history should have been an expression of present beliefs and wishes rather than a true picture of the past, for many things had been dropped from the nation's memory, while others were distorted, and some remains of the past were given a wrong interpretation in order to fit in with contemporary ideas. Moreover people's motive for writing history was not objective curiosity but a desire to influence

towards lessening the difficulty. I in turn will offer a suggestion—namely that his mother observed the large bird's visit to her child as an event which may easily have had the significance of an omen in her eyes—and repeatedly told him about it afterwards. As a result, I suggest, he retained the memory of this mother's story and later, as so often happens, it became possible for him to take it for a memory of an experience of his own. However, this alteration does no damage to the force of my general account. It happens, indeed, as a general rule that the phantasies about their childhood which people construct at a late date are attached to trivial but real events of this early, and normally forgotten, period. There must thus have been some secret reason for bringing into prominence a real event of no importance and for elaborating it in the sort of way Leonardo did in his story of the bird, which he dubbed a vulture, and of its remarkable behaviour.

their contemporaries, to encourage and inspire them, or to hold a mirror up before them. A man's conscious memory of the events of his maturity is in every way comparable to the first kind of historical writing [which was a chronicle of current events], while the memories that he has of his childhood correspond, as far as their origins and reliability are concerned, to the history of a nation's earliest days, which was compiled later and for tendentious reasons.[1]

If, then, Leonardo's story about the vulture that visited him in his cradle is only a phantasy from a later period, one might suppose it could hardly be worth while spending much time on it. One might be satisfied with explaining it on the basis of his inclination, of which he makes no secret, to regard his preoccupation with the flight of birds as pre-ordained by destiny. Yet in underrating this story one would be committing just as great an injustice as if one were carelessly to reject the body of legends, translations and interpretations found in a nation's early history. In spite of all the distortions and misunderstandings, they still represent the reality of the past: they are what a people forms out of the experience of its early days and under the dominance of motives that were once powerful and still operate to-day; and if it were only possible, by a knowledge of all the forces at work, to undo these distortions, there would be no difficulty in disclosing the historical truth lying behind the legendary material. The same holds good for the childhood memories or phantasies of an individual. What someone thinks he remembers from his childhood is not a matter of indifference; as a rule the residual memories—which he himself does not understand—cloak priceless pieces of evidence about the most important features in his mental development.[2] As we now

[1] [Chapter IV of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1916) deals with childhood memories and screen-memories, and, in an addition made to it in 1907, Freud makes the same comparison with historical writing.]

[2] [*Footnote added* 1919.] Since I wrote the above words I have attempted to make similar use of an unintelligible memory dating from the childhood of another man of genius. In the account of his life that Goethe wrote when he was about sixty, '*Dichtung und Wahrheit*', there is a description in the first few pages of how, with the encouragement of his neighbours, he slung first some small and then some large pieces of crockery out of the window into the street, so that they were smashed to

possess in the technique of psycho-analysis exactly the same value as the patient's free associations. Before this can be established, however, we may venture to deal in the same way with Leonardo's fantasy by analysing his childhood phantasy. And if our findings were to be confirmed by the degree of certainty which we achieve, we shall have to console ourselves with the reflection that so many other students of this great and enigmatic man have met with no better fate.

If we examine with the eyes of a psychoanalyst Leonardo's phantasy of the vulture, it does not at first strike us very much. We seem to recall having come across the same sort of thing in many places, for example in dreams, so that we may venture to translate the phantasy from its own special language into words that are generally understood. The translation is then seen to point to an erotic content. A tail, 'coda', is one of the most frequent symbols and substitutive expressions for the male organ, in German no less than in other languages,[1] the situation in the

pieces. This is indeed the only scene that he reports from the earliest years of childhood. The sheer inconsequence of its content, the way it is set down unrelated with the childhood memories of other human beings who did not become great, and the absence of any personal comment—these are the marks by which we are wont to recognize a childhood memory. But when Goethe wrote down such pieces of his past, he was dealing with memories which had long been familiar to him and had undergone many elaborations in the course of his life. Leonardo's memory, on the other hand, is to be found at a later point in the book, where Goethe's own phrases are not to be heard. [Freud then refers briefly to Goethe's memory of the yellow and white dress worn by Gretchen and by Charlotte Buff, and to the significance of this childhood memory in the history of Goethe's mental development.] We must keep to the fact that a memory is not reproduced in the form of a picture, but is replaced by some other picture which has come into contact with it by association. In the case of childhood memories in dreams, such as these, we must be prepared for such substitutions as well as for the fact that what we should be most interested in is missing. In the present case the presence and the absence in this respect of the vulture and the kite are equally remarkable. And the remarkable absence of any mention whatever of a vulture [in the picture-puzzle] is the point at which the process that follows it was started, as [p. 136] the dream is explained as a fantasy aroused in 1564 by the Gazette picture [*Standard Ed.*, 17, 151*n.*]

[1] Cf. the 'Original Record' of the case of the 'Rat Man', *Standard*

phantasy, of a vulture opening the child's mouth and beating about inside it [1] vigorously with its tail, corresponds to the idea of an act of *fellatio*, a sexual act in which the penis is put into the mouth of the person involved. It is strange that this phantasy is so completely passive in character; moreover it resembles certain dreams and phantasies found in women or passive homosexuals (who play the part of the woman in sexual relations).

I hope the reader will restrain himself and not allow a surge of indignation to prevent his following psycho-analysis any further because it leads to an unpardonable aspersion on the memory of a great and pure man the very first time it is applied to his case. Such indignation, it is clear, will never be able to tell us the significance of Leonardo's childhood phantasy; at the same time Leonardo has acknowledged the phantasy in the most unambiguous fashion, and we cannot abandon our expectation—or, if it sounds better, our prejudice—that a phantasy of this kind must have *some* meaning, in the same way as any other psychical creation: a dream, a vision or a delirium. Let us rather therefore give a fair hearing for a while to the work of analysis, which indeed has not yet spoken its last word.

The inclination to take a man's sexual organ into the mouth and suck at it, which in respectable society is considered a loathsome sexual perversion, is nevertheless found with great frequency among women of to-day—and of earlier times as well, as ancient sculptures show—, and in the state of being in love it appears completely to lose its repulsive character. Phantasies derived from this inclination are found by doctors even in women who have not become aware of the possibilities of obtaining sexual satisfaction in this way by reading Krafft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis* or from other sources of information. Women, it seems, find no difficulty in producing this kind

Ed., **10**, 311.—It may be pointed out—supposing the bird to have been in fact a kite—that the kite's long forked tail is one of its noticeable features and plays a large part in the virtuosity of its movements in the air and no doubt attracted Leonardo's attention in his observations of flight. The symbolic meaning of its *coda*, discussed by Freud in this passage, seems to be confirmed by a remark in an ornithological account of the kite published recently in *The Times* (July 7, 1939): 'At times the tail is fanned out at right angles to its normal plane.']

[1] [See end of footnote on p. 82.]

of wishful phantasy spontaneously.[1] Further investigation informs us that this situation, which morality condemns with such severity, may be traced to an origin of the most innocent kind. It only repeats in a different form a situation in which we all once felt comfortable—when we were still in our sucking days (*'essendo io in culla'*[2] and took our mother's (or wet-nurse's) nipple into our mouth and sucked at it. The organic impression of this experience—the first source of pleasure in our life—doubtless remains indelibly printed on us, and when at a later date the child becomes familiar with the cow's udder whose function is that of a nipple, but whose shape and position under the belly make it resemble a penis, the preliminary stage has been reached which will later enable him to form the repellent sexual phantasy.[3]

Now we understand why Leonardo assigned the memory of his supposed experience with the vulture to his sucking period. What the phantasy conceals is merely a reminiscence of sucking—or being suckled—at his mother's breast, a scene of human beauty that he, like so many artists, undertook to depict with his brush, in the guise of the mother of God and her child. There is indeed another point which we do not yet understand and which we must not lose sight of: this reminiscence, which has the same importance for both sexes, has been transformed by the man Leonardo into a passive homosexual phantasy. For the time being we shall put aside the question of what there may be to connect homosexuality with sucking at the mother's breast, merely recording that tradition does in fact represent Leonardo as a man with homosexual feelings. In this connection, it is irrelevant to our purpose whether the charge brought against the young Leonardo [pp. 71–2] was justified or not. What decides whether we describe someone as an invert[4] is not his actual behaviour, but his emotional attitude.

Our interest is next claimed by another unintelligible feature of Leonardo's childhood phantasy. We interpret the phantasy as one of being suckled by his mother, and we find his mother

[1] On this point compare my 'Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria' (1905*e*) [*Standard Ed.*, **7**, 54].

[2] 'While I was in my cradle.' See footnote 1, p. 81 above.

[3] [Cf. the analysis of 'Little Hans', *Standard Ed.*, **10**, 7.]

[4] [In 1910 only: 'a homosexual'.]

replaced by a vulture. Where does this vulture come from and how does it happen to be found in its present place?

At this point a thought comes to the mind from such a remote quarter that it would be tempting to set it aside. In the hieroglyphics of the ancient Egyptians the mother is represented by a picture of a vulture.[1] The Egyptians also worshipped a Mother Goddess, who was represented as having a vulture's head, or else several heads, of which at least one was a vulture's.[2] This goddess's name was pronounced *Mut*. Can the similarity to the sound of our word *Mutter* ['mother'] be merely a coincidence? There is, then, some real connection between vulture and mother – but what help is that to us? For have we any right to expect Leonardo to know of it, seeing that the first man who succeeded in reading hieroglyphics was François Champollion (1790–1832)?[3]

It would be interesting to enquire how it could be that the ancient Egyptians came to choose the vulture as a symbol of motherhood. Now the religion and civilization of the Egyptians were objects of scientific curiosity even to the Greeks and the Romans; and long before we ourselves were able to read the monuments of Egypt we had at our disposal certain pieces of information about them derived from the extant writings of classical antiquity. Some of these writings were by well-known authors, such as Strabo, Plutarch and Ammianus Marcellinus; while others bear unfamiliar names and are uncertain in their source of origin and their date of composition, like the *Hieroglyphica* of Horapollo Nilous and the book of oriental priestly wisdom which has come down to us under the name of the god Hermes Trismegistos. We learn from these sources that the vulture was regarded as a symbol of motherhood because only female vultures were believed to exist; there were, it was thought, no males of this species.[4] A counterpart to this restriction to one sex was also known to the natural history of

[1] Horapollo, *Hieroglyphica* I, 11). 'Μητέρα δὲ γράφοντες . . . γύπα ζῶον σημαίνουσι' ['To denote a mother . . . they delineate a vulture.']

[2] Roscher (1894–97), Lanzone (1882).

[3] Hartleben (1906).

[4] 'γύπα γὰρ ἄρρενα οὐ φασι γινέσθαι ποτε, ἀλλὰ θηλείας ἁπάσας.' ['They say that no male vulture has ever existed but all are females.' Aelian, *De Natura Animalium*, II, 46.] Quoted by von Romer (1903, 732).

antiquity: in the case of the scarabaeus beetle, which the Egyptians worshipped as divine, it was thought that only males existed.[1]

How then were vultures supposed to be impregnated if all of them were female? This is a point fully explained in a passage in Horapollo.[2] At a certain time these birds pause in mid-flight, open their vagina and are impregnated by the wind.

We have now unexpectedly reached a position where we can take something as very probable which only a short time before we had to reject as absurd. It is quite possible that Leonardo was familiar with the scientific fable which was responsible for the vulture being used by the Egyptians as a pictorial representation of the idea of mother. He was a wide reader and his interest embraced all branches of literature and learning. In the Codex Atlanticus we find a catalogue of all the books he possessed at a particular date,[3] and in addition numerous jottings on other books that he had borrowed from friends; and if we may judge by the extracts from his notes by Richter [1883],[4] the extent of his reading can hardly be overestimated. Early works on natural history were well represented among them in addition to contemporary books, and all of them were already in print at the time. Milan was in fact the leading city in Italy for the new art of printing.

On proceeding further we come across a piece of information which can turn the probability that Leonardo knew the fable of the vulture into a certainty. The learned editor and commentator on Horapollo has the following note on the text already quoted above [Leemans, 1835, 172]: 'Caeterum hanc

[1] Plutarch: 'Veluti scarabaeos mares tantum esse putarunt Aegyptii sic inter vultures mares non inveniri statuerunt' ['Just as they believed that only male scarabs existed, so the Egyptians concluded that no male vultures were to be found.' Freud has here inadvertently attributed to Plutarch a sentence which is in fact ascribed by Leemans (1835, 171) on Horapollo.]

[2] *Horapollinis Niloi Hieroglyphica*, ed. Leemans (1835, 14). The words that refer to the vulture's sex run: 'μητέρα μὲν, ἐπειδὴ ἄρρεν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γένει τῶν ζώων οὐχ ὑπάρχει' ['They use the picture of a vulture to denote a mother, because in this race of creatures there are no males.' — It seems as though the wrong passage from Horapollo is quoted here. The phrase in the text implies that what we should have here is the myth of the vulture's impregnation by the wind.]

[3] Müntz (1899, 282).

[4] Müntz (ibid.).

fabulam de vulturibus cupide amplexi sunt Patres Ecclesiastici, ut ita argumento ex rerum natura petito refutarent eos, qui Virginis partum negabant; itaque apud omnes fere hujus rei mentio occurrit.'[1]

So the fable of the single sex of vultures and their mode of conception remained something very far from an unimportant anecdote like the analogous tale of the scarabaeus beetle, it had been seized on by the Fathers of the Church so that they could have at their disposal a proof drawn from natural history to confront those who doubted sacred history. If vultures were described in the best accounts of antiquity as depending on the wind for impregnation, why could not the same thing have also happened on one occasion with a human female? Since the fable of the vulture could be turned to this account 'almost all' the Fathers of the Church made a practice of telling it, and thus it can hardly be doubted that Leonardo too came to know of it through its being favoured by so wide a patronage.

We can now reconstruct the origin of Leonardo's vulture phantasy. He once happened to read in one of the Fathers or in a book on natural history the statement that all vultures were females and could reproduce their kind without any assistance from a male: and at that point a memory sprang to his mind, which was transformed into the phantasy we have been discussing, but which meant to signify that he also had been such a vulture-child – he had had a mother, but no father. With this memory was associated, in the only way in which impressions of so great an age can find expression, an echo of the pleasure he had had at his mother's breast. The allusion made by the Fathers of the Church to the idea of the Blessed Virgin and her child – an idea cherished by every artist – must have played its part in helping the phantasy to appear valuable and important to him. Indeed in this way he was able to identify himself with the child Christ, the comforter and saviour not of this one woman alone.

Our aim in dissecting a childhood phantasy is to separate the

[1] ['But this story about the vulture was eagerly taken up by the Fathers of the Church, in order to refute, by means of a proof drawn from the natural order, those who denied the Virgin Birth. The subject is therefore mentioned in almost all of them.']

real memory that it contains from the later motives that modify and distort it. In Leonardo's case we believe that we now know thereal content of the phantasy: the replacement of his mother by the vulture indicates that the child was aware of his father's absence and found himself alone with his mother. The fact of Leonardo's illegitimate birth is in harmony with his vulture phantasy, it was only on this account that he could compare himself to a vulture child. But the next reliable fact that we possess about his youth is that by the time he was five he had been received into his father's household. We are completely ignorant when that happened: whether it was a few months after his birth or whether it was a few weeks before the drawing-up of the land-register [p. 81]. It is here that the interpretation of the vulture phantasy comes in. Leonardo, it seems to tell us, spent the critical first years of his life not by the side of his father and stepmother, but with his poor, forsaken, real mother, so that he had time to feel the absence of his father. This seems a slender and yet a somewhat daring conclusion to have emerged from our psycho-analytic efforts, but its significance will increase as we continue our investigation. Its certainty is reinforced when we consider the circumstances that did in fact operate in Leonardo's childhood. In the same year that Leonardo was born, the sources tell us, his father, Ser Piero da Vinci, married Donna Albiera, a lady of good birth; it was to the childlessness of this marriage that the boy owed his reception into his father's — or rather his grandfather's, house — an event which had taken place by the time he was five years old, as the document attests. Now it is not usual at the start of a marriage to put an illegitimate offspring into the care of the young bride who still expects to be blessed with children of her own. Years of disappointment must surely first have elapsed before it was decided to adopt the illegitimate child — who had probably grown up an attractive young boy — as a compensation for the absence of the legitimate children that had been hoped for. It fits in best with the interpretation of the vulture phantasy if at least three years of Leonardo's life, and perhaps five, had elapsed before he could exchange the solitary person of his mother for a parental couple. And by then it was too late. In the first three or four years of life certain impressions become fixed and ways of reacting to the outside world are

established which can never be deprived of their importance by later experiences.

If it is true that the unintelligible memories of a person's childhood and the phantasies that are built on them invariably emphasize the most important elements in his mental development, then it follows that the fact which the vulture phantasy confirms, namely that Leonardo spent the first years of his life alone with his mother, will have been of decisive influence in the formation of his inner life. An inevitable effect of this state of affairs was that the child who was confronted in his early life with one problem more than other children began to brood on this riddle with special intensity, and so at a tender age became a researcher, tormented as he was by the great question of where babies come from and what the father has to do with their origin.[1] It was a vague suspicion that his researches and the history of his childhood were connected in this way which later prompted him to exclaim that he had been destined from the first to investigate the problem of the flight of birds since he had been visited by a vulture as he lay in his cradle. Later on it will not be difficult to show how his curiosity about the flight of birds was derived from the sexual researches of his childhood.

[1] [Cf. 'The Sexual Theories of Children' (1908*c*).]

III

In Leonardo's childhood phantasy we have taken the element of the vulture to represent the real content of his memory, while the context in which Leonardo himself placed his phantasy has thrown a bright light on the importance which that content had for his later life. In proceeding with our work of interpretation we now come up against the strange problem of why this content has been recast into a homosexual situation. The mother who suckles her child—or to put it better, at whose breast the child sucks—has been turned into a vulture that puts its tail into the child's mouth. We have asserted [p. 85] that, according to the usual way in which language makes use of substitutes, the vulture's '*coda*' cannot possibly signify anything other than a male genital, a penis. But we do not understand how imaginative activity can have succeeded in endowing precisely this bird which is a mother with the distinguishing mark of masculinity; and in view of this absurdity we are at a loss how to reduce this creation of Leonardo's phantasy to any rational meaning.

However, we should not despair, as we reflect on the number of apparently absurd dreams that we have in the past compelled to give up their meaning. Is there any reason why a memory of childhood should offer us more difficulty than a dream?

Remembering that it is unsatisfactory when a peculiar feature is found singly, let us hasten to add another to it which is even more striking.[1]

The vulture-headed Egyptian goddess Mut, a figure without any personal character according to Drexler's article in Roscher's lexicon, was often merged with other mother goddesses of a more strongly marked individuality, like Isis and Hathor, but at the same time she maintained her separate existence and cult. A special feature of the Egyptian pantheon was that the individual gods did not disappear in the process of syncretization. Alongside the fusion of gods the individual

[1] [Cf. some similar remarks by Freud in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900*a*), *Standard Ed.*, 4, 135–6.]

divinities continued to exist in independence. Now this vulture-headed mother goddess was usually represented by the Egyptians with a phallus,[1] her body was female, as the breasts indicated, but it also had a male organ in a state of erection.

In the goddess Mut, then, we find the same combination of maternal and masculine characteristics as in Leonardo's phantasy of the vulture. Are we to explain this coincidence by assuming that from studying his books [cf. p. 89] Leonardo had also learnt of the androgynous nature of the maternal vulture? Such a possibility is more than questionable, it appears that the sources to which he had access contained no information about this remarkable feature. It is more plausible to trace the correspondence back to a common factor operative in both cases but still unknown.

Mythology can teach us that an androgynous structure, a combination of male and female sex characters, was an attribute not only of Mut but also of other deities like Isis and Hathor — though perhaps of these only in so far as they too had a maternal nature and became amalgamated with Mut (Romer, 1913). It teaches us further that other Egyptian deities, like Neith of Sais — from whom the Greek Athene was later derived — were originally conceived of as androgynous, i.e. as hermaphrodite, and that the same was true of many of the *Greek* gods, especially of those associated with Dionysus, but also of Aphrodite, who was later restricted to the rôle of a female goddess of love. Mythology may then offer the explanation that the addition of a phallus to the female body is intended to denote the primal creative force of nature, and that all these hermaphrodite divinities are expressions of the idea that only a combination of male and female elements can give a worthy representation of divine perfection. But none of these considerations gives us an explanation of the puzzling psychological fact that the human imagination does not boggle at endowing a figure which is intended to embody the essence of the mother with the mark of male potency which is the opposite of everything maternal.

Infantile sexual theories provide the explanation. There was

[1] See the illustrations in Lanzone (1882, Plates CXXXVI–CXXXVIII).

once a time when the male genital was found compatible with the picture of the mother.[1] When a male child first turns his curiosity to the riddles of sexual life, he is dominated by his interest in his own genital. He finds that part of his body too valuable and too important for him to be able to believe that it could be missing in other people whom he feels he resembles so much. As he cannot guess that there exists another type of genital structure of equal worth, he is forced to make the assumption that all human beings, women as well as men, possess a penis like his own. This preconception is so firmly planted in the youthful investigator that it is not destroyed even when he first observes the genitals of little girls. His perception tells him, it is true, that there is something different from what there is in him, but he is incapable of admitting to himself that the content of this perception is that he cannot find a penis in girls. That the penis could be missing strikes him as an uncanny and intolerable idea, and so in an attempt at a compromise he comes to the conclusion that little girls have a penis as well, only it is still very small, it will grow later.[2] If it seems from later observations that this expectation is not realized, he has another remedy at his disposal: little girls too had a penis, but it was cut off and in its place was left a wound. This theoretical advance already makes use of personal experiences of a distressing kind: the boy in the meantime has heard the threat that the organ which is so dear to him will be taken away from him if he shows his interest in it too plainly. Under the influence of this threat of castration he now sees the notion he has gained of the female genitals in a new light; henceforth he will tremble for his masculinity, but at the same time he will despise the unhappy creatures on whom the cruel punishment has, as he supposes, already fallen.[3]

[1] [Cf. 'The Sexual Theories of Children' (1908c).]

[2] Compare the observations in the *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen* [i.e. Freud, 1909b ('Little Hans'), *Standard Ed.*, **10**, 11, and June, 1910 *and later*], in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse* and in [the section dealing with children in] *Imago*.

[3] [*Footnote added* 1919.] The conclusion strikes me as inescapable that here we may also trace one of the roots of the anti-semitism which appears with such elemental force and finds such irrational expression among the nations of the West. Circumcision is unconsciously equated

Before the child comes under the dominance of the castration-complex—at a time when he still holds women at full value—he begins to display an intense desire to look, as an erotic instinctual activity. He wants to see other people's genitals, at first in all probability to compare them with his own. The erotic attraction that comes from his mother soon culminates in a longing for her genital organ, which he takes to be a penis. With the discovery, which is not made till later, that women do not have a penis, this longing often turns into its opposite and gives place to a feeling of disgust which in the years of puberty can become the cause of psychical impotence, misogyny and permanent homosexuality. But the fixation on the object that was once strongly desired, the woman's penis, leaves indelible traces on the mental life of the child, who has pursued that portion of his infantile sexual researches with particular thoroughness. Fetishistic reverence for a woman's foot and shoe appears to take the foot merely as a substitutive symbol for the woman's penis which was once revered and later missed; without knowing it, '*toujours de nuit*'[1] play the part of people who carry out an act of castration on the female genital organ.

People will not reach a proper understanding of the activities of children's sexuality and will probably take refuge in declaring that what has been said here is incredible, so long as they cling to the attitude taken up by our civilization of depreciating the genitals and the sexual functions. To understand the mental life of children we require analogies from primitive times. Through a long series of generations the genitals have been for us the '*pudenda*', objects of shame, and even as a result of further successful sexual repression of disgust. If one makes a broad survey of the sexual life of our time and in particular of the classes who sustain human civilization, one is tempted to declare that[2] it is only with reluctance that the majority of those alive to-day obey the command to propagate their kind; they

with castration. If we venture to carry our conjectures back to the primeval days of the human race we can surmise that originally circumcision must have been a milder substitute, designed to take the place of castration. [Further discussion on this will be found in a footnote to the analysis of 'Little Hans' (1909), *Standard Ed.*, **10**, 50, and in *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), Chapter III, Part I, Section D.]

[1] [Perverts who enjoy cutting off females' hair.]

[2] [The sentence up to this point was added in 1919.]

feel that their dignity as human beings suffers and is degraded in the process. What is to be found among us in the way of another view of sexual life is confined to the uncultivated lower strata of society, among the higher and more refined classes it is concealed, since it is considered culturally inferior, and it ventures to put itself into practice only in the face of a bad conscience. In the primaeval days of the human race it was a different story. The laborious compilations of the student of civilization provide convincing evidence that originally the genitals were the pride and hope of living beings, they were worshipped as gods and transmitted the divine nature of their functions to all newly learned human activities. As a result of the sublimation of their basic nature there arose innumerable divinities; and at the time when the connection between official religions and sexual activity was already hidden from the general consciousness, secret cults devoted themselves to keeping it alive among a number of initiates. In the course of cultural development so much of the divine and sacred was ultimately extracted from sexuality that the exhausted remnant fell into contempt. But in view of the indelibility that is characteristic of all mental traces, it is surely not surprising that even the most primitive forms of genital-worship can be shown to have existed in very recent times and that the language, customs and superstitions of mankind to-day contain survivals from every phase of this process of development.[1]

Impressive analogies from biology have prepared us to find that the individual's mental development repeats the course of human development in an abbreviated form; and the conclusions which psycho-analytic research into the child's mind has reached concerning the high value set on the genitals in infancy will not therefore strike us as improbable. The child's assumption that his mother has a penis is thus the common source from which are derived the androgynously-formed mother goddesses such as the Egyptian Mut and the vultures' '*coda*' in Leonardo's childhood phantasy. It is in fact only due to a misunderstanding that we describe these representations of gods as hermaphrodite in the medical sense of the word. In none of them is there a combination of the true genitals of both sexes—a combination which, to the abhorrence of all beholders,

[1] Cf. Knight [1768].

is found in some cases of malformation; all that has happened is that the male organ has been added to the breasts which are the mark of a mother, just as it was present in the child's first idea of his mother's body. This form of the mother's body, the revered creation of primaeval phantasy, has been preserved for the faithful by mythology. We can now provide the following translation of the emphasis given to the vulture's tail in Leonardo's phantasy: 'That was a time when my fond curiosity was directed to my mother, and when I still believed she had a genital organ like my own.' Here is more evidence of Leonardo's early sexual researches, which in our opinion had a decisive effect on the whole of his later life.

At this point a little reflection will remind us that we ought not to feel satisfied yet with the way the vulture's tail in Leonardo's childhood phantasy has been explained. Something more seems to be contained in it which we do not yet understand. Its most striking feature, after all, was that it changed sucking at the mother's breast into being suckled, that is, into passivity, and thus into a situation whose nature is undoubtedly homosexual. When we remember the historical probability of Leonardo having behaved in his life as one who was emotionally homosexual, the question is forced upon us whether this phantasy does not indicate the existence of a causal connection between Leonardo's relation with his mother in childhood and his later manifest, if ideal [sublimated], homosexuality. We should not venture to infer a connection of this sort from Leonardo's distorted reminiscence if we did not know from the psycho-analytic study of homosexual patients that such a connection does exist and is in fact an intimate and necessary one.

Homosexual men, who have in our times taken vigorous action against the restrictions imposed by law on their sexual activity, are fond of representing themselves, through their theoretical spokesmen, as being from the outset a distinct sexual species, as an intermediate sexual stage, as a 'third sex'. They are, they claim, men who are innately compelled by organic determinants to find pleasure in men and have been debarred from obtaining it in women. Much as one would be glad on grounds of humanity to endorse their claims, one must treat their theories with some reserve, for they have been advanced without regard for the psychical genesis of homo-

sexuality. Psycho-analysis offers the means of filling this gap and of putting the assertions of homosexuals to the test. It has succeeded in the task only in the case of a small number of persons, but all the investigations undertaken so far have yielded the same surprising result.[1] In all our male homosexual cases the subjects had had a very intense erotic attachment to a female person, as a rule their mother, during the first period of childhood, which is afterwards forgotten, this attachment was evoked or encouraged by too much tenderness on the part of the mother herself, and further reinforced by the small part played by the father during their childhood. Sadger emphasizes the fact that the mothers of his homosexual patients were frequently masculine women, women with energetic traits of character, who were able to push the father out of his proper place. I have occasionally seen the same thing, but I was more strongly impressed by cases in which the father was absent from the beginning or left the scene at an early date, so that the boy found himself left entirely under feminine influence. Indeed it almost seems as though the presence of a strong father would ensure that the son made the correct decision in his choice of object, namely someone of the opposite sex.[2]

After this preliminary stage a transformation sets in whose

[1] I refer in particular to the investigations of J. Sadger, which I can in the main confirm from my own experience. I am also aware that Wilhelm Stekel of Vienna and Sandor Ferenczi of Budapest have arrived at the same results.

[2] [*Footnote added* 1914.] Psycho-analytic research has contributed two facts that are beyond question to the understanding of homosexuality, without at the same time supposing that it has exhausted the causes of this sexual aberration. The first is the fixation of the erotic needs on the mother which has been mentioned above, the other is contained in the statement that everyone, even the most normal person, is capable of making a homosexual object-choice and has done so at some time in his life, and either still adheres to it in his unconscious or else protects himself against it by vigorous counter attitudes. These two discoveries put an end both to the claim of homosexuals to be regarded as a 'third sex' and to what has been believed to be the important distinction between innate and acquired homosexuality. The presence of somatic characters of the other sex—the quota provided by physical hermaphroditism—is highly conducive to the homosexual object-choice becoming manifest, but it is not decisive. It must be stated with regret that those who speak for the homosexuals in the field of science have been incapable of learning anything from the established findings of psycho-analysis.

mechanism is known to us but whose motive forces we do not yet understand. The child's love for his mother cannot continue to develop consciously any further; it succumbs to repression. The boy represses his love for his mother: he puts himself in her place, identifies himself with her, and takes his own person as a model in whose likeness he chooses the new objects of his love. In this way he has become a homosexual. What he has in fact done is to slip back to auto-erotism: for the boys whom he now loves as he grows up are after all only substitutive figures and revivals of himself in childhood—boys whom he loves in the way in which his mother loved *him* when he was a child. He finds the objects of his love along the path of *narcissism*, as we say, for Narcissus, according to the Greek legend, was a youth who preferred his own reflection to everything else and who was changed into the lovely flower of that name.[1]

Psychological considerations of a deeper kind justify the assertion that a man who has become a homosexual in this way remains unconsciously fixated to the mnemic image of his mother. By repressing his love for his mother he preserves it in his unconscious and from now on remains faithful to her. While he seems to pursue boys and to be their lover, he is in reality running away from the other women, who might cause him to be unfaithful. In individual cases direct observation has also enabled us to show that the man who gives the appearance of being susceptible only to the charms of men is in fact attracted by women in the same way as a normal man; but on each occasion he hastens to transfer the excitation he has received from women on to a male object, and in this manner he repeats over and over again the mechanism by which he acquired his homosexuality.

We are far from wishing to exaggerate the importance of these explanations of the psychical genesis of homosexuality. It is quite obvious that they are in sharp contrast to the official theories of those who speak for homosexuals, but we know that

[1] [Freud's first published reference to narcissism had appeared only a few months before, in a footnote added to the second edition of his *Three Essays* (1910*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 145n., which was published early in 1910. He had mentioned the concept at a meeting of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on November 10, 1909. For a full-length discussion of the subject see 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' (1914*c*).]

they are not sufficiently comprehensive to make a conclusive explanation of the problem possible. What is for practical reasons called homosexuality may arise from a whole variety of psychosexual inhibitory processes, the particular process we have singled out is perhaps only one among many, and is perhaps related to only one type of 'homosexuality'. We must also admit that the number of cases of our homosexual type in which it is possible to point to the determinants which we require far exceeds the number of those where the deduced effect actually takes place, so that we too cannot reject the part played by unknown constitutional factors, to which the whole of homosexuality is usually traced. We should not have had any cause at all for entering into the psychical genesis of the form of homosexuality we have studied if there were not a strong presumption that Leonardo, whose phantasy of the vulture was our starting point, was himself a homosexual of this very type [1]

Few details are known about the sexual behaviour of the great artist and scientist, but we may place confidence in the probability that the assertions of his contemporaries were not grossly erroneous. In the light of these traditions, then, he appears as a man whose sexual need and activity were exceptionally reduced, as if a higher aspiration had raised him above the common animal need of mankind. It may remain open to doubt whether he ever sought direct sexual satisfaction – and if so, in what manner – or whether he was able to dispense with it altogether. We are however justified in looking in him too for the emotional currents which drive other men imperatively on to perform the sexual act, for we cannot imagine the mental life of any human being in the formation of which sexual desire in the broadest sense – libido – did not have its share, even if that desire has departed far from its original aim, or has refrained from putting itself into effect.

We cannot expect to find in Leonardo anything more than *traces* of untransformed sexual inclinations. But these point in

[1] [A more general discussion of homosexuality and its genesis will be found in the first of Freud's *Three Essays* (1905*d*), particularly in a long footnote added between 1910 and 1915 (*Standard Ed.*, 7, 144 7). Among other later discussions of the subject may be mentioned his case history of a female homosexual (1920*a*) and 'Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality' (1922*b*).]

one direction and moreover allow him to be reckoned as a homosexual. It has always been emphasized that he took only strikingly handsome boys and youths as pupils. He treated them with kindness and consideration, looked after them, and when they were ill nursed them himself, just as a mother nurses her children and just as his own mother might have tended him. As he had chosen them for their beauty and not for their talent, none of them—Cesare da Sesto, Boltraffio, Andrea Salaino, Francesco Melzi and others—became a painter of importance. Generally they were unable to make themselves independent of their master, and after his death they disappeared without having left any definite mark on the history of art. The others, whose works entitled them to be called his pupils, like Luini and Bazi, called Sodoma, he probably did not know personally.

We realize that we shall have to meet the objection that Leonardo's behaviour towards his pupils has nothing at all to do with sexual motives and that it allows no conclusions to be drawn about his particular sexual inclination. Against this we wish to submit with all caution that our view explains some peculiar features of the artist's behaviour which would otherwise have to remain a mystery. Leonardo kept a diary, he made entries in his small hand-writing from right to left which were meant only for himself. It is noteworthy that in this diary he addressed himself in the second person. 'Learn the multiplication of roots from Master Luca.' (Solmi, 1908, 152.) 'Get Master d'Abacco to show you how to square the circle.' (Loc. cit.) Or on the occasion of a journey: 'I am going to Milan on business to do with my garden . . . Have two baggage trunks made. Get Boltraffio to show you the turning-lathe and get him to polish a stone on it. Leave the book for Master Andrea il Todesco.' (Ibid., 203.)[1] Or a resolution of very different importance: 'You have to show in your treatise that the earth is a star, like the moon or something like it, and thus prove the nobility of our world.' (Herzfeld, 1906, 141.)

In this diary, which, by the way, like the diaries of other mortals, often dismisses the most important events of the day

[1] Leonardo is behaving here like someone whose habit it was to make his daily confession to another person and who uses his diary as a substitute for him. For a conjecture as to who this person may have been, see Merezhkovsky (1903, 367).

in a few words or else passes them over in complete silence, there are some entries which on account of their strangeness are quoted by all Leonardo's biographers. They are notes of small sums of money spent by the artist: notes recorded with a minute exactness, as if they were made by a pedantically strict and parsimonious head of a household. There is on the other hand no record of the expenditure of larger sums or any other evidence that the artist was at home in keeping accounts. One of these notes has to do with a new cloak which he bought for his pupil Andrea Salaino: [1]

Silver brocade	15 lire	4 soldi
Crimson velvet for trimming . .	9 „	– „
Braid	– „	9 „
Buttons	– „	12 „

Another very detailed note brings together all the expenses he incurred through the bad character and thievish habits of another pupil: [2] 'On the twenty-first day of April, 1490, I began this book and made a new start on the horse [3] Jacomo came to me on St. Mary Magdalen's day, 1490: he is ten years old.' (Marginal note: 'thievish, untruthful, selfish, greedy.') 'On the second day I had two shirts cut out for him, a pair of trousers and a jacket, and when I put the money aside to pay for these things, he stole the money from my purse, and it was never possible to make him own up, although I was absolutely sure of it.' Marginal note: '4 lire . . .'. The report of the child's misdeeds runs on in this way and ends with the reckoning of expenses. 'In the first year, a cloak, 2 lire; 6 shirts, 4 lire; 3 jackets, 6 lire; 4 pairs of stockings, 7 lire, etc.' [4]

Nothing is further from the wishes of Leonardo's biographers than to try to solve the problems in their hero's mental life by starting from his small weaknesses and peculiarities; and the usual comment that they make on these singular accounts is one which lays stress on the artist's kindness and consideration for his pupils. They forget that what calls for explanation is not Leonardo's behaviour, but the fact that he left these pieces of evidence of it behind him. As it is impossible to believe that his motive was that of letting proofs of his good nature fall into

[1] The text is that given by Merezhkovsky (1903, 282).
[2] Or model. [3] For the equestrian statue of Francesco Sforza.
[4] The full text is to be found in Herzfeld (1906, 45).

our hands, we must assume that it was another motive, an affective one, which led him to write these notes down. What motive it was is not easy to guess, and we should be unable to suggest one if there were not another account found among Leonardo's papers which throws a vivid light on these strangely trifling notes about his pupils' clothing, etc.:

Expenses after Caterina's death for her funeral	27	florins
2 pounds of wax	18	„
For transporting and erecting the cross	12	„
Catafalque	4	„
Pall-bearers	8	„
For 4 priests and 4 clerks	20	„
Bell-ringing	2	„
For the grave-diggers	16	„
For the licence—to the officials	1	„
Total	108	florins

Previous expenses

For the doctor	4	florins
For sugar and candles	12	„
	16	florins
Grand total	124	florins.[1]

The novelist Merezhkovsky alone is able to tell us who this Caterina was. From two other short notes [2] he concludes that

[1] Merezhkovsky (1903, 372).—As a melancholy example of the uncertainty that surrounds the information, which is in any case scanty enough, about Leonardo's private life, I may mention the fact that the same account is quoted by Solmi (1908, 104) with considerable variations. The most serious one is that soldi are given instead of florins. It may be assumed that florins in this account do not mean the old 'gold florins' but the monetary units which were used later and were worth 1¾ lire or 33⅓ soldi. Solmi makes Caterina a servant who had looked after Leonardo's household for some time. The source from which the two versions of these accounts were taken was not accessible to me. [The figures given actually vary to some extent in the different editions of Freud's own book. The cost of the catafalque is given in 1910 as '12', in 1919 and 1923 as '19' and from 1925 as '4'. Before 1925 the cost of transporting and erecting the cross was given as '4'. For a recent version of the whole text, in Italian and English, see J. P. Richter (1939, 2, 379).]

[2] 'Caterina arrived on July 16, 1493'—'Giovannina—a fabulous face—Call on Caterina in the hospital and make enquiries.'

Leonardo's mother, the poor peasant woman of Vinci, came to Milan in 1493 to visit her son, who was then 41, that she fell ill there, was taken to hospital by Leonardo, and when she died was honoured by him with this costly funeral

This interpretation by the psychological novelist cannot be put to the proof, but it can claim so much inner probability, and is so much in harmony with all that we otherwise know of Leonardo's emotional activity, that I cannot refrain from accepting it as correct. He had succeeded in subjecting his feelings to the yoke of research and in inhibiting their free utterance; but even for him there were occasions when what had been suppressed obtained expression forcibly. The death of the mother he had once loved so dearly was one of these. What we have before us in the account of the costs of the funeral is the expression—distorted out of all recognition of his mourning for his mother. We wonder how such distortion could come about, and indeed we cannot understand it if we treat it as a normal mental process. But similar processes are well known to us in the abnormal conditions of neurosis and especially of what is known as 'obsessional neurosis'. There we can see how the expression of intense feelings, which have however become unconscious through repression, is displaced on to trivial and even foolish actions. The expression of these repressed feelings has been lowered by the forces opposed to them to such a degree that one would have had to form a most insignificant estimate of their intensity; but the imperative compulsiveness with which this trivial expressive act is performed betrays the real force of the impulses—a force which is rooted in the unconscious and which consciousness would like to deny. Only a comparison such as this with what happens in obsessional neurosis can explain Leonardo's account of the expenses of his mother's funeral. In his unconscious he was still tied to her by erotically coloured feelings, as he had been in childhood. The opposition that came from the subsequent repression of this childhood love did not allow him to set up a different and worthier memorial to her in his diary. But what emerged as a compromise from this neurotic conflict had to be carried out; and thus it was that the account was entered in the diary, and has come to the knowledge of posterity as something unintelligible.

It does not seem a very extravagant step to apply what we have learnt from the funeral account to the reckonings of the pupils' expenses They would then be another instance of the scanty remnants of Leonardo's libidinal impulses finding expression in a compulsive manner and in a distorted form. On that view, his mother and his pupils, the likenesses of his own boyish beauty, had been his sexual objects—so far as the sexual repression which dominated his nature allows us so to describe them and the compulsion to note in laborious detail the sums he spent on them betrayed in this strange way his rudimentary conflicts. From this it would appear that Leonardo's erotic life did really belong to the type of homosexuality whose psychical development we have succeeded in disclosing, and the emergence of the homosexual situation in his phantasy of the vulture would become intelligible to us: for its meaning was exactly what we have already asserted of that type. We should have to translate it thus: 'It was through this erotic relation with my mother that I became a homosexual.' [1]

[1] The forms of expression in which Leonardo's repressed libido was allowed to show itself—circumstantiality and concern over money—are among the traits of character which result from anal erotism. See my 'Character and Anal Erotism' (1908*b*).

LEONARDO'S MONA LISA

IV

We have not yet done with Leonardo's vulture phantasy. In words which only too plainly recall a description of a sexual act ('and struck me many times with its tail against[1] my lips'), Leonardo stresses the intensity of the erotic relations between mother and child. From this linking of his mother's (the vulture's) activity with the prominence of the mouth zone it is not difficult to guess that a second memory is contained in the phantasy. This may be translated: 'My mother pressed innumerable passionate kisses on my mouth.' The phantasy is compounded from the memory of being suckled and being kissed by his mother.

Kindly nature has given the artist the ability to express his most secret mental impulses, which are hidden even from himself, by means of the works that he creates; and these works have a powerful effect on others who are strangers to the artist, and who are themselves unaware of the source of their emotion. Can it be that there is nothing in Leonardo's life work to bear witness to what his memory preserved as the strongest impression of his childhood? One would certainly expect there to be something. Yet if one considers the profound transformations through which an impression in an artist's life has to pass before it is allowed to make its contribution to a work of art, one will be bound to keep any claim to certainty in one's demonstration within very modest limits, and this is especially so in Leonardo's case.

Anyone who thinks of Leonardo's paintings will be reminded of a remarkable smile, at once fascinating and puzzling, which he conjured up on the lips of his female subjects. It is an unchanging smile, on long, curved lips, it has become a mark of his style and the name 'Leonardesque' has been chosen for it.[2] In the strangely beautiful face of the Florentine Mona Lisa del Giocondo it has produced the most powerful and confusing effect on whoever looks at it. [See Plate II.] This smile has

[1] [See footnote 1, p. 82.]

[2] [*Footnote added* 1919.] The connoisseur of art will think here of the peculiar fixed smile found in archaic Greek sculptures—in those, for example, from Aegina, he will perhaps also discover something similar in the figures of Leonardo's teacher Verrocchio and therefore have some misgivings in accepting the arguments that follow.

called for an interpretation, and it has met with many of the most varied kinds, none of which has been satisfactory. 'Voilà quatre siecles bientot que Monna Lisa fait perdre la tête à tous ceux qui parlent d'elle, apres l'avoir longtemps regardée' [1]

Muther (1909, 1, 314) writes 'What especially casts a spell on the spectator is the daemonic magic of this smile. Hundreds of poets and authors have written about this woman who now appears to smile on us so seductively, and now to stare coldly and without soul into space, and no one has solved the riddle of her smile, no one has read the meaning of her thoughts. Everything, even the landscape, is mysteriously dream-like, and seems to be trembling in a kind of sultry sensuality.'

The idea that two distinct elements are combined in Mona Lisa's smile is one that has struck several critics. They accordingly find in the beautiful Florentine's expression the most perfect representation of the contrasts which dominate the erotic life of women; the contrast between reserve and seduction, and between the most devoted tenderness and a sensuality that is ruthlessly demanding—consuming men as if they were alien beings. This is the view of Muntz (1899, 417), 'On sait quelle énigme indéchiffrable et passionnante Monna Lisa Gioconda ne cesse depuis bientôt quatre siècles de proposer aux admirateurs presses devant elle. Jamais artiste (j'emprunte la plume du delicat ecrivain qui se cache sous le pseudonyme de Pierre de Corlay), "a-t-il traduit ainsi l'essence même de la feminitute: tendresse et coquetterie, pudeur et sourde volupté, tout le mystere d'un coeur qui se réserve, d'un cerveau qui réfléchit, d'une personnalité qui se garde et ne livre d'elle-même que son rayonnement . . ." ' [2] The Italian writer Angelo Conti (1910, 93) saw the picture in the Louvre brought to life by a ray of

[1] ['For almost four centuries now Mona Lisa has caused all who talk of her, after having gazed on her for long, to lose their heads.'] The words are Gruyer's, quoted by von Seidlitz (1909, 2, 281).

[2] ['We know what an insoluble and enthralling enigma Mona Lisa Gioconda has never ceased through nearly four centuries to pose to the admirers that throng in front of her. No artist (I borrow the words from the sensitive writer who conceals himself behind the pseudonym of Pierre de Corlay) "has ever expressed so well the very essence of female duty, tenderness and coquetry, modesty and secret sensuous joy, all the mystery of a heart that beats aloof, a brain that meditates, a personality that holds back and yields nothing of itself save its radiance".']

sunshine. 'La donna sorrideva in una calma regale: i suoi istinti di conquista, di ferocia, tutta l'eredità della specie, la volontà della seduzione e dell' agguato, la grazia del inganno, la bontà che cela un proposito crudele, tutto ciò appariva alternativamente e scompariva dietro il velo ridente e si fondeva nel poema del suo sorriso . . . Buona e malvagia, crudele e compassionevole, graziosa e felina, ella rideva . . .' [1]

Leonardo spent four years painting at this picture, perhaps from 1503 to 1507, during his second period of residence in Florence, when he was over fifty. According to Vasari he employed the most elaborate artifices to keep the lady amused during the sittings and to retain the famous smile on her features. In its present condition the picture has preserved but little of all the delicate details which his brush reproduced on the canvas at that time, while it was being painted it was considered to be the highest that art could achieve, but it is certain that Leonardo himself was not satisfied with it, declaring it to be incomplete, and did not deliver it to the person who had commissioned it, but took it to France with him, where his patron, Francis I, acquired it from him for the Louvre.

Let us leave unsolved the riddle of the expression on Mona Lisa's face, and note the indisputable fact that her smile exercised no less powerful a fascination on the artist than on all who have looked at it for the last four hundred years. From that date the captivating smile reappears in all his pictures and in those of his pupils. As Leonardo's Mona Lisa is a portrait, we cannot assume that he added on his own account such an expressive feature to her face—a feature that she did not herself possess. The conclusion seems hardly to be avoided that he found this smile in his model and fell so strongly under its spell that from then on he bestowed it on the free creations of his phantasy. This interpretation, which cannot be called far-fetched, is put forward, for example, by Konstantinowa (1907, 44):

[1] ['The lady smiled in regal calm: her instincts of conquest, of ferocity, all the heredity of the species, the will to seduce and to ensnare, the charm of deceit, the kindness that conceals a cruel purpose,—all this appeared and disappeared by turns behind the laughing veil and buried itself in the poem of her smile . . . Good and wicked, cruel and compassionate, graceful and feline, she laughed . . .']

'During the long period in which the artist was occupied with the portrait of Mona Lisa del Giocondo, he had entered into the subtle details of the features on this lady's face with such sympathetic feeling that he transferred its traits -in particular the mysterious smile and the strange gaze—to all the faces that he painted or drew afterwards. The Gioconda's peculiar facial expression can even be perceived in the picture of John the Baptist in the Louvre, but above all it may be clearly recognized in the expression on Mary's face in the "Madonna and Child with St. Anne".' [1] [See the Frontispiece of this volume.]

Yet this situation may also have come about in another way. The need for a deeper reason behind the attraction of La Gioconda's smile, which so moved the artist that he was never again free from it, has been felt by more than one of his biographers Walter Pater, who sees in the picture of Mona Lisa a 'presence . . . expressive of what in the ways of a thousand years men had come to desire' [1873, 118], and who writes very sensitively of 'the unfathomable smile, always with a touch of something sinister in it, which plays over all Leonardo's work' [ibid., 117], leads us to another clue when he declares (loc. cit.):

'Besides, the picture is a portrait. From childhood we see this image defining itself on the fabric of his dreams; and but for express historical testimony, we might fancy that this was but his ideal lady, embodied and beheld at last . . .'

Marie Herzfeld (1906, 88) has no doubt something very similar in mind when she declares that in the Mona Lisa Leonardo encountered his own self and for this reason was able to put so much of his own nature into the picture 'whose features had lain all along in mysterious sympathy within Leonardo's mind'.

Let us attempt to clarify what is suggested here. It may very well have been that Leonardo was fascinated by Mona Lisa's smile for the reason that it awoke something in him which had for long lain dormant in his mind probably an old memory. This memory was of sufficient importance for him never to get free of it when it had once been aroused, he was continually

[1] [The title of this subject in German is '*heilige Anna Selbdritt*', literally 'St. Anne with Two Others', a point which is referred to below, p. 112.]

forced to give it new expression. Pater's confident assertion that we can see, from childhood, a face like Mona Lisa's defining itself on the fabric of his dreams, seems convincing and deserves to be taken literally.

Vasari mentions that 'teste di femmine, che ridono' [1] formed the subject of Leonardo's first artistic endeavours. The passage —which, since it is not intended to prove anything, is quite beyond suspicion—runs more fully according to Schorn's translation (1843, 3, 6 : 'In his youth he made some heads of laughing women out of clay, which were reproduced in plaster, and some children's heads which were as beautiful as if they had been modelled by the hand of a master . . .'

Thus we learn that he began his artistic career by portraying two kinds of objects; and these cannot fail to remind us of the two kinds of sexual objects that we have inferred from the analysis of his vulture-phantasy. If the beautiful children's heads were reproductions of his own person as it was in his childhood, then the smiling women are nothing other than repetitions of his mother Caterina, and we begin to suspect the possibility that it was his mother who possessed the mysterious smile the smile that he had lost and that fascinated him so much when he found it again in the Florentine lady.[2]

The painting of Leonardo's which stands nearest to the Mona Lisa in point of time is the so-called 'St Anne with Two Others', St. Anne with the Madonna and child. [See the Frontispiece.] In it the Leonardesque smile is most beautifully and markedly portrayed on both the women's faces It is not possible to discover how long before or after the painting of the Mona Lisa Leonardo began to paint this picture. As both works extended over years, it may, I think, be assumed that the artist was engaged on them at the same time. It would best agree with our expectations if it was the intensity of Leonardo's preoccupation with the features of Mona Lisa which stimulated him to create the composition of St. Anne out of his phantasy. For if the

[1] ['Heads of laughing women'] Quoted by Scognamiglio (1900, 32).

[2] The same assumption is made by Merezhkovsky But the history of Leonardo's childhood as he imagines it departs at the essential points from the conclusions we have drawn from the phantasy of the vulture Yet if the smile had been that of Leonardo himself [as Merezhkovsky also assumes] tradition would hardly have failed to inform us of the coincidence.

Gioconda's smile called up in his mind the memory of his mother, it is easy to understand how it drove him at once to create a glorification of motherhood, and to give back to his mother the smile he had found in the noble lady. We may therefore permit our interest to pass from Mona Lisa's portrait to this other picture—one which is hardly less beautiful, and which to-day also hangs in the Louvre.

St. Anne with her daughter and her grandchild is a subject that is rarely handled in Italian painting. At all events Leonardo's treatment of it differs widely from all other known versions. Muther (1909, **1**, 309) writes:

'Some artists, like Hans Fries, the elder Holbein and Girolamo dai Libri, made Anne sit beside Mary and put the child between them. Others, like Jakob Cornelisz in his Berlin picture, painted what was truly a "St. Anne with Two Others",[1] in other words, they represented her as holding in her arms the small figure of Mary upon which the still smaller figure of the child Christ is sitting.' In Leonardo's picture Mary is sitting on her mother's lap, leaning forward, and is stretching out both arms towards the boy, who is playing with a young lamb and perhaps treating it a little unkindly. The grandmother rests on her hip the arm that is not concealed and gazes down on the pair with a blissful smile. The grouping is certainly not entirely unconstrained. But although the smile that plays on the lips of the two women is unmistakably the same as that in the picture of Mona Lisa, it has lost its uncanny and mysterious character; what it expresses is inward feeling and quiet blissfulness.[2]

After we have studied this picture for some time, it suddenly dawns on us that only Leonardo could have painted it, just as only he could have created the phantasy of the vulture. The picture contains the synthesis of the history of his childhood: its details are to be explained by reference to the most personal impressions in Leonardo's life. In his father's house he found

[1] [I.e., St Anne was the most prominent figure in the picture. See footnote, p. 110 above.]

[2] Konstantinowa (1907, [44]): 'Mary gazes down full of inward feeling on her darling, with a smile that recalls the mysterious expression of La Gioconda.' In another passage [ibid., 52] she says of Mary: 'The Gioconda's smile hovers on her features.'

not only his kind stepmother, Donna Albiera, but also his grandmother, his father's mother, Monna Lucia, who—so we will assume was no less tender to him than grandmothers usually are. These circumstances might well suggest to him a picture representing childhood watched over by mother and grandmother. Another striking feature of the picture assumes even greater significance. St. Anne, Mary's mother and the boy's grandmother, who must have been a matron, is here portrayed as being perhaps a little more mature and serious than the Virgin Mary, but as still being a young woman of unfaded beauty. In point of fact Leonardo has given the boy two mothers, one who stretches her arms out to him, and another in the background; and both are endowed with the blissful smile of the joy of motherhood This peculiarity of the picture has not failed to surprise those who have written about it: Muther, for example, is of the opinion that Leonardo could not bring himself to paint old age, lines and wrinkles, and for this reason made Anne too into a woman of radiant beauty. But can we be satisfied with this explanation? Others have had recourse to denying that there is any similarity in age between the mother and daughter.[1] But Muther's attempt at an explanation is surely enough to prove that the impression that St. Anne has been made more youthful derives from the picture and is not an invention for an ulterior purpose.

Leonardo's childhood was remarkable in precisely the same way as this picture. He had had two mothers, first, his true mother Caterina, from whom he was torn away when he was between three and five, and then a young and tender stepmother, his father's wife, Donna Albiera. By his combining this fact about his childhood with the one mentioned above (the presence of his mother and grandmother) [2] and by his condensing them into a composite unity, the design of 'St. Anne with Two Others' took shape for him. The maternal figure that is further away from the boy the grandmother corresponds to the earlier and true mother, Caterina, in its appearance and in its special relation to the boy The artist seems to have used the blissful smile of St. Anne to disavow and to cloak the envy which the unfortunate woman felt when she was forced to give

[1] Von Seidlitz (1909, 2, 274, notes).

[2] [The words in parentheses were added in 1923.]

up her son to her better-born rival, as she had once given up his father as well.[1]

We thus find a confirmation in another of Leonardo's works of our suspicion that the smile of Mona Lisa del Giocondo had awakened in him as a grown man the memory of the mother of his earliest childhood. From that time onward, madonnas and aristocratic ladies were depicted in Italian painting humbly bowing their heads and smiling the strange, blissful smile of Caterina, the poor peasant girl who had brought into the world

[1] [*Footnote added* 1919] If an attempt is made to separate the figures of Anne and Mary in this picture and to trace the outline of each, it will not be found altogether easy. One is inclined to say that they are fused with each other like badly condensed dream-figures, so that in some places it is hard to say where Anne ends and where Mary begins. But what appears to a critic's eye [in 1919 only: 'to an artist's eye'] as a fault, as a defect in composition, is vindicated in the eyes of analysis by reference to its secret meaning. It seems that for the artist the two mothers of his childhood were melted into a single form.

[*Added* 1923.] It is especially tempting to compare the 'St. Anne with Two Others' of the Louvre with the celebrated London cartoon, where the same material is used to form a different composition. [See Fig. 2] Here the forms of the two mothers are fused even more closely and their separate outlines are even harder to make out, so that critics, far re-

Fig. 2

the splendid son who was destined to paint, to search and to suffer.

If Leonardo was successful in reproducing on Mona Lisa's face the double meaning which this smile contained, the promise of unbounded tenderness and at the same time sinister menace – to quote Pater's phrase [above, p. 110] – then here too he had remained true to the content of his earliest memory. For his mother's tenderness was fateful for him, it determined his destiny and the privations that were in store for him. The

moved from any attempt to offer an interpretation, have been forced to say that it seems 'as if two heads were growing from a single body'.

Most authorities are in agreement in pronouncing the London cartoon to be the earlier work and in assigning its origin to Leonardo's first period in Milan, before 1500. Adolf Rosenberg [1898], on the other hand, sees the composition of the cartoon as a later – and more successful – version of the same theme, and follows Anton Springer in dating it even after the Mona Lisa. It would fit in excellently with our arguments if the cartoon were to be much the earlier work. It is also not hard to imagine how the picture in the Louvre arose out of the cartoon, while the reverse course of events would make no sense. If we take the composition shown in the cartoon as our starting point, we can see how Leonardo may have felt the need to undo the dream-like fusion of the two women – a fusion corresponding to his childhood memory – and to separate the two heads in space. This came about as follows. From the group formed by the mothers he detached Mary's head and the upper part of her body and bent them downwards. To provide a reason for this displacement the child Christ had to come down from her lap on to the ground. There was then no room for the little St. John, who was replaced by the lamb.

[*Added* 1919.] A remarkable discovery has been made in the Louvre picture by Oskar Pfister, which is of undeniable interest, even if one may not feel inclined to accept it without reserve. In Mary's curiously arranged and rather confusing drapery he has discovered the *outline of a vulture* and he interprets it as an *unconscious picture-puzzle* –

'In the picture that represents the artist's mother *the vulture, the symbol of motherhood,* is perfectly clearly visible.

'In the length of blue cloth, which is visible around the hip of the woman in front and which extends in the direction of her lap and her right knee, one can see the vulture's extremely characteristic head, its neck and the sharp curve where its body begins. Hardly any observer whom I have confronted with my little find has been able to resist the evidence of this picture-puzzle.' Pfister, 1913, 147.

At this point the reader will not, I feel sure, grudge the effort of looking at the accompanying illustration, to see if he can find in it the outlines of the vulture seen by Pfister. The piece of blue cloth, whose border

violence of the caresses, to which his phantasy of the vulture points, was only too natural. In her love for her child the poor forsaken mother had to give vent to all her memories of the caresses she had enjoyed as well as her longing for new ones; and she was forced to do so not only to compensate herself for having no husband, but also to compensate her child for having

marks the edges of the picture-puzzle, stands out in the reproduction as a light grey field against the darker ground of the rest of the drapery. [See the Frontispiece and Fig. 3.]



Fig. 3.

Pfister continues: 'The important question however is: How far does the picture-puzzle extend? If we follow the length of cloth, which stands out so sharply from its surroundings, starting at the middle of the wing and continuing from there, we notice that one part of it runs down to the woman's foot, while the other part extends in an upward direction and rests on her shoulder and on the child. The former of these parts might more or less represent the vulture's wing and tail, as it is in nature, the latter might be a pointed belly and—especially when we notice the radiating lines which resemble the outlines of feathers a bird's outspread tail, whose right-hand end, *exactly as in Leonardo's fateful childhood dream* [sic], *leads to the mouth of the child, i.e. of Leonardo himself.*'

The author goes on to examine the interpretation in greater detail, and discusses the difficulties to which it gives rise.

no father to fondle him. So, like all unsatisfied mothers, she took her little son in place of her husband, and by the too early maturing of his erotism robbed him of a part of his masculinity. A mother's love for the infant she suckles and cares for is something far more profound than her later affection for the growing child. It is in the nature of a completely satisfying love-relation, which not only fulfils every mental wish but also every physical need; and if it represents one of the forms of attainable human happiness, that is in no little measure due to the possibility it offers of satisfying, without reproach, wishful impulses which have long been repressed and which must be called perverse.[1] In the happiest young marriage the father is aware that the baby, especially if he is a baby son, has become his rival, and this is the starting-point of an antagonism towards the favourite which is deeply rooted in the unconscious.

When, in the prime of life, Leonardo once more encountered the smile of bliss and rapture which had once played on his mother's lips as she fondled him, he had for long been under the dominance of an inhibition which forbade him ever again to desire such caresses from the lips of women. But he had become a painter, and therefore he strove to reproduce the smile with his brush, giving it to all his pictures (whether he in fact executed them himself or had them done by his pupils under his direction) to Leda, to John the Baptist and to Bacchus. The last two are variants of the same type. 'Leonardo has turned the locust-eater of the Bible', says Mather [1909, **1**, 314], 'into a Bacchus, a young Apollo, who, with a mysterious smile on his lips, and with his smooth legs crossed, gazes at us with eyes that intoxicate the senses.' These pictures breathe a mystical air into whose secret one dares not penetrate; at the very most one can attempt to establish their connection with Leonardo's earlier creations. The figures are still androgynous, but no longer in the sense of the vulture-phantasy. They are beautiful youths of feminine delicacy and with effeminate forms; they do not cast their eyes down, but gaze in mysterious triumph, as if they knew of a great achievement of happiness, about which silence must be kept. The familiar smile of fascination leads one to guess that it is a secret of love. It is possible

[1] See my *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905*d*), [*Standard Ed.*, **7**, 223].

that in these figures Leonardo has denied the unhappiness of his erotic life and has triumphed over it in his art, by representing the wishes of the boy, infatuated with his mother, as fulfilled in this blissful union of the male and female natures.

V

Among the entries in Leonardo's notebooks there is one which catches the reader's attention owing to the importance of what it contains and to a minute formal error.

In July 1504 he writes:

'Adì 9 di Luglio 1504 mercoledì a ore 7 morì Ser Piero da Vinci, notalio al palazzo del Potestà, mio padre, a ore 7. Era d'età d'anni 80, lasciò 10 figlioli maschi e 2 femmine.' [1]

As we see, the note refers to the death of Leonardo's father. The small error in its form consists of the repetition of the time of day 'a ore 7' [at 7 o'clock], which is given twice, as if Leonardo had forgotten at the end of the sentence that he had already written it at the beginning. It is only a small detail, and anyone who was not a psycho-analyst would attach no importance to it. He might not even notice it, and if his attention was drawn to it he might say that a thing like that can happen to anyone in a moment of distraction or of strong feeling, and that it has no further significance.

The psycho-analyst thinks differently. To him nothing is too small to be a manifestation of hidden mental processes. He has learnt long ago that such cases of forgetting or repetition are significant, and that it is the 'distraction' which allows impulses that are otherwise hidden to be revealed.

We would say that this note, like the account for Caterina's funeral [p. 104] and the bills of the pupils' expenses [p. 103], is a case in which Leonardo was unsuccessful in suppressing his affect and in which something that had long been concealed forcibly obtained a distorted expression. Even the form is similar: there is the same pedantic exactness, and the same prominence given to numbers.[2]

We call a repetition of this kind a perseveration. It is an

[1] ['On July 9, 1504, Wednesday at 7 o'clock died Ser Piero da Vinci, notary at the palace of the Podestà, my father, at 7 o'clock. He was 80 years old, and left 10 sons and 2 daughters.'] After Müntz (1899, 13 *n.*).

[2] I am leaving on one side a greater error made by Leonardo in this note by giving his father's age as 80 instead of 77. [See also note 2 on page 120.]

excellent means of indicating affective colour. One recalls, for example, St. Peter's tirade in Dante's *Paradiso* against his unworthy representative on earth:

> Quegli ch'usurpa in terra il luogo mio,
> Il luogo mio, il luogo mio, che vaca
> Nella presenza del Figliuol di Dio,
>
> Fatto ha del cimiterio mio cloaca.[1]

Without Leonardo's affective inhibition the entry in his diary might have run somewhat as follows: 'To-day at 7 o'clock my father died—Ser Piero da Vinci, my poor father!' But the displacement of the perseveration on to the most indifferent detail in the report of his death, the hour at which he died, robs the entry of all emotion, and further lets us see that here was something to be concealed and suppressed.

Ser Piero da Vinci, notary and descendant of notaries, was a man of great energy who reached a position of esteem and prosperity. He was married four times. His first two wives died childless, and it was only his third wife who presented him with his first legitimate son, in 1476, by which time Leonardo had reached the age of 24 and had long ago exchanged his father's home for the studio of his master Verrocchio. By his fourth and last wife, whom he married when he was already in his fifties, he had nine more sons and two daughters.[2]

It cannot be doubted that his father too came to play an important part in Leonardo's psychosexual development, and not only negatively by his absence during the boy's first childhood years, but also directly by his presence in the later part of Leonardo's childhood. No one who as a child desires his mother can escape wanting to put himself in his father's place, can fail to identify himself with him in his imagination, and later to make it his task in life to gain ascendency over him. When Leonardo was received into his grandfather's house before he had reached the age of five, his young step-mother Albiera

[1] [He who usurps on earth my place, my place, my place, which in the presence of the Son of God is vacant, has made a sewer of the ground where I am buried.'] Canto XXVII, 22–25.

[2] Leonardo has apparently made a further mistake in this passage in his diary over the number of his brothers and sisters—a remarkable contrast to the apparent exactness of the passage.

must certainly have taken his mother's place where his feelings were concerned, and he must have found himself in what may be called the normal relationship of rivalry with his father. As we know, a decision in favour of homosexuality only takes place round about the years of puberty. When this decision had been arrived at in Leonardo's case, his identification with his father lost all significance for his sexual life, but it nevertheless continued in other spheres of non-erotic activity. We hear that he was fond of magnificence and fine clothes, and kept servants and horses, although, in Vasari's words, 'he possessed almost nothing and did little work'. The responsibility for these tastes is not to be attributed solely to his feeling for beauty: we recognize in them at the same time a compulsion to copy and to outdo his father. His father had been a great gentleman to the poor peasant girl, and the son, therefore, never ceased to feel the spur to play the great gentleman as well, the urge 'to out-herod Herod',[1] to show his father what a great gentleman really looks like.

There is no doubt that the creative artist feels towards his works like a father. The effect which Leonardo's identification with his father had on his paintings was a fateful one. He created them and then cared no more about them, just as his father had not cared about him. His father's later concern could change nothing in this compulsion; for the compulsion derived from the impressions of the first years of childhood, and what has been repressed and has remained unconscious cannot be corrected by later experiences.

In the days of the Renaissance - and even much later - every artist stood in need of a gentleman of rank, a benefactor and patron, who gave him commissions and in whose hands his fortune rested. Leonardo found his patron in Lodovico Sforza, called Il Moro, a man of ambition and a lover of splendour, astute in diplomacy, but of erratic and unreliable character. At his court in Milan Leonardo passed the most brilliant period of his life, and in his service his creative power attained its most uninhibited expansion, to which the Last Supper and the equestrian statue of Francesco Sforza bore witness. He left Milan before catastrophe overtook Lodovico Sforza, who died a prisoner in a French dungeon. When the news of his patron's

[1] [The last three words are in English in the original.]

fate reached Leonardo, he wrote in his diary: 'The duke lost his dukedom and his property and his liberty, and none of the works that he undertook was completed.' [1] It is remarkable, and certainly not without significance, that he here cast the same reproach at his patron which posterity was to bring against himself. It is as if he wanted to make someone from the class of his fathers responsible for the fact that he himself left his works unfinished. In point of fact he was not wrong in what he said about the duke.

But if his imitation of his father did him damage as an artist, his rebellion against his father was the infantile determinant of what was perhaps an equally sublime achievement in the field of scientific research. In Merezhkovsky's admirable simile (1903, 318), he was like a man who had awoken too early in the darkness, while everyone else was still asleep. He dared to utter the bold assertion which contains within itself the justification for all independent research: '*He who appeals to authority when there is a difference of opinion works with his memory rather than with his reason.*' [2] Thus he became the first modern natural scientist, and an abundance of discoveries and suggestive ideas rewarded his courage for being the first man since the time of the Greeks to probe the secrets of nature while relying solely on observation and his own judgement. But in teaching that authority should be looked down on and that imitation of the 'ancients' should be repudiated, and in constantly urging that the study of nature was the source of all truth, he was merely repeating—in the highest sublimation attainable by man—the one-sided point of view which had already forced itself on the little boy as he gazed in wonder on the world. If we translate scientific abstraction back again into concrete individual experience, we see that the 'ancients' and authority simply correspond to his father, and nature once more becomes the tender and kindly mother who had nourished him. In most other human beings—no less to-day than in primaeval times—the need for support from an authority of some sort is so compelling that their world begins to totter if that authority is

[1] 'Il duca perse lo stato e la roba e libertà e nessuna sua opera si finì per lui.' Quoted by Von Seidlitz (1909, **2**, 270).

[2] 'Chi disputa allegando l'autorità non adopra l'ingegno ma piuttosto la memoria.' Quoted by Solmi (1910, 13). [Codex Atlanticus, F. 76r.a.]

threatened. Only Leonardo could dispense with that support; he would not have been able to do so had he not learnt in the first years of his life to do without his father. His later scientific research, with all its boldness and independence, presupposed the existence of infantile sexual researches uninhibited by his father, and was a prolongation of them with the sexual element excluded.

When anyone has, like Leonardo, escaped being intimidated by his father during his earliest [1] childhood, and has in his researches cast away the fetters of authority, it would be in the sharpest contradiction to our expectation if we found that he had remained a believer and had been unable to escape from dogmatic religion. Psycho-analysis has made us familiar with the intimate connection between the father-complex and belief in God; it has shown us that a personal God is, psychologically, nothing other than an exalted father, and it brings us evidence every day of how young people lose their religious beliefs as soon as their father's authority breaks down. Thus we recognize that the roots of the need for religion are in the parental complex; the almighty and just God, and kindly Nature, appear to us as grand sublimations of father and mother, or rather as revivals and restorations of the young child's ideas of them. Biologically speaking, religiousness is to be traced to the small human child's long-drawn-out helplessness and need of help; and when at a later date he perceives how truly forlorn and weak he is when confronted with the great forces of life, he feels his condition as he did in childhood, and attempts to deny his own despondency by a regressive revival of the forces which protected his infancy. The protection against neurotic illness, which religion vouchsafes to those who believe in it, is easily explained. it removes their parental complex, on which the sense of guilt in individuals as well as in the whole human race depends, and disposes of it, while the unbeliever has to grapple with the problem on his own.[2]

It does not seem as if the instance of Leonardo could show

[1] [This word was added in 1925.]

[2] [This last sentence was added in 1919.—The same point is mentioned in Freud's contemporary address to the Nuremberg Congress (1910*d*), p. 146 below, and again, much later, in the last chapter of *Group Psychology* (1921*c*), *Standard Ed.*, **18**, 142.]

this view of religious belief to be mistaken. Accusations charging him with unbelief or (what at that time came to the same thing) with apostasy from Christianity were brought against him while he was still alive, and are clearly described in the first biography which Vasari [1550] wrote of him. (Müntz, 1899, 292 ff.) In the second (1568) edition of his *Vite* Vasari omitted these observations. In view of the extraordinary sensitiveness of his age where religious matters were in question, we can understand perfectly why even in his notebooks Leonardo should have refrained from directly stating his attitude to Christianity. In his researches he did not allow himself to be led astray in the slightest degree by the account of the Creation in Holy Writ; he challenged, for example, the possibility of a universal Deluge, and in geology he calculated in terms of hundreds of thousands of years with no more hesitation than men in modern times.

Among his 'prophecies' there are some things that would have been bound to offend the sensitive feelings of a Christian believer. Take for example, 'On the practice of praying to the images of saints':

'Men will speak to men that perceive nothing, that have their eyes open and see nothing; they will talk to them and receive no answer; they will implore the grace of those that have ears and hear not; they will kindle lights for one that is blind.' (After Herzfeld, 1906, 292.)

Or 'On the mourning on Good Friday':

'In every part of Europe great peoples will weep for the death of a single man who died in the East.' (Ibid., 297.)

The view has been expressed about Leonardo's art that he took from the sacred figures the last remnant of their connection with the Church and made them human, so as to represent by their means great and beautiful human emotions. Muther praises him for overcoming the prevailing mood of decadence and for restoring to man his right to sensuality and the joy of living. In the notes that show Leonardo engrossed in fathoming the great riddles of nature there is no lack of passages where he expresses his admiration for the Creator, the ultimate cause of all these noble secrets, but there is nothing which indicates that he wished to maintain any personal relation with this divine power. The reflections in which he has recorded the deep wisdom of his last years of life breathe the resignation of

the human being who subjects himself to *Ἀνάγκη*, to the laws of nature, and who expects no alleviation from the goodness or grace of God. There is scarcely any doubt that Leonardo had prevailed over both dogmatic and personal religion, and had by his work of research removed himself far from the position from which the Christian believer surveys the world.

The findings, mentioned above [p. 94 ff.], which we have reached concerning the development of the mental life of children suggest the view that in Leonardo's case too the first researches of childhood were concerned with the problems of sexuality. Indeed he himself gives this away in a transparent disguise by connecting his urge for research with the vulture phantasy, and by singling out the problem of the flight of birds as one to which, as the result of a special chain of circumstances, he was destined to turn his attention. A highly obscure passage in his notes which is concerned with the flight of birds, and which sounds like a prophecy, gives a very good demonstration of the degree of affective interest with which he clung to his wish to succeed in imitating the art of flying himself: 'The great bird will take its first flight from the back of its Great Swan; it will fill the universe with stupefaction, and all writings with renown, and be the eternal glory of the nest where it was born.' [1] He probably hoped that he himself would be able to fly one day, and we know from wish-fulfilling dreams what bliss is expected from the fulfilment of that hope.

But why do so many people dream of being able to fly? The answer that psycho-analysis gives is that to fly or to be a bird is only a disguise for another wish, and that more than one bridge, involving words or things, leads us to recognize what it is. When we consider that inquisitive children are told that babies are brought by a large bird, such as the stork; when we find that the ancients represented the phallus as having wings; that the commonest expression in German for male sexual activity is '*vögeln*' ['to bird'; '*Vogel*' is the German for 'bird']; that the male organ is actually called '*l'uccello*' ['the bird'] in Italian—all of these are only small fragments from a whole mass of connected ideas, from which we learn

[1] After Herzfeld, 1906, 32. 'The Great Swan' seems to mean Monte Cecero, a hill near Florence [now Monte Ceceri. '*Cecero*' is Italian for 'swan'].

that in dreams the wish to be able to fly is to be understood as nothing else than a longing to be capable of sexual performance.[1] This is an early infantile wish. When an adult recalls his childhood it seems to him to have been a happy time, in which one enjoyed the moment and looked to the future without any wishes; it is for this reason that he envies children. But if children themselves were able to give us information earlier [2] they would probably tell a different story. It seems that childhood is not the blissful idyll into which we distort it in retrospect, and that, on the contrary, children are goaded on through the years of childhood by the one wish to get big and do what grown-ups do. This wish is the motive of all their games. Whenever children feel in the course of their sexual researches that in the province which is so mysterious but nevertheless so important there is something wonderful of which adults are capable but which *they* are forbidden to know of and do, they are filled with a violent wish to be able to do it, and they dream of it in the form of flying, or they prepare this disguise of their wish to be used in their later flying dreams. Thus aviation, too, which in our day is at last achieving its aim, has its infantile erotic roots.

In admitting to us that ever since his childhood he felt bound up in a special and personal way with the problem of flight, Leonardo gives us confirmation that his childhood researches were directed to sexual matters, and this is what we were bound to expect as a result of our investigations on children in our own time. Here was one problem at least which had escaped the repression that later estranged him from sexuality. With slight changes in meaning, the same subject continued to interest him from his years of childhood until the time of his most complete intellectual maturity, and it may very well be that the skill that he desired was no more attainable by him in its primary sexual sense than in its mechanical one, and that he remained frustrated in both wishes.

[1] [*Footnote added* 1920.] This statement is based on the researches of Paul Federn [1914], and of Mourly Vold [1912], a Norwegian man of science who had no contact with psycho-analysis. [See also *The Interpretation of Dreams* [1900*a*], *Standard Ed.*, **5**, 394.]

[2] ['*Früher*.' In the editions before 1923 '*darüber*' appears in place of '*früher*', giving the meaning 'about it'.]

Indeed, the great Leonardo remained like a child for the whole of his life in more than one way, it is said that all great men are bound to retain some infantile part. Even as an adult he continued to play, and this was another reason why he often appeared uncanny and incomprehensible to his contemporaries. It is only we who are unsatisfied that he should have constructed the most elaborate mechanical toys for court festivities and ceremonial receptions, for we are reluctant to see the artist turning his power to such trifles He himself seems to have shown no unwillingness to spend his time thus, for Vasari tells us that he made similar things when he had not been commissioned to do so: 'There in Rome he got a soft lump of wax, and made very delicate animals out of it, filled with air; when he blew into them they flew around, and when the air ran out they fell to the ground. For a peculiar lizard which was found by the wine-grower of Belvedere he made wings from skin torn from other lizards, and filled them with quicksilver, so that they moved and quivered when it walked. Next he made eyes, a beard and horns for it, tamed it and put it in a box and terrified all his friends with it.' [1] Such ingenuities often served to express thoughts of a serious kind. 'He often had a sheep's intestines cleaned so carefully that they could have been held in the hollow of the hand. He carried them into a large room, took a pair of blacksmith's bellows into an adjoining room, fastened the intestines to them and blew them up, until they took up the whole room and forced people to take refuge in a corner. In this way he showed how they gradually became transparent and filled with air, and from the fact that at first they were limited to a small space and gradually spread through the whole breadth of the room, he compared them to genius.' [2] The same playful delight in harmlessly concealing things and giving them ingenious disguises is illustrated by his fables and riddles The latter are cast into the form of 'prophecies': almost all are rich in ideas and to a striking degree devoid of any element of wit.

The games and pranks which Leonardo allowed his imagination have in some cases led his biographers, who misunderstood this side of his character, grievously astray. In Leonardo's

[1] Vasari, from Schorn's translation (1843, 39/ [ed. Poggi, 1919, 41].
[2] Ibid., 39 [ed. Poggi, 41].

Milanese manuscripts there are, for example, some drafts of letters to the 'Diodario of Sorio (Syria , Viceroy of the Holy Sultan of Babylonia', in which Leonardo presents himself as an engineer sent to those regions of the East to construct certain works; defends himself against the charge of laziness; supplies geographical descriptions of towns and mountains, and concludes with an account of a great natural phenomenon that occurred while he was there.[1]

In 1883 an attempt was made by J. P. Richter to prove from these documents that it was really a fact that Leonardo had made these observations while travelling in the service of the Sultan of Egypt, and had even adopted the Mohammedan religion when in the East. On this view his visit there took place in the period before 1483 – that is, before he took up residence at the court of the Duke of Milan. But the acumen of other authors has had no difficulty in recognizing the evidences of Leonardo's supposed Eastern journey for what they are – imaginary productions of the youthful artist, which he created for his own amusement and in which he may have found expression for a wish to see the world and meet with adventures.

Another probable example of a creation of his imagination is to be found in the 'Academia Vinciana' which has been postulated from the existence of five or six emblems, intertwined patterns of extreme intricacy, which contain the Academy's name. Vasari mentions these designs but not the Academy.[2] Muntz, who put one of these ornaments on the cover of his large work on Leonardo, is among the few who believe in the reality of an 'Academia Vinciana'.

It is probable that Leonardo's play-instinct vanished in his maturer years, and that it too found its way into the activity of research which represented the latest and highest expansion

[1] For these letters and the various questions connected with them see Muntz (1899, 82 ff.), the actual texts and other related notes will be found in Herzfeld (1906, 223 ff.).

[2] 'Besides, he lost some time by even making a drawing of knots of cords, in which it was possible to trace the thread from one end to the other until it formed a completely circular figure. A very complex and beautiful design of this sort is engraved on copper, in the middle can be read the words "Leonardus Vinci Academia".' Schorn (1843, 8) [ed. Poggi, 5].

of his personality. But its long duration can teach us how slowly anyone tears himself from his childhood if in his childhood days he has enjoyed the highest erotic bliss, which is never again attained.

VI

It would be futile to blind ourselves to the fact that readers to-day find all pathography unpalatable. They clothe their aversion in the complaint that a pathographical review of a great man never results in an understanding of his importance and his achievements, and that it is therefore a piece of useless impertinence to make a study of things in him that could just as easily be found in the first person one came across. But this criticism is so manifestly unjust that it is only understandable when taken as a pretext and a disguise Pathography does not in the least aim at making the great man's achievements intelligible; and surely no one should be blamed for not carrying out something he has never promised to do The real motives for the opposition are different. We can discover them if we bear in mind that biographers are fixated on their heroes in a quite special way. In many cases they have chosen their hero as the subject of their studies because – for reasons of their personal emotional life – they have felt a special affection for him from the very first. They then devote their energies to a task of idealization, aimed at enrolling the great man among the class of their infantile models – at reviving in him, perhaps, the child's idea of his father. To gratify this wish they obliterate the individual features of their subject's physiognomy, they smooth over the traces of his life's struggles with internal and external resistances, and they tolerate in him no vestige of human weakness or imperfection. They thus present us with what is in fact a cold, strange, ideal figure, instead of a human being to whom we might feel ourselves distantly related. That they should do this is regrettable, for they thereby sacrifice truth to an illusion, and for the sake of their infantile phantasies abandon the opportunity of penetrating the most fascinating secrets of human nature.[1]

Leonardo himself, with his love of truth and his thirst for knowledge, would not have discouraged an attempt to take the trivial peculiarities and riddles in his nature as a starting-

[1] This criticism applies quite generally and is not to be taken as being aimed at Leonardo's biographers in particular

point, for discovering what determined his mental and intellectual development. We do homage to him by learning from him. It does not detract from his greatness if we make a study of the sacrifices which his development from childhood must have entailed, and if we bring together the factors which have stamped him with the tragic mark of failure.

We must expressly insist that we have never reckoned Leonardo as a neurotic or a 'nerve case', as the awkward phrase goes. Anyone who protests at our so much as daring to examine him in the light of discoveries gained in the field of pathology is still clinging to prejudices which we have to-day rightly abandoned. We no longer think that health and illness, normal and neurotic people, are to be sharply distinguished from each other, and that neurotic traits must necessarily be taken as proofs of a general inferiority. To-day we know that neurotic symptoms are structures which are substitutes for certain achievements of repression that we have to carry out in the course of our development from a child to a civilized human being. We know too that we all produce such substitutive structures, and that it is only their number, intensity and distribution which justify us in using the practical concept of illness and in inferring the presence of constitutional inferiority. From the slight indications we have about Leonardo's personality we should be inclined to place him close to the type of neurotic that we describe as 'obsessional'; and we may compare his researches to the 'obsessive brooding' of neurotics, and his inhibitions to what are known as their 'abulias'.

The aim of our work has been to explain the inhibitions in Leonardo's sexual life and in his artistic activity. With this in view we may be allowed to summarize what we have been able to discover about the course of his psychical development.

We have no information about the circumstances of his heredity; on the other hand we have seen that the accidental conditions of his childhood had a profound and disturbing effect on him. His illegitimate birth deprived him of his father's influence until perhaps his fifth year, and left him open to the tender seductions of a mother whose only solace he was. After being kissed by her into precocious sexual maturity, he must no doubt have embarked on a phase of infantile sexual activity of which only one single manifestation is definitely

attested—the intensity of his infantile sexual researches. The instinct to look and the instinct to know were those most strongly excited by the impressions of his early childhood; the erotogenic zone of the mouth was given an emphasis which it never afterwards surrendered. From his later behaviour in the contrary direction, such as his exaggerated sympathy for animals, we can conclude that there was no lack of strong sadistic traits in this period of his childhood.

A powerful wave of repression brought this childhood excess to an end, and established the dispositions which were to become manifest in the years of puberty. The most obvious result of the transformation was the avoidance of every crudely sensual activity; Leonardo was enabled to live in abstinence and to give the impression of being an asexual human being. When the excitations of puberty came in their flood upon the boy they did not, however, make him ill by forcing him to develop substitutive structures of a costly and harmful kind. Owing to his very early inclination towards sexual curiosity the greater portion of the needs of his sexual instinct could be sublimated into a general urge to know, and thus evaded repression. A much smaller portion of his libido continued to be devoted to sexual aims and represented a stunted adult sexual life. Because his love for his mother had been repressed, this portion was driven to take up a homosexual attitude and manifested itself in ideal love for boys. The fixation on his mother and on the blissful memories of his relations with her continued to be preserved in the unconscious, but for the time being it remained in an inactive state. In this way repression, fixation and sublimation all played their part in disposing of the contributions which the sexual instinct made to Leonardo's mental life.

Leonardo emerges from the obscurity of his boyhood as an artist, a painter and a sculptor, owing to a specific talent which may have been reinforced by the precocious awakening in the first years of childhood of his scopophilic instinct. We should be most glad to give an account of the way in which artistic activity derives from the primal instincts of the mind if it were not just here that our capacities fail us. We must be content to emphasize the fact—which it is hardly any longer possible to doubt—that what an artist creates provides at the same time an outlet for his sexual desire, and in Leonardo's case we can

point to the information which comes from Vasari [above, p. 111], that heads of laughing women and beautiful boys—in other words, representations of his sexual objects were notable among his first artistic endeavours. In the bloom of his youth Leonardo appears at first to have worked without inhibition. Just as he modelled himself on his father in the outward conduct of his life, so too he passed through a period of masculine creative power and artistic productiveness in Milan, where a kindly fate enabled him to find a father-substitute in the duke Lodovico Moro. But soon we find confirmation of our experience that the almost total repression of a real sexual life does not provide the most favourable conditions for the exercise of sublimated sexual trends. The pattern imposed by sexual life made itself felt. His activity and his ability to form quick decisions began to fail; his tendency towards deliberation and delay was already noticeable as a disturbing element in the 'Last Supper', and by influencing his technique it had a decisive effect on the fate of that great painting. Slowly there occurred in him a process which can only be compared to the regressions in neurotics. The development that turned him into an artist at puberty was overtaken by the process which led him to be an investigator, and which had its determinants in early infancy. The second sublimation of his erotic instinct gave place to the original sublimation for which the way had been prepared on the occasion of the first repression. He became an investigator, at first still in the service of his art, but later independently of it and away from it. With the loss of his patron, the substitute for his father, and with the increasingly sombre colours which his life took on, this regressive shift assumed larger and larger proportions. He became '*impacientissimo al pennello*',[1] as we are told by a correspondent of the Countess Isabella d'Este, who was extremely eager to possess a painting from his hand. His infantile past had gained control over him. But the research which now took the place of artistic creation seems to have contained some of the features which distinguish the activity of unconscious instincts—insatiability, unyielding rigidity and the lack of an ability to adapt to real circumstances.

At the summit of his life, when he was in his early fifties, a

[1] ['Very impatient of painting.'] Von Seidlitz (1909, **2**, 271).

time when in women the sexual characters have already undergone involution and when in men the libido not infrequently makes a further energetic advance a new transformation came over him. Still deeper layers of the contents of his mind became active once more; but this further regression was to the benefit of his art, which was in the process of becoming stunted. He met the woman who awakened his memory of his mother's happy smile of sensual rapture; and, influenced by this revived memory, he recovered the stimulus that guided him at the beginning of his artistic endeavours, at the time when he modelled the smiling women. He painted the Mona Lisa, the 'St. Anne with Two Others' and the series of mysterious pictures which are characterized by the enigmatic smile. With the help of the oldest of all his erotic impulses he enjoyed the triumph of once more conquering the inhibition in his art. This final development is obscured from our eyes in the shadows of approaching age. Before this his intellect had soared upwards to the highest realizations of a conception of the world that left his epoch far behind it.

In the preceding chapters I have shown what justification can be found for giving this picture of Leonardo's course of development for proposing these subdivisions of his life and for explaining his vacillation between art and science in this way. If in making these statements I have provoked the criticism, even from friends of psycho-analysis and from those who are expert in it, that I have merely written a psycho-analytic novel, I shall reply that I am far from over-estimating the certainty of these results. Like others I have succumbed to the attraction of this great and mysterious man, in whose nature one seems to detect powerful instinctual passions which can nevertheless only express themselves in so remarkably subdued a manner.

But whatever the truth about Leonardo's life may be, we cannot desist from our endeavour to find a psycho-analytic explanation for it until we have completed another task. We must stake out in a quite general way the limits which are set to what psycho-analysis can achieve in the field of biography: otherwise every explanation that is not forthcoming will be held up to us as a failure. The material at the disposal of a psycho-analytic enquiry consists of the data of a person's life

history: on the one hand the chance circumstances of events and background influences, and, on the other hand, the subject's reported reactions. Supported by its knowledge of psychical mechanisms it then endeavours to establish a dynamic basis for his nature on the strength of his reactions, and to disclose the original motive forces of his mind, as well as their later transformations and developments. If this is successful the behaviour of a personality in the course of his life is explained in terms of the combined operation of constitution and fate, of internal forces and external powers. Where such an undertaking does not provide any certain results – and this is perhaps so in Leonardo's case – the blame rests not with the faulty or inadequate methods of psycho-analysis, but with the uncertainty and fragmentary nature of the material relating to him which tradition makes available. It is therefore only the author who is to be held responsible for the failure, by having forced psycho-analysis to pronounce an expert opinion on the basis of such insufficient material.

But even if the historical material at our disposal were very abundant, and if the psychical mechanisms could be dealt with with the greatest assurance, there are two important points at which a psycho-analytic enquiry would not be able to make us understand how inevitable it was that the person concerned should have turned out in the way he did and in no other way. In Leonardo's case we have had to maintain the view that the accident of his illegitimate birth and the excessive tenderness of his mother had the most decisive influence on the formation of his character and on his later fortune, since the sexual repression which set in after this phase of childhood caused him to sublimate his libido into the urge to know, and established his sexual inactivity for the whole of his later life. But this repression after the first erotic satisfactions of childhood need not necessarily have taken place, in someone else it might perhaps not have taken place or might have assumed much less extensive proportions. We must recognize here a degree of freedom which cannot be resolved any further by psycho-analytic means. Equally, one has no right to claim that the consequence of this wave of repression was the only possible one. It is probable that another person would not have succeeded in withdrawing the major portion of his libido from repression by sublimating

it into a craving for knowledge, under the same influences he would have sustained a permanent injury to his intellectual activity or have acquired an insurmountable disposition to obsessional neurosis. We are left, then, with these two characteristics of Leonardo which are inexplicable by the efforts of psycho-analysis: his quite special tendency towards instinctual repressions, and his extraordinary capacity for sublimating the primitive instincts.

Instincts and their transformations are at the limit of what is discernible by psycho-analysis. From that point it gives place to biological research. We are obliged to look for the source of the tendency to repression and the capacity for sublimation in the organic foundations of character on which the mental structure is only afterwards erected. Since artistic talent and capacity are intimately connected with sublimation we must admit that the nature of the artistic function is also inaccessible to us along psycho-analytic lines. The tendency of biological research to-day is to explain the chief features in a person's organic constitution as being the result of the blending of male and female dispositions, based on [chemical] substances. Leonardo's physical beauty and his left-handedness might be quoted in support of this view.[1] We will not, however, leave the ground of purely psychological research. Our aim remains that of demonstrating the connection along the path of instinctual activity between a person's external experiences and his reactions. Even if psycho-analysis does not throw light on the fact of Leonardo's artistic power, it at least renders its manifestations and its limitations intelligible to us. It seems at any rate as if only a man who had had Leonardo's childhood experiences could have painted the Mona Lisa and the St. Anne, have secured so melancholy a fate for his works and have embarked on such an astonishing career as a natural scientist, as if the key to all his achievements and misfortunes lay hidden in the childhood phantasy of the vulture.

But may one not take objection to the findings of an enquiry which ascribes to accidental circumstances of his parental con-

[1] [This is no doubt an allusion to the views of Fliess by which Freud had been greatly influenced. Cf. his *Three Essays* (1905*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 216*n*. On the particular question of bilaterality, however, they had not been in complete agreement. See above, p. 53*n*.]

stellation so decisive an influence on a person's fate—which, for example, makes Leonardo's fate depend on his illegitimate birth and on the barrenness of his first stepmother Donna Albiera? I think one has no right to do so. If one considers chance to be unworthy of determining our fate, it is simply a relapse into the pious view of the Universe which Leonardo himself was on the way to overcoming when he wrote that the sun does not move [p. 76]. We naturally feel hurt that a just God and a kindly providence do not protect us better from such influences during the most defenceless period of our lives. At the same time we are all too ready to forget that in fact everything to do with our life is chance, from our origin out of the meeting of spermatozoon and ovum onwards—chance which nevertheless has a share in the law and necessity of nature, and which merely lacks any connection with our wishes and illusions. The apportioning of the determining factors of our life between the 'necessities' of our constitution and the 'chances' of our childhood may still be uncertain in detail; but in general it is no longer possible to doubt the importance precisely of the first years of our childhood. We all still show too little respect for Nature which (in the obscure words of Leonardo which recall Hamlet's lines) 'is full of countless causes ['*ragioni*'] that never enter experience'.[1]

Every one of us human beings corresponds to one of the countless experiments in which these '*ragioni*' of nature force their way into experience.

[1] '*La natura è piena d'infinite ragioni che non furono mai in isperienza*' (Herzfeld, 1906, 11).—[The allusion seems to be to Hamlet's familiar words:

> There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
> Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.]

THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYTIC THERAPY
(1910)

DIE ZUKÜNFTIGEN CHANCEN DER PSYCHOANALYTISCHEN THERAPIE

(*a*) GERMAN EDITIONS:

1910 *Zbl. Psychoan.*, **1** (1–2), 1–9.
1913 *S.K.S.N.*, **3**, 288–298. (2nd ed. 1921.)
1924 *Technik und Metapsychol.*, 25–36.
1925 *G.S.*, **6**, 25–36.
1943 *G.W.*, **8**, 104–115.

(*b*) ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS:

'The Future Chances of Psychoanalytic Therapy'

1912 *S.P.H.* (2nd ed.), 207-215. (Tr. A. A. Brill.) (3rd ed. 1920.)

'The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Therapy'

1924 *C.P.*, **2**, 285–296. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)

The present translation is based on the one published in 1924.

This paper was delivered as an address at the opening of the Second Psycho-Analytical Congress, held at Nuremberg on March 30 and 31, 1910. As a general survey of the contemporary position of psycho-analysis, it may be compared with the similar address 'Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy' (1919*a*) delivered by Freud eight years later at the Budapest Congress. In particular, the second part of the present paper, dealing with technique, foreshadows the 'active' therapy which was the main theme of the later one.

THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYTIC THERAPY

GENTLEMEN,—Since the objects for which we are assembled here to-day are mainly practical, I shall choose a practical theme for my introductory address and appeal to your medical, not to your scientific, interest. I can imagine your probable views on the results of our therapy, and I assume that most of you have already passed through the two stages which all beginners go through, the stage of enthusiasm at the unexpected increase in our therapeutic achievements, and the stage of depression at the magnitude of the difficulties which stand in the way of our efforts. At whatever point in this development, however, each of you may happen to be, my intention to-day is to show you that we have by no means come to the end of our resources for combating the neuroses, and that we may expect a substantial improvement in our therapeutic prospects before long.

This reinforcement will come, I think, from three directions:

(1) from internal progress,
(2) from increased authority, and
(3) from the general effect of our work.

(1) Under 'internal progress' I include advances (*a*) in our analytic knowledge, (*b*) in our technique.

(*a*) Advances in our knowledge. We are, of course, still a long way from knowing all that is required for an understanding of the unconscious in our patients. It is clear that every advance in our knowledge means an increase in our therapeutic power. As long as we have understood nothing, we have accomplished nothing; the more we understand, the more we shall achieve. At its beginning psycho-analytic treatment was inexorable and exhausting. The patient had to say everything himself, and the physician's activity consisted of urging him on incessantly. To-day things have a more friendly air. The treatment is made up of two parts—what the physician infers and tells the patient, and the patient's working-over of what he has heard. The

mechanism of our assistance is easy to understand: we give the patient the conscious anticipatory idea [the idea of what he may expect to find] and he then finds the repressed unconscious idea in himself on the basis of its similarity to the anticipatory one.[1] This is the intellectual help which makes it easier for him to overcome the resistances between conscious and unconscious. Incidentally, I may remark that it is not the only mechanism made use of in analytic treatment; you all know the far more powerful one which lies in the use of the 'transference'. It is my intention in the near future to deal with these various factors, which are so important for an understanding of the treatment, in an *Allgemeine Methodik der Psychoanalyse*.[2] And further, in speaking to you I need not rebut the objection that the evidential value in support of the correctness of our hypotheses is obscured in our treatment as we practise it to-day; you will not forget that this evidence is to be found elsewhere, and that a therapeutic procedure cannot be carried out in the same way as a theoretical investigation.

Let me now touch upon one or two fields in which we have new things to learn and do in fact discover new things every day. Above all, there is the field of symbolism in dreams and in the unconscious—a fiercely contested subject, as you know. It is no small merit in our colleague, Wilhelm Stekel, that, untroubled by all the objections raised by our opponents, he has undertaken a study of dream-symbols. There is indeed still much to learn here, my *Interpretation of Dreams*, which was written in 1899, awaits important amplification from researches into symbolism.[3]

[1] [See, however, below, p. 225. The present point had been explained rather more fully in Freud's paper on 'Little Hans' (1909*b*), *Standard Ed.*, **10**, 120 f. He returned to it in his technical paper 'On Beginning the Treatment' (1913*c*). The metapsychology of the process of interpretation is discussed at length in Sections II and VII of the paper on 'The Unconscious' (1915*e*).]

[2] [*General Methodology of Psycho-Analysis*—a systematic work on psychoanalytic technique, planned and at least partly written by Freud in 1908 and 1909, but never published. Some years later (from 1911 onwards) he published a number of separate papers on technique which will be found collected in *Standard Ed.*, **12**.]

[3] [Stekel published a paper on dream-interpretation in 1909 and a large book on the same subject in 1911. Freud gave some account of the effect of these on him in a passage added to *The Interpretation of Dreams*

I will say a few words about one of the symbols that has newly been recognized. A little time ago I heard that a psychologist whose views are somewhat different from ours had remarked to one of us that, when all was said and done, we did undoubtedly exaggerate the hidden sexual significance of dreams: his own commonest dream was of going upstairs, and surely there could not be anything sexual in *it*. We were put on the alert by this objection, and began to turn our attention to the appearance of steps, staircases and ladders in dreams, and were soon in a position to show that staircases (and analogous things) were unquestionably symbols of copulation. It is not hard to discover the basis of the comparison: we come to the top in a series of rhythmical movements and with increasing breathlessness and then, with a few rapid leaps, we can get to the bottom again. Thus the rhythmical pattern of copulation is reproduced in going upstairs. Nor must we omit to bring in the evidence of linguistic usage. It shows us that 'mounting' [German '*steigen*'] is used as a direct equivalent for the sexual act. We speak of a man as a '*Steiger*' [a 'mounter'] and of '*nachsteigen*' ['to run after', literally 'to climb after']. In French the steps on a staircase are called '*marches*' and '*un vieux marcheur*' has the same meaning as our '*ein alter Steiger*' ['an old rake'].[1] The dream-material from which these newly recognized symbols are derived will in due time be put before you by the committee we are about to form for a collective study of symbolism. You will find some remarks on another interesting symbol, on 'rescue' and its changes in significance, in the second volume of our *Jahrbuch*.[2] But I must break off here or I shall not get to my other points.

(1900*a*, in 1925, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 350.) A further commentary on this will be found in the Editor's Introduction to that work, *Standard Ed.*, 4, xiv f. The second edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams* had been published in 1909, and had been prepared by Freud during the summer of 1908. In this, and still more in the third edition (1911), the section on symbolism was very considerably enlarged.]

[1] [The whole paragraph down to this point (except for the first sentence) was reprinted as a footnote by Freud in the 1911 edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 359*n*.]

[2] [See 'A Special Type of Choice of Object' (1910*h*), below, p. 172 f. — A committee for the study of symbols was formed at the Nuremberg Congress on the suggestion of Ernest Jones, but, as he tells us (Jones, 1955, 75–6), 'little came of it later'.]

Every one of you will know from his own experience what a very different attitude he has towards a new case of illness when once he has thoroughly grasped the structure of a few typical cases Imagine that we had arrived at a succinct formula of the factors regularly concerned in constructing the various forms of neuroses, as we have so far succeeded in doing for the construction of hysterical symptoms, and consider how firmly it would establish our prognostic judgement! Just as an obstetrician can tell by examining the placenta whether it has been completely expelled or whether noxious fragments of it still remain, so should we, independently of the outcome and of the patient's condition at the moment, be able to say whether our work had been definitely successful or whether we had to expect relapses and fresh onsets of illness.

(*b*) I will hasten on to the innovations in the field of technique, where indeed nearly everything still awaits final settlement, and much is only now beginning to become clear There are now two aims in psycho-analytic technique: to save the physician effort and to give the patient the most unrestricted access to his unconscious. As you know, our technique has undergone a fundamental transformation. At the time of the cathartic treatment what we aimed at was the elucidation of the symptoms; we then turned away from the symptoms and devoted ourselves instead to uncovering the 'complexes', to use a word which Jung has made indispensable, now, however, our work is aimed directly at finding out and overcoming the 'resistances', and we can justifiably rely on the complexes coming to light without difficulty as soon as the resistances have been recognized and removed. Some of you have since felt a need to be able to make a survey of these resistances and classify them. I will ask you to examine your material and see whether you can confirm the generalized statement that in male patients the most important resistances in the treatment seem to be derived from the father-complex and to express themselves in fear of the father, in defiance of the father and in disbelief of the father.

Other innovations in technique relate to the physician himself. We have become aware of the 'counter-transference', which arises in him as a result of the patient's influence on his unconscious feelings, and we are almost inclined to insist that he

shall recognize this counter-transference in himself and overcome it. Now that a considerable number of people are practising psycho-analysis and exchanging their observations with one another, we have noticed that no psycho-analyst goes further than his own complexes and internal resistances permit; and we consequently require that he shall begin his activity with a self-analysis and continually carry it deeper while he is making his observations on his patients. Anyone who fails to produce results in a self-analysis of this kind may at once give up any idea of being able to treat patients by analysis.[1]

We are also now coming to the opinion that analytic technique must be modified in certain ways according to the nature of the disease and the dominant instinctual trends in the patient. We started out from the treatment of conversion hysteria; in anxiety hysteria (phobias) we must to some extent alter our procedure. For these patients cannot bring out the material necessary for resolving their phobia so long as they feel protected by obeying the condition which it lays down. One cannot, of course, succeed in getting them to give up their protective measures and work under the influence of anxiety from the beginning of the treatment. One must therefore help them by interpreting their unconscious to them until they can make up their minds to do without the protection of their phobia and expose themselves to a now greatly mitigated anxiety. Only after they have done so does the material become accessible, which, when it has been mastered, leads to a solution of the phobia. Other modifications of technique, which seem to me not yet ripe for discussion, will be required in the treatment of obsessional neurosis. In this connection very important questions arise, which have not hitherto been elucidated: how far the instincts which the patient is combating are to be allowed some satisfaction during the treatment, and what difference it makes whether these impulses are active (sadistic) or passive (masochistic) in their nature.[2]

[1] [Freud was not always equally convinced of the possibility of adequate self analyses for would-be analysts. He insisted later on the necessity for training analyses conducted by some other person. A fuller discussion of this will be found in an Editor's footnote to a passage in the first section of his history of the psycho-analytic movement (1914*d*).]

[2] [These ideas were further developed by Freud in his Budapest Congress Paper (1919*a*). *Standard Ed.*, **17**, 165 ff.]

I hope you will have formed an impression that, when we *know* all that we now only *suspect* and when we have carried out all the improvements in technique to which deeper observation of our patients is bound to lead us, our medical procedure will reach a degree of precision and certainty of success which is not to be found in every specialized field of medicine.

(2) I have said that we had much to expect from the increase in authority which must accrue to us as time goes on. I need not say much to you about the importance of authority. Only very few civilized people are capable of existing without reliance on others or are even capable of coming to an independent opinion. You cannot exaggerate the intensity of people's inner lack of resolution and craving for authority. The extraordinary increase in neuroses since the power of religions has waned may give you a measure of it.[1] The impoverishment of the ego due to the large expenditure of energy on repression demanded of every individual by civilization may be one of the principal causes of this state of things.

Hitherto, this authority, with its enormous weight of suggestion, has been against us. All our therapeutic successes have been achieved in the face of this suggestion: it is surprising that any successes at all could be gained in such circumstances. I must not let myself be led into describing my agreeable experiences during the period when I alone represented psychoanalysis. I can only say that when I assured my patients that I knew how to relieve them permanently of their sufferings they looked round my modest abode, reflected on my lack of fame and title, and regarded me like the possessor of an infallible system at a gambling-resort, of whom people say that if he could do what he professes he would look very different himself. Nor was it really pleasant to carry out a psychical operation while the colleagues whose duty it should have been to assist took particular pleasure in spitting into the field of operation, and while at the first signs of blood or restlessness in the patient his relatives began threatening the operating surgeon. An operation is surely entitled to produce reactions, in surgery we became accustomed to that long ago. People simply did not

[1] [Cf. above, p. 123.]

believe me, just as even to-day people do not much believe any of us. Under such conditions not a few attempts were bound to fail. To estimate the increase in our therapeutic prospects when we have received general recognition, you should think of the position of a gynaecologist in Turkey and in the West. In Turkey, all he may do is to feel the pulse of an arm stretched out to him through a hole in the wall; and his medical achievements are in proportion to the inaccessibility of their object. Our opponents in the West wish to allow us much the same degree of access to our patient's minds. But now that the force of social suggestion drives sick women to the gynaecologist, he has become their helper and saviour. I trust you will not say that the fact of the authority of society coming to our aid and increasing our successes so greatly would do nothing to prove the validity of our hypotheses; arguing as you might that, since suggestion is supposed to be able to do anything, our successes would then be successes of suggestion and not of psycho-analysis. Social suggestion is at present favourable to treating nervous patients by hydropathy, dieting and electrotherapy, but that does not enable such measures to get the better of neuroses. Time will show whether psycho-analytic treatment can accomplish more.

Now, however, I must once more damp your expectations. Society will not be in a hurry to grant us authority. It is bound to offer us resistance, for we adopt a critical attitude towards it; we point out to it that it itself plays a great part in causing neuroses. Just as we make an individual our enemy by uncovering what is repressed in him, so society cannot respond with sympathy to a relentless exposure of its injurious effects and deficiencies. Because we destroy illusions we are accused of endangering ideals. It might seem, therefore, as though the condition from which I expect such great advantages for our therapeutic prospects will never be fulfilled. And yet the situation is not so hopeless as one might think at the present time. Powerful though men's emotions and self-interest may be, yet intellect is a power too—a power which makes itself felt, not, it is true, immediately, but all the more certainly in the end. The harshest truths are heard and recognized at last, after the interests they have injured and the emotions they have roused have exhausted their fury. It has always been so, and the

unwelcome truths which we psycho-analysts have to tell the world will have the same fate. Only it will not happen very quickly; we must be able to wait.

(3) Finally, I have to explain to you what I mean by the 'general effect' of our work, and how I come to set hopes on it. What we have here is a very remarkable therapeutic constellation, the like of which is perhaps not to be found anywhere else and which will appear strange to you too at first, until you recognize in it something you have long been familiar with. You know, of course, that the psychoneuroses are substitutive satisfactions of some instinct the presence of which one is obliged to deny to oneself and others. Their capacity to exist depends on this distortion and lack of recognition. When the riddle they present is solved and the solution is accepted by the patients these diseases cease to be able to exist. There is hardly anything like this in medicine, though in fairy tales you hear of evil spirits whose power is broken as soon as you can tell them their name—the name which they have kept secret.

In place of a single sick person let us put society suffering as a whole from neuroses, though composed of sick and healthy members; and in place of individual acceptance in the one case let us put general recognition in the other. A little reflection will then show you that this substitution cannot in any way alter the outcome. The success which the treatment can have with the individual must occur equally with the community. Sick people will not be able to let their various neuroses become known: their anxious over-tenderness which is meant to conceal their hatred, their agoraphobia which tells of disappointed ambition, their obsessive actions which represent self-reproaches for evil intentions and precautions against them – if all their relatives and every stranger from whom they wish to conceal their mental processes know the general meaning of such symptoms, and if they themselves know that in the manifestations of their illness they are producing nothing that other people cannot instantly interpret. The effect, however, will not be limited to the concealment of the symptoms – which, incidentally, it is often impossible to carry out; for this necessity for concealment destroys the use of being ill. Disclosure of the secret will have attacked, at its most sensitive

point, the 'aetiological equation' from which neuroses arise—[1] it will have made the gain from the illness illusory; and consequently the final outcome of the changed situation brought about by the physician's indiscretion can only be that the production of the illness will be brought to a stop.

If this hope seems Utopian to you, you may remember that neurotic phenomena have actually been dispelled already by this means, although only in quite isolated instances. Think how common hallucinations of the Virgin Mary used to be among peasant girls in former times. So long as such a phenomenon brought a flock of believers and might lead to a chapel being built on the sacred spot, the visionary state of these girls was inaccessible to influence. To-day even our clergy have changed their attitude to such things; they allow police and doctors to examine the visionary, and now the Virgin makes only very rare appearances.

Or let me examine these developments, which I have been describing as taking place in the future, in an analogous situation which is on a smaller scale and consequently easier to take in. Suppose a number of ladies and gentlemen in good society have planned to have a picnic one day at an inn in the country. The ladies have arranged among themselves that if one of them wants to relieve a natural need she will announce that she is going to pick flowers. Some malicious person, however, has got wind of this secret and has had printed on the programme which is sent round to the whole party: 'Ladies who wish to retire are requested to announce that they are going to pick flowers.' After this, of course, no lady will think of availing herself of this flowery pretext, and, in the same way, other similar formulas, which may be freshly agreed upon, will be seriously compromised. What will be the result? The ladies will admit their natural needs without shame and none of the men will object.

Let us return to our more serious case. A certain number of

[1] [This is a reference back to an early paper of Freud's, the second one on anxiety neurosis (1895). In the later part of that paper he analyses the different categories of causes operative in bringing about neuroses. He then introduces the concept of an 'aetiological equation' of several terms, each of which must be satisfied if a neurosis is to be produced. Anything that prevents any one of the terms from being satisfied will therefore have a therapeutic effect.]

people, faced in their lives by conflicts which they have found too difficult to solve, have taken flight into neurosis and in this way won an unmistakable, although in the long run too costly, gain from illness. What will these people have to do if their flight into illness is barred by the indiscreet revelations of psycho-analysis? They will have to be honest, confess to the instincts that are at work in them, face the conflict, fight for what they want, or go without it, and the tolerance of society, which is bound to ensue as a result of psycho-analytic enlightenment, will help them in their task.

Let us remember, however, that our attitude to life ought not to be that of a fanatic for hygiene or therapy. We must admit that the ideal prevention of neurotic illnesses which we have in mind would not be of advantage to every individual. A good number of those who now take flight into illness would not, under the conditions we have assumed, support the conflict but would rapidly succumb or would cause a mischief greater than their own neurotic illness. Neuroses have in fact their biological function as a protective contrivance and they have their social justification, the 'gain from illness' they provide is not always a purely subjective one. Is there one of you who has not at some time looked into the causation of a neurosis and had to allow that it was the naïdest possible outcome of the situation? And should such heavy sacrifices be made in order to eradicate the neuroses in particular, when the world is full of other unavoidable misery?

Are we, then, to abandon our efforts to explain the hidden meaning of neurosis as being in the last resort dangerous to the individual and harmful to the workings of society? Are we to give up drawing the practical conclusion from a piece of scientific insight? No; I think that in spite of this our duty lies in the other direction. The gain from illness provided by the neuroses is nevertheless on the whole and in the end detrimental to individuals as well as to society. The unhappiness that our work of enlightenment may cause will after all only affect some individuals. The change-over to a more realistic and creditable attitude on the part of society will not be bought too dearly by these sacrifices. But above all, all the energies which are to-day consumed in the production of neurotic symptoms serving the purposes of a world of phantasy isolated

from reality, will, even if they cannot at once be put to uses in life, help to strengthen the clamour for the changes in our civilization through which alone we can look for the well-being of future generations.

I should therefore like to let you go with an assurance that in treating your patients psycho-analytically you are doing your duty in more senses than one. You are not merely working in the service of science, by making use of the one and only opportunity for discovering the secrets of the neuroses; you are not only giving your patients the most efficacious remedy for their sufferings that is available to-day; you are contributing your share to the enlightenment of the community from which we expect to achieve the most radical prophylaxis against neurotic disorders along the indirect path of social authority.[1]

[1] [The subject of 'gain from illness' was discussed at length by Freud in Lecture XXIV of his *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17).]

THE ANTITHETICAL MEANING OF PRIMAL WORDS
(1910)

ÜBER DEN GEGENSINN DER URWORTE

(*a*) GERMAN EDITIONS:

1910 *Jb. psychoan. psychopath. Forsch.*, **2** (1), 179–184.
1913 *S K.S.N.*, **3**, 280–287. (2nd ed. 1921.)
1924 *G.S.*, **10**, 221 228.
1943 *G.W.*, **8**, 214–221.

(*b*) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

' "The Antithetical Sense of Primal Words" '
1925 *C.P.*, **4**, 184–191. (Tr. M. N. Searl.)

The present translation with a modified title, 'The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words', is a new one by Alan Tyson.

We are told by Ernest Jones (1955, 347) that Freud came across Abel's pamphlet in the autumn of 1909. He was particularly pleased by the discovery, as is shown by the many references he made to it in his writings In 1911, for instance, he added a footnote on it to *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900*a*), *Standard Ed.*, **4**, 318, and he summarized it at some length in two passages in his *Introductory Lectures* (1916 17), Lectures XI and XV. The reader should bear in mind the fact that Abel's pamphlet was published in 1884 and it would not be surprising if some of his findings were not supported by later philologists. This is especially true of his Egyptological comments, which were made before Erman had put Egyptian philology for the first time on a scientific basis. The quotations from Abel which are made here are translated without any modification in the spelling of his examples.

THE ANTITHETICAL MEANING OF PRIMAL WORDS[1]

In my *Interpretation of Dreams* I made a statement about one of the findings of my analytic work which I did not then understand. I will repeat it here by way of preface to this review:

'The way in which dreams treat the category of contraries and contradictories is highly remarkable. It is simply disregarded. "No" seems not to exist so far as dreams are concerned. They show a particular preference for combining contraries into a unity or for representing them as one and the same thing. Dreams feel themselves at liberty, moreover, to represent any element by its wishful contrary; so that there is no way of deciding at a first glance whether any element that admits of a contrary is present in the dream-thoughts as a positive or as a negative.' [2]

The dream-interpreters of antiquity seem to have made the most extensive use of the notion that a thing in a dream can mean its opposite. This possibility has also occasionally been recognized by modern students of dreams, in so far as they concede at all that dreams have a meaning and can be interpreted.[3] Nor do I think that I shall be contradicted if I assume that all who have followed me in interpreting dreams on scientific lines have found confirmation of the statement quoted above.

I did not succeed in understanding the dream-work's singular tendency to disregard negation and to employ the same means of representation for expressing contraries until I happened by chance to read a work by the philologist Karl Abel, which was published in 1884 as a separate pamphlet and included in the following year in the author's *Sprachwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen* [Philological Essays]. The subject is of sufficient interest to justify my quoting here the full text of the crucial passages

[1] [In the editions previous to 1924, the title was printed in inverted commas, and there was a sub-title which ran as follows: 'A review of a pamphlet by Karl Abel (1884) bearing the same title.']

[2] *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900*a*), *Standard Ed.*, 4, 318.

[3] Cf. G. H. von Schubert (1814), Chapter II.

in Abel's paper (omitting, however, most of the examples). We obtain from them the astonishing information that the behaviour of the dream-work which I have just described is identical with a peculiarity in the oldest languages known to us.

After stressing the antiquity of the Egyptian language which must have been developed a very long time before the first hieroglyphic inscriptions, Abel goes on (1884, 4):

'Now in the Egyptian language, this sole relic of a primitive world, there are a fair number of words with two meanings, one of which is the exact opposite of the other. Let us suppose, if such an obvious piece of nonsense can be imagined, that in German the word "strong" meant both "strong" and "weak"; that in Berlin the noun "light" was used to mean both "light" and "darkness"; that one Munich citizen called beer "beer", while another used the same word to speak of water: this is what the astonishing practice amounts to which the ancient Egyptians regularly followed in their language. How could anyone be blamed for shaking his head in disbelief? . . .' (Examples omitted.)

(Ibid., 7): 'In view of these and many similar cases of antithetical meaning (see the Appendix) it is beyond doubt that in one language at least there was a large number of words that denoted at once a thing and its opposite. However astonishing it may be, we are faced with the fact and have to reckon with it.'

The author goes on to reject an explanation of these circumstances which suggests that two words might happen by chance to have the same sound, and is equally firm in repudiating an attempt to refer it to the low state of mental development in Egypt:

(Ibid., 9): 'But Egypt was anything but a home of nonsense. On the contrary, it was one of the cradles of the development of human reason. . . . It recognized a pure and dignified morality and formulated a great part of the Ten Commandments at a time when the peoples in whose hands civilization rests to-day were in the habit of slaughtering human victims as a sacrifice to bloodthirsty idols. A people that kindled the torch of justice and culture in so dark an age cannot surely have been completely stupid in everyday speech and thought. . . . Men who were able to make glass and raise and move huge

blocks by machinery must at least have possessed sufficient sense not to regard a thing as being simultaneously both itself and its opposite. How are we then to reconcile this with the fact that the Egyptians allowed themselves such a strangely contradictory language? . . . that they used to give one and the same phonetic vehicle to the most mutually inimical thoughts, and used to bind together in a kind of indissoluble union things that were in the strongest opposition to each other?'

Before any explanation is attempted, mention must also be made of a further stage in this unintelligible behaviour of the Egyptian language. 'Of all the eccentricities of the Egyptian vocabulary perhaps the most extraordinary feature is that, quite apart from the words that combine antithetical meanings, it possesses other compound words in which two vocables of antithetical meanings are united so as to form a compound which bears the meaning of only one of its two constituents. Thus in this extraordinary language there are not only words meaning equally "strong" or "weak", and "command" or "obey"; but there are also compounds like "old-young", "far-near", "bind-sever", "outside-inside" . . . which, in spite of combining the extremes of difference, mean only "young", "near", "bind" and "inside" respectively . . . So that in these compound words contradictory concepts have been quite intentionally combined, not in order to produce a third concept, as occasionally happens in Chinese, but only in order to use the compound to express the meaning of one of its contradictory parts – a part which would have had the same meaning by itself . . .'

However, the riddle is easier to solve than it appears to be. Our concepts owe their existence to comparisons 'If it were always light we should not be able to distinguish light from dark, and consequently we should not be able to have either the concept of light or the word for it . . .' 'It is clear that everything on this planet is relative and has an independent existence only in so far as it is differentiated in respect of its relations to other things . . .' 'Since every concept is in this way the twin of its contrary, how could it be first thought of and how could it be communicated to other people who were trying to conceive it, other than by being measured against its contrary . . .?' (Ibid., 15): 'Since the concept of strength could

not be formed except as a contrary to weakness, the word denoting "strong" contained a simultaneous recollection of "weak", as the thing by means of which it first came into existence. In reality this word denoted neither "strong" nor "weak", but the relation and difference between the two, which created both of them equally . . .' 'Man was not in fact able to acquire his oldest and simplest concepts except as contraries to their contraries, and only learnt by degrees to separate the two sides of an antithesis and think of one without conscious comparison with the other.'

Since language serves not only to express one's own thoughts but essentially to communicate them to others the question may be raised how it was that the 'primal Egyptian' made his neighbour understand 'which side of the twin concept he meant on any particular occasion'. In the written language this was done with the help of the so-called 'determinative' signs which, placed after the alphabetical ones, assign their meaning to them and are not themselves intended to be spoken. Ibid., 18. 'If the Egyptian word "*ken*" is to mean "strong", its sound, which is written alphabetically, is followed by the picture of an upright armed man, if the same word has to express "weak", the letters which represent the sound are followed by the picture of a squatting, limp figure. The majority of other words with two meanings are similarly accompanied by explanatory pictures.' Abel thinks that in speech the desired meaning of the spoken word was indicated by gesture.

According to Abel it is in the 'oldest roots' that antithetical double meanings are found to occur. In the subsequent course of the language's development this ambiguity disappeared and, in Ancient Egyptian at any rate, all the intermediate stages can be followed, down to the unambiguousness of modern vocabularies. 'A word that originally bore two meanings separates in the later language into two words with single meanings, in a process whereby each of the two opposed meanings takes over a particular phonetic "reduction" [modification] of the original root.' Thus, for example, in hieroglyphics the word '*ken*', 'strong-weak', already divides into '*ken*', 'strong' and '*kan*', 'weak'. 'In other words, the concepts which could only be arrived at by means of an antithesis became in course of time sufficiently familiar to men's minds to make an inde-

pendent existence possible for each of their two parts and accordingly to enable a separate phonetic representative to be formed for each part.'

Proof of the existence of contradictory primal meanings, which is easily established in Egyptian, extends, according to Abel, to the Semitic and Indo-European languages as well. 'How far this may happen in other language-groups remains to be seen; for although antithesis must have been present originally to the thinking minds of every race, it need not necessarily have become recognizable or have been retained everywhere in the meanings of words.'

Abel further calls attention to the fact that the philosopher Bain, apparently without knowledge that the phenomenon actually existed, claimed this double meaning of words on purely theoretical grounds as a logical necessity. The passage in question [1] begins with these sentences:

'The essential relativity of all knowledge, thought or consciousness cannot but show itself in language. If everything that we can know is viewed as a transition from something else, every experience must have two sides; and either every name must have a double meaning, or else for every meaning there must be two names.'

From the 'Appendix of Examples of Egyptian, Indo-Germanic and Arabic Antithetical Meanings' I select a few instances which may impress even those of us who are not experts in philology. In Latin '*altus*' means 'high' and 'deep', '*sacer*' 'sacred' and 'accursed'; here accordingly we have the complete antithesis in meaning without any modification of the sound of the word. Phonetic alteration to distinguish contraries is illustrated by examples like '*clamare*' ('to cry') '*clam*' ('softly', 'secretly'); '*siccus*' ('dry') '*sucus*' ('juice'). In German '*Boden*' ['garret' or 'ground'] still means the highest as well as the lowest thing in the house. Our '*bos*' ('bad') is matched by a word '*bass*' ('good'); in Old Saxon '*bat*' ('good') corresponds to the English 'bad', and the English 'to lock' to the German '*Lücke*', '*Loch*' ['hole']. We can compare the German '*kleben*' ['to stick'] with the English 'to cleave' ([in the sense of] 'to split'); the German words '*stumm*' ['dumb'] and '*Stimme*' ['voice'], and so on. In this way perhaps even the much

[1] Bain (1870, 1, 54).

derided derivation *lucus a non lucendo*[1] would have some sense in it.

In his essay on 'The Origin of Language' Abel (1885, 305) calls attention to further traces of ancient difficulties in thinking. Even to-day the Englishman in order to express '*ohne*' says 'without' ('*mitohne*' ['with-without'] in German), and the East Prussian does the same. The word 'with' itself, which to-day corresponds to the German '*mit*', originally meant 'without' as well as 'with', as can be recognized from 'withdraw' and 'withhold'. The same transformation can be seen in the German '*wider*' ('against') and '*wieder*' 'together with'.

For comparison with the dream-work there is another extremely strange characteristic of the ancient Egyptian language which is significant. 'In Egyptian, words can apparently, we will say to begin with—*have their sound as well as their sense.* Let us suppose that the German word "*gut*" ["good"] was Egyptian: it could then mean "bad" as well as "good", and be pronounced "tug" as well as "gut". Numerous examples of such reversals of sound, which are too frequent to be explained as chance occurrences, can be produced from the Aryan and Semitic languages as well. Confining ourselves in the first instance to Germanic languages we may note: *Topf* [pot]—pot; boat—tub, wait—*tauaren* [tarry]; hurry—*Ruhe* [rest]; care—reck; *Balken* [beam]—*Klobe* [log], club. If we take the other Indo-Germanic languages into consideration, the number of relevant instances grows accordingly; for example, *capere* [Latin for "take"]—*packen* [German for "seize"]; *ren* [Latin for "kidney"]—*Niere* [German for "kidney"], leaf—*folium* [Latin for "leaf"], *dum-a* [Russian for "thought"], θυμός [Greek for "spirit", "courage"]—*médh*, *mádha* [Sanscrit for "mind"], *Mut* [German for "courage"]; *rauchen* [German for "to smoke"]—*Kur-it* [Russian for "to smoke"]; *kreischen* [German for "to shriek"]—to shriek, etc.'

Abel tries to explain the phenomenon of reversal of sound as a doubling or reduplication of the root. Here we should find some difficulty in following the philologist. We remember in this connection how fond children are of playing at reversing the sound of words and how frequently the dream-work makes use

[1] ['*Lucus*' (Latin for 'a grove') is said to be derived from '*lucere*' ('to shine') because it does not shine there. (Attributed to Quintilian.)]

of a reversal of the representational material for various purposes. (Here it is no longer letters but images whose order is reversed.) We should therefore be more inclined to derive reversal of sound from a factor of deeper origin.[1]

In the correspondence between the peculiarity of the dream-work mentioned at the beginning of the paper and the practice discovered by philology in the oldest languages, we may see a confirmation of the view we have formed about the regressive, archaic character of the expression of thoughts in dreams. And we psychiatrists cannot escape the suspicion that we should be better at understanding and translating the language of dreams if we knew more about the development of language.[2]

[1] For the phenomenon of reversal of sound (metathesis), which is perhaps even more intimately related to the dream-work than are contradictory meanings (antithesis), compare also Meyer-Rinteln (1909).

[2] It is plausible to suppose, too, that the original antithetical meaning of words exhibits the ready-made mechanism which is exploited for various purposes by slips of the tongue that result in the opposite being said [of what was consciously intended].

A SPECIAL TYPE OF CHOICE OF OBJECT MADE BY MEN

(CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE I)

(1910)

BEITRÄGE ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DES LIEBESLEBENS I

ÜBER EINEN BESONDEREN TYPUS DER OBJEKTWAHL BEIM MANNE

(*a*) GERMAN EDITIONS:

1910 *Jb. psychoan. psychopath. Forsch.*, **2** (2), 389–97. ('Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens' I.)
1918 *S.K.S.N.*, **4**, 200–12. (2nd ed. 1922.)
1924 *G.S.*, **5**, 186–97.
1924 In *Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens*, Leipzig, Vienna and Zurich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. (Pp. 3–14.)
1931 *Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre*, 69–80.
1943 *G.W.*, **8**, 66–77.

(*b*) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

'Contributions to the Psychology of Love: A Special Type of Choice of Object made by Men'

1925 *C.P.*, **4**, 192–202. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)

The present translation is a new one by Alan Tyson.

This and the two following papers, though they were written and published over a period of some years, were brought together by Freud in the fourth series of his shorter papers (*S.K.S.N.*, **4**, 1918) under the collective title printed above. We learn from Ernest Jones (1955, 333) that Freud had announced his intention of writing some such work at a meeting of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on November 28, 1906. The gist of the present paper was given before the same society on May 19, 1909, and discussed a week later. But it was not actually written until the early summer of the following year.

A SPECIAL TYPE OF CHOICE OF OBJECT MADE BY MEN

(CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE I)

Up till now we have left it to the creative writer to depict for us the 'necessary conditions for loving' which govern people's choice of an object, and the way in which they bring the demands of their imagination into harmony with reality. The writer can indeed draw on certain qualities which fit him to carry out such a task: above all, on a sensitivity that enables him to perceive the hidden impulses in the minds of other people, and the courage to let his own unconscious speak. But there is one circumstance which lessens the evidential value of what he has to say. Writers are under the necessity to produce intellectual and aesthetic pleasure, as well as certain emotional effects. For this reason they cannot reproduce the stuff of reality unchanged, but must isolate portions of it, remove disturbing associations, tone down the whole and fill in what is missing. These are the privileges of what is known as 'poetic licence'. Moreover they can show only slight interest in the origin and development of the mental states which they portray in their completed form. In consequence it becomes inevitable that science should concern herself with the same materials whose treatment by artists has given enjoyment to mankind for thousands of years, though her touch must be clumsier and the yield of pleasure less. These observations will, it may be hoped, serve to justify us in extending a strictly scientific treatment to the field of human love. Science is, after all, the most complete renunciation of the pleasure principle of which our mental activity is capable.

In the course of psycho-analytic treatment there are ample opportunities for collecting impressions of the way in which neurotics behave in love; while at the same time we can recall having observed or heard of similar behaviour in people of average health or even in those with outstanding qualities. When the material happens to be favourable and thus leads to

an accumulation of such impressions, distinct types emerge more clearly. I will begin here with a description of one such type of object-choice which occurs in men, since it is characterized by a number of 'necessary conditions for loving' whose combination is unintelligible, and indeed bewildering, and since it admits of a simple explanation on psycho-analytic lines.

(1) The first of these preconditions for loving can be described as positively specific: wherever it is found, the presence of the other characteristics of this type may be looked for. It may be termed the precondition that there should be 'an injured third party', it stipulates that the person in question shall never choose as his love-object a woman who is disengaged, that is, an unmarried girl or an unattached married woman, but only one to whom another man can claim right of possession as her husband, fiancé or friend. In some cases this precondition proves so cogent that a woman can be ignored, or even rejected, so long as she does not belong to any man, but becomes the object of passionate feelings immediately she comes into one of these relationships with another man.

(2) The second precondition is perhaps a less constant one, but it is no less striking. It has to be found in conjunction with the first for the type to be realized, whereas the first precondition seems very often to occur independently as well. This second precondition is to the effect that a woman who is chaste and whose reputation is irreproachable never exercises an attraction that might raise her to the status of a love-object, but only a woman who is in some way or other of bad repute sexually, whose fidelity and reliability are open to some doubt. This latter characteristic may vary within substantial limits, from the faint breath of scandal attaching to a married woman who is not averse to a flirtation up to the openly promiscuous way of life of a *cocotte* or of an adept in the art of love; but the men who belong to our type will not be satisfied without something of the kind. This second necessary condition may be termed, rather crudely, 'love for a prostitute'.

While the first precondition provides an opportunity for gratifying impulses of rivalry and hostility directed at the man from whom the loved woman is wrested, the second one, that of the woman's being like a prostitute, is connected with the

experiencing of *jealousy*, which appears to be a necessity for lovers of this type. It is only when they are able to be jealous that their passion reaches its height and the woman acquires her full value, and they never fail to seize on an occasion that allows them to experience these most powerful emotions. What is strange is that it is not the lawful possessor of the loved one who becomes the target of this jealousy, but strangers, making their appearance for the first time, in relation to whom the loved one can be brought under suspicion. In glaring instances the lover shows no wish for exclusive possession of the woman and seems to be perfectly comfortable in the triangular situation. One of my patients, who had been made to suffer terribly by his lady's escapades, had no objection to her getting married, and did all he could to bring it about, in the years that followed he never showed a trace of jealousy towards her husband. Another typical patient had, it is true, been very jealous of the husband in his first love affair, and had forced the lady to stop having marital relations; but in his numerous subsequent affairs he behaved like the other members of this type and no longer regarded the lawful husband as an interference.

So much for the conditions required in the love-object. The following points describe the lover's behaviour towards the object he has chosen.

(3) In normal love the woman's value is measured by her sexual integrity, and is reduced by any approach to the characteristic of being like a prostitute.[1] Hence the fact that women with this characteristic are considered by men of our type to be *love-objects of the highest value* seems to be a striking departure from the normal. Their love-relationships with these women are carried on with the highest expenditure of mental energy, to the exclusion of all other interests, they are felt as the only people whom it is possible to love, and the demand for fidelity which the lover makes upon himself is repeated again and again, however often it may be broken in reality. These features of the love-relationships which I am here describing show their

[1] [The German '*Dirne*', here and in several other passages in this paper, is not well rendered by 'prostitute', which in English lays too much stress on the monetary side of the relation. 'Harlot' would give the sense better, if the word had not to-day acquired an antiquated and even Biblical colouring.]

compulsive nature very clearly, though that is something which is found up to a certain degree whenever anyone falls in love. But the fidelity and intensity that mark the attachment must not lead one to expect that a single love-relationship of this kind will make up the whole erotic life of the person in question or occur only once in it. On the contrary, passionate attachments of this sort are repeated with the same peculiarities - each an exact replica of the others - again and again in the lives of men of this type; in fact, owing to external events such as changes of residence and environment, the love-objects may replace one another so frequently that a *long series of them is formed.*

(4) What is most startling of all to the observer in lovers of this type is the urge they show to '*rescue*' the woman they love. The man is convinced that she is in need of him, that without him she would lose all moral control and rapidly sink to a lamentable level. He rescues her, therefore, by not giving her up. In some individual cases the idea of having to rescue her can be justified by reference to her sexual unreliability and the dangers of her social position: but it is no less conspicuous where there is no such basis in reality. One man of the type I am describing, who knew how to win his ladies by clever methods of seduction and subtle arguments, spared no efforts in the subsequent course of these affairs to keep the woman he was for the time being in love with on the path of 'virtue' by presenting her with tracts of his own composition.

If we survey the different features of the picture presented here - the conditions imposed on the man that his loved one should not be unattached and should be like a prostitute, the high value he sets on her, his need for feeling jealousy, his fidelity, which is nevertheless compatible with being broken down into a long series of instances, and the urge to rescue the woman—it will seem scarcely probable that they should all be derived from a single source. Yet psycho-analytic exploration into the life-histories of men of this type has no difficulty in showing that there is such a single source. The object-choice which is so strangely conditioned, and this very singular way of behaving in love, have the same psychical origin as we find in the loves of normal people. They are derived from the infantile

fixation of tender feelings on the mother, and represent one of the consequences of that fixation. In normal love only a few characteristics survive which reveal unmistakably the maternal prototype of the object-choice, as, for instance, the preference shown by young men for maturer women; the detachment of libido from the mother has been effected relatively swiftly. In our type, on the other hand, the libido has remained attached to the mother for so long, even after the onset of puberty, that the maternal characteristics remain stamped on the love-objects that are chosen later, and all these turn into easily recognizable mother-surrogates. The comparison with the way in which the skull of a newly born child is shaped [1] springs to mind at this point: after a protracted labour it always takes the form of a cast of the narrow part of the mother's pelvis.

We have now to show the plausibility of our assertion that the characteristic features of our type — its conditions for loving and its behaviour in love — do in fact arise from the psychical constellation connected with the mother. This would seem to be easiest where the first precondition is concerned — the condition that the woman should not be unattached, or that there should be an injured third party. It is at once clear that for the child who is growing up in the family circle the fact of the mother belonging to the father becomes an inseparable part of the mother's essence, and that the injured third party is none other than the father himself. The trait of overvaluing the loved one, and regarding her as unique and irreplaceable, can be seen to fall just as naturally into the context of the child's experience, for no one possesses more than one mother, and the relation to her is based on an event that is not open to any doubt and cannot be repeated.

If we are to understand the love-objects chosen by our type as being above all mother-surrogates, then the formation of a series of them, which seems so flatly to contradict the condition of being faithful to one, can now also be understood. We have learnt from psycho-analysis in other examples that the notion of something irreplaceable, when it is active in the unconscious, frequently appears as broken up into an endless series: endless for the reason that every surrogate nevertheless fails to provide the desired satisfaction. This is the explanation of the insatiable

[1] [In the editions before 1924 this read 'deformed'.]

urge to ask questions shown by children at a certain age: they have one single question to ask, but it never crosses their lips.[1] It explains, too, the garrulity of some people affected by neurosis; they are under the pressure of a secret which is burning to be disclosed but which, despite all temptation, they never reveal.

On the other hand the second precondition for loving—the condition that the object chosen should be like a prostitute—seems energetically to oppose a derivation from the mother-complex. The adult's conscious thought likes to regard his mother as a person of unimpeachable moral purity, and there are few ideas which he finds so offensive when they come from others, or feels as so tormenting when they spring from his own mind, as one which calls this aspect of his mother in question. This very relation of the sharpest contrast between 'mother' and 'prostitute' will however encourage us to enquire into the history of the development of these two complexes and the unconscious relation between them, since we long ago discovered that what, in the conscious, is found split into a pair of opposites often occurs in the unconscious as a unity.[2] Investigation then leads us back to the time in a boy's life at which he first gains a more or less complete knowledge of the sexual relations between adults, somewhere about the years of prepuberty. Brutal pieces of information, which are undisguisedly intended to arouse contempt and rebelliousness, now acquaint him with the secret of sexual life and destroy the authority of adults, which appears incompatible with the revelation of their sexual activities. The aspect of these disclosures which affects the newly initiated child most strongly is the way in which they apply to his own parents. This application is often flatly rejected by him, in some such words as these: '*Your* parents and other people may do something like that with one another, but *my* parents can't possibly do it.'[3]

As an almost invariable corollary to this sexual enlighten-

[1] [This point is also made by Freud in his essay on Leonardo da Vinci (1910*c*), above, p. 78.]

[2] [This fact had already been hinted at in Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900*a*), *Standard Ed.*, **4**, 318, and explicitly mentioned in Chapter VI of his book on jokes (1905*c*). See also above, p. 155 f.]

[3] [Cf. the last paragraph of Freud's paper on the sexual theories of children (1908*c*).]

ment, the boy at the same time gains a knowledge of the existence of certain women who practise sexual intercourse as a means of livelihood, and who are for this reason held in general contempt. The boy himself is necessarily far from feeling this contempt: as soon as he learns that he too can be initiated by these unfortunates into sexual life, which till then he accepted as being reserved exclusively for 'grown-ups', he regards them only with a mixture of longing and horror. When after this he can no longer maintain the doubt which makes his parents an exception to the universal and odious norms of sexual activity, he tells himself with cynical logic that the difference between his mother and a whore is not after all so very great, since basically they do the same thing. The enlightening information he has received has in fact awakened the memory-traces of the impressions and wishes of his early infancy, and these have led to a reactivation in him of certain mental impulses. He begins to desire his mother herself in the sense with which he has recently become acquainted, and to hate his father anew as a rival who stands in the way of this wish; he comes, as we say, under the dominance of the Oedipus complex.[1] He does not forgive his mother for having granted the favour of sexual intercourse not to himself but to his father, and he regards it as an act of unfaithfulness If these impulses do not quickly pass, there is no outlet for them other than to run their course in phantasies which have as their subject his mother's sexual activities under the most diverse circumstances; and the consequent tension leads particularly readily to his finding relief in masturbation. As a result of the constant combined operation of the two driving forces, desire and thirst for revenge, phantasies of his mother's unfaithfulness are by far the most preferred; the lover with whom she commits her act of infidelity almost always exhibits the features of the boy's own ego, or more accurately, of his own idealized personality, grown up and so raised to a level with his father. What I have elsewhere[2]

[1] [This appears to be Freud's first published use of the actual term. The concept had, of course, long been familiar to him (cf. *Standard Ed.*, 4, 263*n*.), and he had already spoken of the 'nuclear complex', e.g. in the paper referred to in the last footnote and in his 'Five Lectures', 1910*a*, above, p. 47.]

[2] In [a discussion included in] Rank's *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (1909) [Freud (1909*c*)].

described as the 'family romance' comprises the manifold ramifications of this imaginative activity and the way in which they are interwoven with various egoistic interests of this period of life.

Now that we have gained an insight into this piece of mental development we can no longer regard it as contradictory and incomprehensible that the precondition of the loved one's being like a prostitute should derive directly from the mother-complex. The type of male love which we have described bears the traces of this evolution and is simple to understand as a fixation on the phantasies formed by the boy in puberty—phantasies which have later after all found a way out into real Life. There is no difficulty in assuming that the masturbation assiduously practised in the years of puberty has played its part in the fixation of the phantasies.

To these phantasies which have succeeded in dominating the man's love in real life, the urge to *rescue* the loved one seems to bear merely a loose and superficial relation, and one that is fully accounted for by conscious reasons. By her propensity to be fickle and unfaithful the loved one brings herself into dangerous situations, and thus it is understandable that the lover should be at pains to protect her from these dangers by watching over her virtue and counteracting her bad inclinations. However, the study of people's screen-memories, phantasies and nocturnal dreams shows that we have here a particularly felicitous 'rationalization' of an unconscious motive, a process which may be compared to a successful secondary revision of a dream. In actual fact the 'rescue-*motif*' has a meaning and History of its own, and is an independent derivative of the mother-complex, or more accurately, of the parental complex. When a child hears that he *owes his life* to his parents, or that his mother *gave him life*, his feelings of tenderness unite with impulses which strive at power and independence, and they generate the wish to return this gift to the parents and to repay them with one of equal value. It is as though the boy's defiance were to make him say. 'I want nothing from my father; I will give him back all I have cost him.' He then forms the phantasy of *rescuing his father from danger and saving his life*; in this way he puts his account square with him. This phantasy is commonly enough displaced on to the emperor, king or some other great

man; after being thus distorted it becomes admissible to consciousness, and may even be made use of by creative writers. In its application to a boy's father it is the defiant meaning in the idea of rescuing which is by far the most important; where his mother is concerned it is usually its tender meaning. The mother gave the child life, and it is not easy to find a substitute of equal value for this unique gift. With a slight change of meaning, such as is easily effected in the unconscious and is comparable to the way in which in consciousness concepts shade into one another, rescuing his mother takes on the significance of giving her a child or making a child for her—needless to say, one like himself. This is not too remote from the original sense of rescuing, and the change in meaning is not an arbitrary one. His mother gave him a life—his own life—and in exchange he gives her another life, that of a child which has the greatest resemblance to himself. The son shows his gratitude by wishing to have by his mother a son who is like himself: in other words, in the rescue-phantasy he is completely identifying himself with his father. All his instincts, those of tenderness, gratitude, lustfulness, defiance and independence, find satisfaction in the single wish *to be his own father*. Even the element of danger has not been lost in the change of meaning; for the act of birth itself is the danger from which he was saved by his mother's efforts. Birth is both the first of all dangers to life and the prototype of all the later ones that cause us to feel anxiety, and the experience of birth has probably left behind in us the expression of affect which we call anxiety. Macduff of the Scottish legend, who was not born of his mother but ripped from her womb, was for that reason unacquainted with anxiety.[1]

[1] [*Macbeth*, V, 7. This is Freud's first extended allusion to the relation between birth and anxiety. He had already referred to the question in a footnote added in the previous year (1909) to Chapter VII, E of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900*a*), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 400 n., and had mentioned it in a discussion at the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on November 17, 1909 (Jones, 1955, 404). He dealt with it again at some length near the beginning of Lecture XXV of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17). But his longest discussion of it will, of course, be found in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926*d*), especially in Chapters II, VIII and XI, A (b), where his former opinions are largely revised. At the beginning of his psychological studies Freud had connected the symptoms of anxiety not with the experience of birth, but with the accompaniments of copulation. Cf. the penultimate paragraph of Section III

Artemidorus, the dream-interpreter of antiquity, was certainly right in maintaining that the meaning of a dream depends on who the dreamer happens to be.[1] Under the laws governing the expression of unconscious thoughts, the meaning of rescuing may vary, depending on whether the author of the phantasy is a man or a woman. It can equally mean (in a man) making a child, i.e. causing it to be born, or (in a woman) giving birth oneself to a child. These various meanings of rescuing in dreams and phantasies can be recognized particularly clearly when they are found in connection with water. A man rescuing a woman from the water in a dream means that he makes her a mother, which in the light of the preceding discussion amounts to making her his own mother. A woman rescuing someone else (a child) from the water acknowledges herself in this way as the mother who bore him, like Pharoah's daughter in the legend of Moses (Rank, 1909). At times there is also a tender meaning contained in rescue-phantasies directed towards the father. In such cases they aim at expressing the subject's wish to have his father as a son—that is, to have a son who is like his father.[2]

It is on account of all these connections between the rescue-*motif* and the parental complex that the urge to rescue the loved one forms an important feature of the type of loving which I have been discussing.

I do not feel that it is necessary for me to justify my method of work on this subject; as in my presentation of anal erotism [Freud (1908*b*)], so here too I have in the first place aimed at singling out from the observational material extreme and sharply defined types. In both cases we find a far greater number of individuals in whom only a few features of the type can be recognized, or only features which are not distinctly marked,

of his first paper on anxiety neurosis (1895*b*) and a passage near the end of the probably even earlier Draft E in the Fliess correspondence (Freud, 1950*a*).]

[1] [Cf. a passage in Chapter II of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900*a*), *Standard Ed.*, **4**, 98, and a footnote to it added in 1914.]

[2] [Dreams of rescuing are mentioned in a paragraph added in 1911 to Chapter VI (E) of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Standard Ed.*, **5**, 403. A woman's rescue dream is analysed in Freud's paper on 'Dreams and Telepathy' (1922*a*), *Standard Ed.*, **18**, 212 ff.]

and it is obvious that a proper appreciation of these types will not be possible until the whole context to which they belong has been explored.[1]

[1] [In a paper (1920*a*) written many years after the present one, Freud demonstrated the occurrence of precisely the same type of object-choice in a homosexual girl, *Standard Ed.*, **18**, 160 f.]

ON THE UNIVERSAL TENDENCY TO DEBASEMENT IN THE SPHERE OF LOVE

(CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE II)

(1912)

BEITRÄGE ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DES LIEBESLEBENS II

ÜBER DIE ALLGEMEINSTE ERNIEDRIGUNG DES LIEBESLEBENS

(*a*) GERMAN EDITIONS:

1912 *Jb. psychoan. psychopath. Forsch.*, **4** (1), 40–50. ('Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens' II.)
1918 *S.K.S N.*, **4**, 213–28. (2nd ed. 1922.)
1924 *G.S.*, **5**, 198–211.
1924 In *Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens*, Leipzig, Vienna and Zurich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. (Pp. 15–28.)
1931 *Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre*, 80–95.
1943 *G.W.*, **8**, 78–91.

(*b*) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

'Contributions to the Psychology of Love: The Most Prevalent Form of Degradation in Erotic Life'

1925 *C.P.*, **4**, 203–16. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)

The present translation, with a different title 'On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love', is a new one by Alan Tyson.

The discussion of the two sexual currents in the earlier part of the present paper is in effect a supplement to the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905*d*), in the 1915 edition of which, indeed, a short summary of it was included (*Standard Ed.*, **7**, 200). The analysis of psychical impotence, which occupies the central section of the paper, is Freud's principal contribution to that topic. The last part of the paper is one of the long series of his elaborations of the theme of the antagonism between civilization and instinctual life, another instance of which appears in his *Five Lectures*, p. 54 above. His fullest arguments on the subject will be found in the paper on '"Civilized" Sexual Ethics and Modern Nervous Illness' (1908*d*) and in the very much later *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930*a*).

ON THE UNIVERSAL TENDENCY TO DEBASEMENT IN THE SPHERE OF LOVE

(CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE II)

I

If the practising psycho-analyst asks himself on account of what disorder people most often come to him for help, he is bound to reply disregarding the many forms of anxiety that it is psychical impotence. This singular disturbance affects men of strongly libidinous [1] natures, and manifests itself in a refusal by the executive organs of sexuality to carry out the sexual act, although before and after they may show themselves to be intact and capable of performing the act, and although a strong psychical inclination to carry it out is present. The first clue to understanding his condition is obtained by the sufferer himself on making the discovery that a failure of this kind only arises when the attempt is made with certain individuals; whereas with others there is never any question of such a failure. He now becomes aware that it is some feature of the sexual object which gives rise to the inhibition of his male potency, and sometimes he reports that he has a feeling of an obstacle inside him, the sensation of a counter-will which successfully interferes with his conscious intention. However, he is unable to guess what this internal obstacle is and what feature of the sexual object brings it into operation. If he has had repeated experience of a failure of this kind, he is likely, by the familiar process of 'erroneous connection',[2] to decide that the recollection of the first occasion evoked the disturbing anxiety-idea and so caused the failure to be repeated each time; while he derives the first occasion itself from some 'accidental' impression.

[1] ['*Libidinös*.' Here 'libidinous', as contrasted with the technical 'libidinal'.]

[2] [This seems to be an allusion to the slightly differently termed 'false connection' already described in *Studies on Hysteria* (1895*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 67*n*.]

Psycho-analytic studies of psychical impotence have already been carried out and published by several writers.[1] Every analyst can confirm the explanations provided by them from his own clinical experience. It is in fact a question of the inhibitory influence of certain psychical complexes which are withdrawn from the subject's knowledge. An incestuous fixation on mother or sister, which has never been surmounted, plays a prominent part in this pathogenic material and is its most universal content. In addition there is the influence to be considered of accidental distressing impressions connected with infantile sexual activity, and also those factors which in a general way reduce the libido that is to be directed on to the female sexual object.[2]

When striking cases of psychical impotence are exhaustively investigated by means of psycho-analysis, the following information is obtained about the psychosexual processes at work in them. Here again—as very probably in all neurotic disturbances—the foundation of the disorder is provided by an inhibition in the developmental history of the libido before it assumes the form which we take to be its normal termination. Two currents whose union is necessary to ensure a completely normal attitude in love have, in the cases we are considering, failed to combine. These two may be distinguished as the *affectionate* and the *sensual* current.

The affectionate current is the older of the two. It springs from the earliest years of childhood; it is formed on the basis of the interests of the self-preservative instinct and is directed to the members of the family and those who look after the child. From the very beginning it carries along with it contributions from the sexual instincts—components of erotic interest—which can already be seen more or less clearly even in childhood and in any event are uncovered in neurotics by psycho-analysis later on. It corresponds to *the child's primary object-choice*. We learn in this way that the sexual instincts find their first objects by attaching themselves to the valuations made by the ego-instincts, precisely in the way in which the first sexual satis-

[1] Steiner (1907), Stekel (1908), Ferenczi (1908). [Freud had written a preface to Stekel's book (Freud, 1908*f*) and wrote one later to a book of Steiner's on the same subject (Freud, 1913*e*).]

[2] Stekel (1908, 191 ff.).

factions are experienced in attachment to the bodily functions necessary for the preservation of life.[1] The 'affection' shown by the child's parents and those who look after him, which seldom fails to betray its erotic nature ('the child is an erotic plaything'), does a very great deal to raise the contributions made by erotism to the cathexes of his ego-instincts, and to increase them to an amount which is bound to play a part in his later development, especially when certain other circumstances lend their support.

These affectionate fixations of the child persist throughout childhood, and continually carry along with them erotism, which is consequently diverted from its sexual aims. Then at the age of puberty they are joined by the powerful 'sensual' current which no longer mistakes its aims. It never fails, apparently, to follow the earlier paths and to cathect the objects of the primary infantile choice with quotas of libido that are now far stronger. Here, however, it runs up against the obstacles that have been erected in the meantime by the barrier against incest; consequently it will make efforts to pass on from these objects which are unsuitable in reality, and find a way as soon as possible to other, extraneous objects with which a real sexual life may be carried on. These new objects will still be chosen on the model (imago) of the infantile ones, but in the course of time they will attract to themselves the affection that was tied to the earlier ones. A man shall leave his father and his mother —according to the biblical command[2] and shall cleave unto his wife; affection and sensuality are then united. The greatest intensity of sensual passion will bring with it the highest psychical valuation of the object—this being the normal overvaluation of the sexual object on the part of a man.

Two factors will decide whether this advance in the developmental path of the libido is to fail. First, there is the amount of *frustration in reality* which opposes the new object-choice and reduces its value for the person concerned. There is after all no point in embarking upon an object-choice if no choice is to be allowed at all or if there is no prospect of being able to choose anything suitable. Secondly, there is the amount of *attraction*

[1] [The 'attachment' (or 'anaclitic') type of object-choice was discussed more fully in Freud's later paper on narcissism (1914c).]

[2] [*Genesis* ii, 24.]

which the infantile objects that have to be relinquished are able to exercise, and which is in proportion to the erotic cathexis attaching to them in childhood. If these two factors are sufficiently strong, the general mechanism by which the neuroses are formed comes into operation. The libido turns away from reality, is taken over by imaginative activity (the process of introversion), strengthens the images of the first sexual objects and becomes fixated to them. The obstacle raised against incest, however, compels the libido that has turned to these objects to remain in the unconscious. The masturbatory activity carried out by the sensual current, which is now part of the unconscious, makes its own contribution in strengthening this fixation. Nothing is altered in this state of affairs if the advance which has miscarried in reality is now completed in phantasy, and if in the phantasy-situations that lead to masturbatory satisfaction the original sexual objects are replaced by different ones. As a result of this substitution the phantasies become admissible to consciousness, but no progress is made in the allocation of the libido in reality. In this way it can happen that the whole of a young man's sensuality becomes tied to incestuous objects in the unconscious[1], or to put it another way, becomes fixated to unconscious incestuous phantasies. The result is then total impotence, which is perhaps further ensured by the simultaneous onset of an actual weakening of the organs that perform the sexual act.

Less severe conditions are required to bring about the state known specifically as psychical impotence. Here the fate of the sensual current must not be that its whole charge has to conceal itself behind the affectionate current; it must have remained sufficiently strong or uninhibited to secure a partial outlet into reality. The sexual activity of such people shows the clearest signs, however, that it has not the whole psychical driving force of the instinct behind it. It is capricious, easily disturbed, often not properly carried out, and not accompanied by much pleasure. But above all it is forced to avoid the affectionate current. A restriction has thus been placed on object-choice. The sensual current that has remained active seeks only objects which do not recall the incestuous figures

[1] [In the editions before 1924 the word used here is the very unusual '*Unbewusstsein*', 'unconsciousness'.]

forbidden to it; if someone makes an impression that might lead to a high psychical estimation of her, this impression does not find an issue in any sensual excitation but in affection which has no erotic effect. The whole sphere of love in such people remains divided in the two directions personified in art as sacred and profane (or animal) love. Where they love they do not desire and where they desire they cannot love. They seek objects which they do not need to love, in order to keep their sensuality away from the objects they love; and, in accordance with the laws of 'complexive sensitiveness' [1] and of the return of the repressed, the strange failure shown in psychical impotence makes its appearance whenever an object which has been chosen with the aim of avoiding incest recalls the prohibited object through some feature, often an inconspicuous one.

The main protective measure against such a disturbance which men have recourse to in this split in their love consists in a psychical *debasement* of the sexual object, the overvaluation that normally attaches to the sexual object being reserved for the incestuous object and its representatives. As soon as the condition of debasement is fulfilled, sensuality can be freely expressed, and important sexual capacities and a high degree of pleasure can develop. There is a further factor which contributes to this result. People in whom there has not been a proper confluence of the affectionate and the sensual currents do not usually show much refinement in their modes of behaviour in love; they have retained perverse sexual aims whose non-fulfilment is felt as a serious loss of pleasure, and whose fulfilment on the other hand seems possible only with a debased and despised sexual object.

We can now understand the motives behind the boy's phantasies mentioned in the first of these 'Contributions' (above, p. 171), which degrade the mother to the level of a prostitute. They are efforts to bridge the gulf between the two currents in love, at any rate in phantasy, and by debasing the mother to acquire her as an object of sensuality.

[1] [This term is borrowed from Jung's word association experiments (Jung, 1906), and is also used by Freud in the 'Rat Man' case history (1909*d*), *Standard Ed.*, **10**, 210.]

2

In the preceding section we have approached the study of psychical impotence from a medico-psychological angle of which the title of this paper gives no indication. It will however become clear that this introduction was required by us to provide an approach to our proper subject.

We have reduced psychical impotence to the failure of the affectionate and the sensual currents in love to combine, and this developmental inhibition has in turn been explained as being due to the influences of strong childhood fixations and of later frustration in reality through the intervention of the barrier against incest. There is one principal objection to the theory we advance; it does too much. It explains why certain people suffer from psychical impotence, but it leaves us with the apparent mystery of how others have been able to escape this disorder. Since we must recognize that all the relevant factors known to us – the strong childhood fixation, the incest-barrier and the frustration in the years of development after puberty – are to be found in practically all civilized human beings, we should be justified in expecting psychical impotence to be a universal affliction under civilization and not a disorder confined to some individuals.

It would be easy to escape from this conclusion by pointing to the quantitative factor in the causation of illness – to the greater or lesser extent of the contribution made by the various elements which determine whether a recognizable illness results or not. But although I accept this answer as correct, it is not my intention to make it a reason for rejecting the conclusion itself. On the contrary, I shall put forward the view that psychical impotence is much more widespread than is supposed, and that a certain amount of this behaviour does in fact characterize the love of civilized man.

If the concept of psychical impotence is broadened and is not restricted to failure to perform the act of coitus in circumstances where a desire to obtain pleasure is present and the genital apparatus is intact, we may in the first place add all those men who are described as psychanaesthetic: men who never fail in the act but who carry it out without getting any particular pleasure from it—a state of affairs that is more com-

mon than one would think. Psycho-analytic examination of such cases discloses the same aetiological factors as we found in psychical impotence in the narrower sense, without at first arriving at any explanation of the difference between their symptoms. An easily justifiable analogy takes one from these anaesthetic men to the immense number of frigid women, and there is no better way to describe or understand their behaviour in love than by comparing it with the more conspicuous disorder of psychical impotence in men.[1]

If however we turn our attention not to an extension of the concept of psychical impotence, but to the gradations in its symptomatology, we cannot escape the conclusion that the behaviour in love of men in the civilized world to-day bears the stamp altogether of psychical impotence. There are only a very few educated people in whom the two currents of affection and sensuality have become properly fused; the man almost always feels his respect for the woman acting as a restriction on his sexual activity, and only develops full potency when he is with a debased sexual object; and thus in its turn is partly caused by the entrance of perverse components into his sexual aims, which he does not venture to satisfy with a woman he respects. He is assured of complete sexual pleasure only when he can devote himself unreservedly to obtaining satisfaction, which with his well-brought-up wife, for instance, he does not dare to do. This is the source of his need for a debased sexual object, a woman who is ethically inferior, to whom he need attribute no aesthetic scruples, who does not know him in his other social relations and cannot judge him in them. It is to such a woman that he prefers to devote his sexual potency, even when the whole of his affection belongs to a woman of a higher kind. It is possible, too, that the tendency so often observed in men of the highest classes of society to choose a woman of a lower class as a permanent mistress or even as a wife is nothing but a consequence of their need for a debased sexual object, to whom, psychologically, the possibility of complete satisfaction is linked.

[1] I am at the same time very willing to admit that frigidity in women is a complex subject which can also be approached from another angle. [The question is examined at length in 'The Taboo of Virginity' (1918a), p. 201 ff. below.]

I do not hesitate to make the two factors at work in psychical impotence in the strict sense—the factors of intense incestuous fixation in childhood and the frustration by reality in adolescence—responsible, too, for this extremely common characteristic of the love of civilized men. It sounds not only disagreeable but also paradoxical, yet it must nevertheless be said that anyone who is to be really free and happy in love must have surmounted his respect for women and have come to terms with the idea of incest with his mother or sister. Anyone who subjects himself to a serious self-examination on the subject of this requirement will be sure to find that he regards the sexual act basically as something degrading, which defiles and pollutes not only the body. The origin of this low opinion, which he will certainly not willingly acknowledge, must be looked for in the period of his youth in which the sensual current in him was already strongly developed but its satisfaction with an object outside the family was almost as completely prohibited as it was with an incestuous one.

In our civilized world women are under the influence of a similar after-effect of their upbringing, and, in addition, of their reaction to men's behaviour. It is naturally just as unfavourable for a woman if a man approaches her without his full potency as it is if his initial overvaluation of her when he is in love gives place to undervaluation after he has possessed her. In the case of women there is little sign of a need to debase their sexual object. This is no doubt connected with the absence in them as a rule of anything similar to the sexual overvaluation found in men. But their long holding back from sexuality and the lingering of their sensuality in phantasy has another important consequence for them. They are subsequently often unable to undo the connection between sensual activity and the prohibition, and prove to be psychically impotent, that is, frigid, when such activity is at last allowed them. This is the origin of the endeavour made by many women to keep even legitimate relations secret for a while; and of the capacity of other women for normal sensation as soon as the condition of prohibition is re-established by a secret love affair: unfaithful to their husband, they are able to keep a second order of faith with their lover [cf. p. 203].

The condition of forbiddenness in the erotic life of women is,

I think, comparable to the need on the part of men to debase their sexual object. Both are consequences of the long period of delay, which is demanded by education for cultural reasons, between sexual maturity and sexual activity. Both aim at abolishing the psychical impotence that results from the failure of affectionate and sensual impulses to coalesce. That the effect of the same causes should be so different in men and in women may perhaps be traced to another difference in the behaviour of the two sexes. Civilized women do not usually transgress the prohibition on sexual activity in the period during which they have to wait, and thus they acquire the intimate connection between prohibition and sexuality. Men usually break through this prohibition if they can satisfy the condition of debasing the object, and so they carry on this condition into their love in later life.

In view of the strenuous efforts being made in the civilized world to-day to reform sexual life, it will not be superfluous to give a reminder that psycho-analytic research is as remote from tendentiousness as any other kind of research. It has no other end in view than to throw light on things by tracing what is manifest back to what is hidden. It is quite satisfied if reforms make use of its findings to replace what is injurious by something more advantageous; but it cannot predict whether other institutions may not result in other, and perhaps graver, sacrifices.

3

The fact that the curb put upon love by civilization involves a universal tendency to debase sexual objects will perhaps lead us to turn our attention from the object to the instincts themselves. The damage caused by the initial frustration of sexual pleasure is seen in the fact that the freedom later given to that pleasure in marriage does not bring full satisfaction. But at the same time, if sexual freedom is unrestricted from the outset the result is no better. It can easily be shown that the psychical value of erotic needs is reduced as soon as their satisfaction becomes easy. An obstacle is required in order to heighten libido; and where natural resistances to satisfaction have not been sufficient men have at all times erected conventional ones so as to be able to enjoy love. This is true both of individuals and

of nations. In times in which there were no difficulties standing in the way of sexual satisfaction, such as perhaps during the decline of the ancient civilizations, love became worthless and life empty, and strong reaction-formations were required to restore indispensable affective values. In this connection it may be claimed that the ascetic current in Christianity created psychical values for love which pagan antiquity was never able to confer on it. This current assumed its greatest importance with the ascetic monks, whose lives were almost entirely occupied with the struggle against libidinal temptation.

One's first inclination is no doubt to trace back the difficulties revealed here to universal characteristics of our organic instincts. It is no doubt also true in general that the psychical importance of an instinct rises in proportion to its frustration. Suppose a number of totally different human beings were all equally exposed to hunger. As their imperative need for food mounted, all the individual differences would disappear and in their place one would see the uniform manifestations of the one unappeased instinct. But is it also true that with the satisfaction of an instinct its psychical value always falls just as sharply? Consider, for example, the relation of a drinker to wine. Is it not true that wine always provides the drinker with the same toxic satisfaction, which in poetry has so often been compared to erotic satisfaction – a comparison acceptable from the scientific point of view as well? Has one ever heard of the drinker being obliged constantly to change his drink because he soon grows tired of keeping to the same one? On the contrary, habit constantly tightens the bond between a man and the kind of wine he drinks. Does one ever hear of a drinker who needs to go to a country where wine is dearer or drinking is prohibited, so that by introducing obstacles he can reinforce the dwindling satisfaction that he obtains? Not at all. If we listen to what our great alcoholics, such as Böcklin,[1] say about their relation to wine, it sounds like the most perfect harmony, a model of a happy marriage. Why is the relation of the lover to his sexual object so very different?

It is my belief that, however strange it may sound, we must reckon with the possibility that something in the nature of the sexual instinct itself is unfavourable to the realization of com-

[1] Floerke (1902, 16).

plete satisfaction. If we consider the long and difficult developmental history of the instinct, two factors immediately spring to mind which might be made responsible for this difficulty. Firstly, as a result of the diphasic onset of object-choice, and the interposition of the barrier against incest, the final object of the sexual instinct is never any longer the original object but only a surrogate for it. Psycho-analysis has shown us that when the original object of a wishful impulse has been lost as a result of repression, it is frequently represented by an endless series of substitutive objects none of which, however, brings full satisfaction. This may explain the inconstancy in object-choice, the 'craving for stimulation' [1] which is so often a feature of the love of adults.

Secondly, we know that the sexual instinct is originally divided into a great number of components—or rather, it develops out of them—some of which cannot be taken up into the instinct in its later form, but have at an earlier stage to be suppressed or put to other uses. These are above all the coprophilic instinctual components, which have proved incompatible with our aesthetic standards of culture, probably since, as a result of our adopting an erect gait, we raised our organ of smell from the ground.[2] The same is true of a large portion of the sadistic urges which are a part of erotic life. But all such developmental processes affect only the upper layers of the complex structure. The fundamental processes which produce erotic excitation remain unaltered. The excremental is all too intimately and inseparably bound up with the sexual; the position of the genitals—*inter urinas et faeces*—remains the decisive and unchangeable factor. One might say here, varying a well-known saying of the great Napoleon: 'Anatomy is destiny.' The genitals themselves have not taken part in the development of the human body in the direction of beauty; they have remained animal, and thus love, too, has remained in essence just as animal as it ever was. The instincts of love are hard to educate; education of them achieves now too much, now too little. What civilization aims at making out of them

[1] ['*Reizhunger*.' This term seems to have been introduced by Hoche and Bloch. See Freud's *Three Essays* (1905*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 151*n*.]

[2] [Cf. two long footnotes to Chapter VI of *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930*a*).]

seems unattainable except at the price of a sensible loss of pleasure; the persistence of the impulses that could not be made use of can be detected in sexual activity in the form of non-satisfaction.

Thus we may perhaps be forced to become reconciled to the idea that it is quite impossible to adjust the claims of the sexual instinct to the demands of civilization; that in consequence of its cultural development renunciation and suffering, as well as the danger of extinction in the remotest future, cannot be avoided by the human race. This gloomy prognosis rests, it is true, on the single conjecture that the non-satisfaction that goes with civilization is the necessary consequence of certain peculiarities which the sexual instinct has assumed under the pressure of culture. The very incapacity of the sexual instinct to yield complete satisfaction as soon as it submits to the first demands of civilization becomes the source, however, of the noblest cultural achievements which are brought into being by ever more extensive sublimation of its instinctual components. For what motive would men have for putting sexual instinctual forces to other uses if, by any distribution of those forces, they could obtain fully satisfying pleasure? They would never abandon that pleasure and they would never make any further progress. It seems, therefore, that the irreconcilable difference between the demands of the two instincts—the sexual and the egoistic—has made men capable of ever higher achievements, though subject, it is true, to a constant danger, to which, in the form of neurosis, the weaker are succumbing to-day.

It is not the aim of science either to frighten or to console. But I myself am quite ready to admit that such far-reaching conclusions as those I have drawn should be built on a broader foundation, and that perhaps developments in other directions may enable mankind to correct the results of the developments I have here been considering in isolation.

THE TABOO OF VIRGINITY

(CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE III)

(1918 [1917])

BEITRÄGE ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DES LIEBESLEBENS III

DAS TABU DER VIRGINITÄT

(*a*) GERMAN EDITIONS:

(1917 Read as a communication to the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society, December 12, 1917.)

1918 *S.K.S.N.*, **4**, 229–51. ('Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens' III.) (2nd ed. 1922.)

1924 *G.S.*, **5**, 212–31.

1924 In *Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens*, Leipzig, Vienna and Zurich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. (Pp. 29–48.)

1931 *Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre*, 95–115.

1947 *G.W.*, **12**, 161–80.

(*b*) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

'Contributions to the Psychology of Love: The Taboo of Virginity'

1925 *C.P.*, **4**, 217–35. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)

The present translation is a new one by Angela Richards.

This paper was written in September 1917, but was not published till the following year. In spite of the gap of several years separating this paper from the two preceding ones, it has seemed right to bring them together, since Freud himself assembled them under a common heading. *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13) had appeared in the interval since the second paper in the series, and this third one may from one point of view be regarded as an addition to the second essay in that work. On the other hand, however, it includes a discussion of the clinical problem of frigidity in women and is in that respect the counterpart of the study of impotence in men in the second paper in the series (see p. 184 ff. above).

THE TABOO OF VIRGINITY

(CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE III)

Few details of the sexual life of primitive peoples are so alien to our own feelings as their estimate of virginity, the state in a woman of being untouched. The high value which her suitor places on a woman's virginity seems to us so firmly rooted, so much a matter of course, that we find ourselves almost at a loss if we have to give reasons for this opinion. The demand that a girl shall not bring to her marriage with a particular man any memory of sexual relations with another is, indeed, nothing other than a logical continuation of the right to exclusive possession of a woman, which forms the essence of monogamy, the extension of this monopoly to cover the past.

From this point we have no trouble in justifying what looked at first like a prejudice, by referring to our views on the erotic life of women. Whoever is the first to satisfy a virgin's desire for love, long and laboriously held in check, and who in doing so overcomes the resistances which have been built up in her through the influences of her milieu and education, that is the man she will take into a lasting relationship, the possibility of which will never again be open to any other man. This experience creates a state of bondage in the woman which guarantees that possession of her shall continue undisturbed and makes her able to resist new impressions and enticements from outside.

The expression 'sexual bondage' was chosen by von Krafft-Ebing (1892) to describe the phenomenon of a person's acquiring an unusually high degree of dependence and lack of selfreliance in relation to another person with whom he has a sexual relationship. This bondage can on occasion extend very far, as far as the loss of all independent will and as far as causing a person to suffer the greatest sacrifices of his own interests, the author, however, does not fail to remark that a certain measure of such dependence 'is absolutely necessary, if the tie is to last for any length of time'. Some such measure of sexual bondage is, indeed, indispensable to the maintenance of civilized marriage and to holding at bay the polygamous

tendencies which threaten it, and in our social communities this factor is regularly reckoned upon

Von Krafft-Ebing derives the formation of sexual bondage from a conjunction of an 'uncommon degree of the state of being in love and of weakness of character' in one person and unbounded egoism in the other. Analytic experience, however, will not let us rest satisfied with this simple attempt at explanation. We can see, rather, that the decisive factor is the amount of sexual resistance that is overcome and in addition the fact that the process of overcoming the resistance is concentrated and happens only once. This state of bondage is, accordingly, far more frequent and more intense in women than in men, though it is true it occurs in the latter more often nowadays than it did in ancient times. Wherever we have been able to study sexual bondage in men it has shown itself as resulting from an overcoming of psychical impotence through one particular woman, to whom the man in question has remained subsequently bound.[1] Many strange marriages and not a few tragic events -even some with far-reaching consequences - seem to owe their explanation to this origin

Turning to the attitude of primitive peoples, it is incorrect to describe it by declaring that they set no value on virginity and to submit as proof of this the fact that they perform the defloration of girls outside marriage and before the first act of marital intercourse On the contrary, it appears that for them, too, defloration is a significant act, but it has become the subject of a taboo—of a prohibition which may be described as religious. Instead of reserving it for the girl's bridegroom and future partner in marriage, custom demands that *he shall shun the performance of it.*[2]

It is no part of my purpose to make a full collection of the literary evidence for the existence of this custom of prohibition, to pursue its geographical distribution and to enumerate all the forms in which it is expressed. I shall content myself, therefore, with stating the fact that the practice of rupturing the hymen in this way outside the subsequent marriage is very wide-

[1] [A remark on this will be found in a footnote at the end of Freud's late paper 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' [1937c].]

[2] Cf. Crawley [1902], Pluss and Bartels (1891), Frazer (1911) and Havelock Ellis [1913].

spread among primitive races living to-day. As Crawley says: 'This marriage ceremony consists in perforation of the hymen by some appointed person other than the husband; it is most common in the lowest stages of culture, especially in Australia.' (Crawley, 1902, 347.)

If, however, defloration is not to result from the first act of marital intercourse, then it must have been carried out beforehand whatever the way and whoever the agent may have been. I shall quote a few passages from Crawley's book, mentioned above, which provide information on these points but also give grounds for some critical observations.

(Ibid., 191.) 'Thus in the Dieri and neighbouring tribes (in Australia) it is the universal custom when a girl reaches puberty to rupture the hymen (*Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, **24**, 169). In the Portland and Glenelg tribes this is done to the bride by an old woman, and sometimes white men are asked for this reason to deflower maidens (Brough Smith, [1878], **2**, 319).'

(Ibid., 307.) 'The artificial rupture of the hymen sometimes takes place in infancy, but generally at puberty. . . . It is often combined, as in Australia, with a ceremonial act of intercourse.'

(Ibid., 348.) (Of Australian tribes among which the well-known exogamous marriage-restrictions are in force, from communications by Spencer and Gillen [1899].) 'The hymen is artificially perforated, and then the assisting men have access (ceremonial, be it observed) to the girl in a stated order. . . . The act is in two parts, perforation and intercourse.'

(Ibid., 349.) 'An important preliminary of marriage amongst the Masai in Equatorial Africa, is the performance of this operation on the girl (J. Thomson, [1887], **2**, 258). This defloration is performed by the father of the bride amongst the Sakais (Malays, Battas Sumatra, and Alfoers of Celebes (Ploss and Bartels, [1891], **2**, 490). In the Philippines there were certain men whose profession it was to deflower brides, in case the hymen had not been ruptured in childhood by an old woman who was sometimes employed for this (Featherman, [1885-91], **2**, 474). The defloration of the bride was amongst some Eskimo tribes entrusted to the *angekok*, or priest (ibid., **3**, 406).'

The critical remarks I referred to are concerned with two

points. Firstly, it is a pity that in these reports a more careful distinction is not made between simple rupture of the hymen without intercourse, and intercourse for the purpose of effecting this rupture. There is only one passage in which we are told expressly that the procedure falls into two actions: defloration (carried out by hand or with some instrument) and the act of intercourse which follows it. The material in Ploss and Bartels (1891), in other respects so rich, is almost useless for our purpose, because in their presentation of it the psychological importance of the act of defloration is completely displaced in favour of its anatomical results. Secondly, we should be glad to be informed how the 'ceremonial' (purely formal, ritual, or official) coitus, which takes place on these occasions, differs from ordinary sexual intercourse. The authors to whom I have had access either have been too embarrassed to discuss the matter or have once again underestimated the psychological importance of such sexual details. It is to be hoped that the first-hand accounts of travellers and missionaries may be more complete and less ambiguous, but since this literature, which is for the most part foreign, is for the time being inaccessible I cannot say anything definite on the subject.[1] Besides, we may get round the problem arising over this second point if we bear in mind the fact that a ceremonial mock-coitus would after all only represent a substitute for, and perhaps replace altogether, an act that in earlier times would have been carried out completely.[2]

There are various factors which can be adduced to explain this taboo of virginity and which I will enumerate and consider briefly. When a virgin is deflowered, her blood is as a rule shed; the first attempt at explanation, then, is based on the horror of blood among primitive races who consider blood as the seat of life. This blood taboo is seen in numerous kinds of observances which have nothing to do with sexuality; it is obviously connected with the prohibition against murder and forms a protective measure against the primal thirst for blood, primaeval

[1] [This was written during the first World War.]

[2] In numerous other examples of marriage ceremonies there can be no doubt that people other than the bridegroom, for example his assistants and companions (our traditional 'groomsmen' ['*Brautführer*']), are granted full sexual access to the bride.

man's pleasure in killing. According to this view the taboo of virginity is connected with the taboo of menstruation which is almost universally maintained. Primitive people cannot dissociate the puzzling phenomenon of this monthly flow of blood from sadistic ideas. Menstruation, especially its first appearance, is interpreted as the bite of some spirit-animal, perhaps as a sign of sexual intercourse with this spirit. Occasionally some report gives grounds for recognizing the spirit as that of an ancestor and then, supported by other findings,[1] we understand that the menstruating girl is taboo because she is the property of this ancestral spirit.

Other considerations, however, warn us not to over-estimate the influence of a factor such as the horror of blood. It has not, after all, been strong enough to suppress practices like the circumcision of boys and the still more cruel equivalent with girls (excision of the clitoris and labia minora) which are to some extent the custom in these same races, nor to abolish the prevalence of other ceremonies involving bloodshed. It would not therefore be surprising, either, if this horror were overcome for the benefit of the husband on the occasion of the first cohabitation.

There is a second explanation, also unconcerned with sexuality, which has, however, a much more general scope than the first. It suggests that primitive man is prey to a perpetual lurking apprehensiveness, just as in the psycho-analytic theory of the neuroses we claim to be the case with people suffering from anxiety neurosis. This apprehensiveness will appear most strongly on all occasions which differ in any way from the usual, which involve something new or unexpected, something not understood or uncanny. This is also the origin of the ceremonial practices, widely adopted in later religions, which are connected with the beginning of every new undertaking, the start of every new period of time, the first-fruits of human, animal and plant life. The dangers which the anxious man believes to be threatening him never appear more vivid in his expectation than on the threshold of a dangerous situation, and then, too, is the only time when protecting himself against them is of any use. The first act of intercourse in marriage can certainly claim, on grounds of importance, to be preceded by

[1] Cf. *Totem and Taboo*, (1912-13), [*Standard Ed.*, **13**, 141 4].

such precautionary measures. These two attempts at explanation, based on horror of blood and on fear of first occurrences, do not contradict but rather reinforce each other. The first occasion of sexual intercourse is certainly a crucial action, all the more so if it is to involve a flow of blood.

A third explanation — the one which Crawley prefers — draws attention to the fact that the taboo of virginity is part of a large totality which embraces the whole of sexual life. It is not only the first coitus with a woman which is taboo but sexual intercourse in general; one might almost say that women are altogether taboo. A woman is not only taboo in particular situations arising from her sexual life such as menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth and lying-in, apart from these situations, intercourse with women is subject to such solemn and numerous restrictions that we have every reason to doubt the reputed sexual freedom of savages. It is true that, on particular occasions, primitive man's sexuality will override all inhibitions; but for the most part it seems to be more strongly held in check by prohibitions than it is at higher levels of civilization. Whenever the man undertakes some special enterprise, like setting out on an expedition, a hunt or a campaign, he is obliged to keep away from his wife and especially from sexual intercourse with her; otherwise she will paralyse his strength and bring him bad luck. In the usages of daily life as well there is an unmistakable tendency to keep the sexes apart. Women live with women, men with men, family life, in our sense, seems scarcely to exist in many primitive tribes. This separation sometimes goes so far that one sex is not allowed to say aloud the personal names of members of the other sex, and that the women develop a language with a special vocabulary. Sexual needs will from time to time break through these barriers of separation afresh, but in some tribes even the encounters of husband and wife have to take place outside the house and in secret.

Wherever primitive man has set up a taboo he fears some danger and it cannot be disputed that a generalized dread of women is expressed in all these rules of avoidance. Perhaps this dread is based on the fact that woman is different from man, for ever incomprehensible and mysterious, strange and therefore apparently hostile. The man is afraid of being weakened by the woman, infected with her femininity and of then

showing himself incapable. The effect which coitus has of discharging tensions and causing flaccidity may be the prototype of what the man fears; and realization of the influence which the woman gains over him through sexual intercourse, the consideration she thereby forces from him, may justify the extension of this fear. In all this there is nothing obsolete, nothing which is not still alive among ourselves.

Many observers of primitive races living to-day have put forward the view that their impulsions in love are relatively weak and never reach the degree of intensity which we are accustomed to meet with in civilized men. Other observers have contradicted this opinion, but in any case the practice of the taboos we have described testifies to the existence of a force which opposes love by rejecting women as strange and hostile.

Crawley, in language which differs only slightly from the current terminology of psycho-analysis, declares that each individual is separated from the others by a 'taboo of personal isolation', and that it is precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them. It would be tempting to pursue this idea and to derive from this 'narcissism of minor differences' [1] the hostility which in every human relation we see fighting successfully against feelings of fellowship and overpowering the commandment that all men should love one another. Psycho-analysis believes that it has discovered a large part of what underlies the narcissistic rejection of women by men, which is so much mixed up with despising them, in drawing attention to the castration complex and its influence on the opinion in which women are held.

We can see, however, that these latter considerations have led us to range far beyond our subject. The general taboo of women throws no light on the particular rules concerning the first sexual act with a virgin. As far as they are concerned, we have not got beyond the first two explanations, based on horror of blood and fear of first occurrences, and even these, we must point out, do not touch the core of the taboo in question. It is quite clear that the intention underlying this taboo is that of

[1] [Freud returns to this in Chapter VI of *Group Psychology* (1921c), *Standard Ed.*, 18, 101, and in Chapter V of *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930a).]

denying or sparing precisely the future husband something which cannot be dissociated from the first sexual act, although according to our introductory observations this very relation would lead to the woman becoming specially bound to this one man.

It is not our task on this occasion to discuss the origin and ultimate significance of taboo observances. I have done this in my book *Totem and Taboo* [1912-13], where I have given due consideration to the part played by primal ambivalence in determining the formation of taboo and have traced the genesis of the latter from the prehistoric events which led to the founding of the human family. We can no longer recognize an original meaning of this kind in taboos observed among primitive tribes to-day. We forget all too easily, in expecting to find any such thing, that even the most primitive peoples exist in a culture far removed from that of primaeval days, which is just as old as our own from the point of view of time and like ours corresponds to a later, if different, stage of development.

To-day we find taboos among primitive peoples already elaborated into an intricate system of fast the sort that neurotics among ourselves develop in their phobias, and we find old *motifs* replaced by new ones that fit together harmoniously. Leaving aside these genetic problems, then, we will go back to the idea that primitive man institutes a taboo where he fears some danger. Taking it generally this danger is a psychical one, for primitive man is not impelled at this point to make two distinctions, which to us it seems cannot be disregarded. He does not separate material from psychical danger, nor real from imaginary. In his consistently applied animistic view of the universe, every danger springs from the hostile intention of some being with a soul like himself, and this is as much the case with dangers which threaten him from some natural force as it is with those from other human beings or animals. But on the other hand he is accustomed to project his own internal impulses of hostility on to the external world, to ascribe them, that is, to the objects which he feels to be disagreeable or even merely strange. In this way women also are regarded as being a source of such dangers, and the first act of sexual intercourse with a woman stands out as a danger of particular intensity.

Now I believe that we shall receive some indication as to

what this heightened danger is and why it threatens precisely the future husband, if we examine more closely the behaviour under the same circumstances of women of our own stage of civilization to-day. I will submit in advance, as the result of this examination, that such a danger really exists, so that with the taboo of virginity primitive man is defending himself against a correctly sensed, although psychical, danger.

We consider it to be the normal reaction for a woman after intercourse to embrace the man, pressing him to her at the climax of satisfaction, and we see this as an expression of her gratitude and a token of lasting bondage. But we know it is by no means the rule that the first occasion of intercourse should lead to this behaviour; very frequently it means only disappointment for the woman, who remains cold and unsatisfied, and it usually requires quite a long time and frequent repetition of the sexual act before she too begins to find satisfaction in it. There is an unbroken series from these cases of mere initial frigidity which soon vanishes, up to the cheerless phenomenon of permanent and obstinate frigidity which no tender efforts on the part of the husband can overcome. I believe this frigidity in women is not yet sufficiently understood and, except for those cases which must be blamed on the man's insufficient potency, calls for elucidation, possibly through allied phenomena.

I do not want to introduce at this point the attempts - which are so frequent - to take flight from the first occasion of sexual intercourse, because they are open to several interpretations and are in the main, although not altogether, to be understood as an expression of the general female tendency to take a defensive line. As against this, I do believe that light is thrown on the riddle of female frigidity by certain pathological cases in which, after the first and indeed after each repeated instance of sexual intercourse, the woman gives unconcealed expression to her hostility towards the man by abusing him, raising her hand against him or actually striking him. In one very clear case of this kind, which I was able to submit to a thorough analysis, this happened although the woman loved the man very much, used to demand intercourse herself and unmistakably found great satisfaction in it. I think that this strange, contradictory reaction is the result of the very same impulses

which ordinarily can only find expression as frigidity—which, that is, can hold back the tender reaction without at the same time being able to put themselves into effect. In the pathological case we find separated so to speak into its two components what in the far more common instance of frigidity is united to produce an inhibiting effect, just like the process we have long recognized in the so-called 'diphasic symptoms' of obsessional neurosis.[1] The danger which is thus aroused through the defloration of a woman would consist in drawing her hostility down upon one elf, and the prospective husband is just the person who would have every reason to avoid such enmity.

Now analysis enables us to infer without difficulty which impulses in women take part in bringing about this paradoxical behaviour, in which I expect to find the explanation of frigidity. The first act of intercourse mobilizes a number of impulses which are out of place in the desired feminine attitude, some of which, incidentally, need not recur during subsequent intercourse. In the first place we think of the pain which defloration causes a virgin, and we are perhaps even inclined to consider this factor as decisive and to give up the search for any others. But we cannot well ascribe such importance to this pain; we must rather substitute for it the narcissistic injury which proceeds from the destruction of an organ and which is even represented in a rationalized form in the knowledge that loss of virginity brings a diminution of sexual value. The marriage customs of primitive peoples, however, contain a warning against over-estimating this. We have heard that in some cases the rite falls into two phases: after the hymen has been ruptured (by hand or with some instrument) there follows a ceremonial act of coitus or mock-intercourse with the representatives of the husband, and this proves to us that the purpose of the taboo observance is not fulfilled by avoiding anatomical defloration, that the husband is to be spared something else as well as the woman's reaction to the painful injury.

We find a further reason for the disappointment experienced in the first act of intercourse in the fact that, with civilized women at least, fulfilment cannot be in accordance with ex-

[1] [This is explained in a passage near the end of Lecture XIX of Freud's *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17).]

pectations. Before this, sexual intercourse has been associated in the strongest possible way with prohibitions, lawful and permissible intercourse is not, therefore, felt to be the same thing. Just how close this association can be is demonstrated in an almost comic fashion by the efforts of so many girls about to be married to keep their new love-relationship secret from everyone outside, and indeed even from their parents, where there is no real necessity to do so and no objection can be looked for. Girls often say openly that their love loses value for them if other people know of it. On occasion this feeling can become dominating and can completely prevent the development of any capacity for love in a marriage. The woman only recovers her susceptibility to tender feelings in an illicit relationship which has to be kept secret, and in which alone she knows for certain that her own will is uninfluenced [cf. p. 186].

However, this motive does not go deep enough either; besides, being bound up with civilized conditions, it fails to provide a satisfactory connection with the state of affairs among primitive people All the more important, therefore, is the next factor, which is based on the evolution of the libido. We have learnt from analytic researches how universal and how powerful the earliest allocations of libido are. In these we are concerned with infantile sexual wishes which are clung to (in women usually a fixation of the libido on the father or a brother who takes his place)—wishes which frequently enough were directed towards other things than intercourse, or included it only as a dimly perceived goal. The husband is almost always so to speak only a substitute, never the right man; it is another man—in typical cases the father who has first claim to a woman's love, the husband at most takes second place. It depends on how intense this fixation is and on how obstinately it is maintained whether the substitute is rejected as unsatisfying. Frigidity is thus among the genetic determinants of neuroses. The more powerful the psychical element in a woman's sexual life is, the greater will be the capacity for resistance shown by her distribution of libido to the upheaval of the first sexual act, and the less overpowering will be the effect which bodily possession of her can produce. Frigidity may then become established as a neurotic inhibition or provide the foundation for the development of other neuroses and

even a moderate diminution of potency in the man will greatly contribute to help this process.

The customs of primitive peoples seem to take account of this *motif* of the early sexual wish by handing over the task of defloration to an elder, priest or holy man, that is, to a substitute for the father (see above [p. 195]). There seems to me to be a direct path leading from this custom to the highly vexed question of the *jus primae noctis* of the mediaeval lord of the manor. A. J. Storfer (1911) has put forward the same view and has in addition, as Jung (1909) had already done before him, interpreted the widespread tradition of the 'Tobias nights' (the custom of continence during the first three nights of marriage) as an acknowledgment of the privilege of the patriarch. It agrees with our expectations, therefore, when we find the images of gods included among the father-surrogates entrusted with defloration. In some districts of India, the newly-married woman was obliged to sacrifice her hymen to the wooden lingam, and, according to St. Augustine's account, the same custom existed in the Roman marriage ceremony (of his time[1]), but modified so that the young wife only had to seat herself on the gigantic stone phallus of Priapus.[2]

There is another motive, reaching down into still deeper layers, which can be shown to bear the chief blame for the paradoxical reaction towards the man, and which, in my view, further makes its influence felt in female frigidity. The first act of intercourse activates in a woman other impulses of long standing as well as those already described, and these are in complete opposition to her womanly role and function.

We have learnt from the analysis of many neurotic women that they go through an early age in which they envy their brothers their sign of masculinity and feel at a disadvantage and humiliated because of the lack of it (actually because of its diminished size) in themselves. We include this 'envy for the penis' in the 'castration complex'. If we understand 'masculine' as including the idea of wishing to be masculine, then the designation 'masculine protest' fits this behaviour; the phrase was coined by Adler [1910][2] with the intention of proclaiming

[1] Ploss and Bartels (1891, 1, xi[illegible] and Dulaure (1905, 142).

[2] [Cf. the third section of Freud's 'History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement' (1914*d*).]

this factor as being responsible for neurosis in general. During this phase, little girls often make no secret of their envy, nor of the hostility towards their favoured brothers which arises from it. They even try to urinate standing upright like their brothers in order to prove the equality which they lay claim to. In the case already described [p. 201] in which the woman used to show uncontrolled aggression after intercourse towards her husband, whom otherwise she loved, I was able to establish that this phase had existed before that of object-choice. Only later was the little girl's libido directed towards her father, and then, instead of wanting to have a penis, she wanted a child.[1]

I should not be surprised if in other cases the order in which these impulses occurred were reversed and this part of the castration complex only became effective after a choice of object had been successfully made. But the masculine phase in the girl in which she envies the boy for his penis is in any case developmentally the earlier, and it is closer to the original narcissism than it is to object-love.

Some time ago I chanced to have an opportunity of obtaining insight into a dream of a newly-married woman which was recognizable as a reaction to the loss of her virginity. It betrayed spontaneously the woman's wish to castrate her young husband and to keep his penis for herself. Certainly there was also room for the more innocent interpretation that what she wished for was the prolongation and repetition of the act, but several details of the dream did not fit into this meaning and the character as well as the subsequent behaviour of the woman who had the dream gave evidence in favour of the more serious view. Behind this envy for the penis, there comes to light the woman's hostile bitterness against the man, which never completely disappears in the relations between the sexes, and which is clearly indicated in the strivings and in the literary productions of 'emancipated' women. In a palaeo-biological speculation, Ferenczi has traced back this hostility of women—I do not know if he is the first to do so—to the period in time when the sexes became differentiated. At first, in his opinion, copulation took place between two similar individuals, one of which, however, developed into the stronger and forced the weaker

[1] Cf. 'On Transformations of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Erotism' (1917) [*Standard Ed.*, 17, 129].

one to submit to sexual union. The feelings of bitterness arising from this subjection still persist in the present-day disposition of women. I do not think there is any harm in employing such speculations, so long as one avoids setting too much value on them.

After this enumeration of the motives for the paradoxical reaction of women to defloration, traces of which persist in frigidity, we may sum up by saying that a woman's *immature sexuality* is discharged on to the man who first makes her acquainted with the sexual act. This being so, the taboo of virginity is reasonable enough and we can understand the rule which decrees that precisely the man who is to enter upon a life shared with this woman shall avoid these dangers. At higher stages of civilization the importance attributed to this danger diminishes in face of her promise of bondage and no doubt of other motives and inducements, virginity is looked upon as a possession which the husband is not called upon to renounce. But analysis of disturbed marriages teaches us that the motives which seek to drive a woman to take vengeance for her defloration are not completely extinguished even in the mental life of civilized women. I think it must strike the observer in how uncommonly large a number of cases the woman remains frigid and feels unhappy in a first marriage, whereas after it has been dissolved she becomes a tender wife, able to make her second husband happy. The archaic reaction has, so to speak, exhausted itself on the first object.

The taboo of virginity, however, even apart from this has not died out in our civilized existence. It is known to the popular mind and writers have on occasion made use of this material. A comedy by Anzengruber [1] shows how a simple peasant lad is deterred from marrying his intended bride because she is 'a wench who'll cost her first his life'. For this reason he agrees to her marrying another man and is ready to take her when she is a widow and no longer dangerous. The title of the play, *Das Jungfern-Gift* ['Virgin's Venom'], reminds us of the habit of snake-charmers, who make poisonous snakes first bite a piece of cloth in order to handle them afterwards without danger.[2]

[1] [The Viennese dramatist (1839–89).]

[2] A masterly short story by Arthur Schnitzler, *Das Schicksal des Freiherrn von Leisenbogh* ['The Fate of Freiherr von Leisenbogh'], de-

The taboo of virginity and something of its motivation has been depicted most powerfully of all in a well-known dramatic character, that of Judith in Hebbel's tragedy *Judith und Holofernes*. Judith is one of those women whose virginity is protected by a taboo. Her first husband was paralysed on the bridal night by a mysterious anxiety, and never again dared to touch her. 'My beauty is like belladonna,' she says. 'Enjoyment of it brings madness and death.' When the Assyrian general is besieging her city, she conceives the plan of seducing him by her beauty and of destroying him, thus employing a patriotic motive to conceal a sexual one. After she has been deflowered by this powerful man, who boasts of his strength and ruthlessness, she finds the strength in her fury to strike off his head, and thus becomes the liberator of her people. Beheading is well-known to us as a symbolic substitute for castrating; Judith is accordingly the woman who castrates the man who has deflowered her, which was just the wish of the newly-married woman expressed in the dream I reported. It is clear that Hebbel has intentionally sexualized the patriotic narrative from the Apocrypha of the Old Testament, for there Judith is able to boast after her return that she has not been defiled, nor is there in the Biblical text any mention of her uncanny wedding night. But probably, with the fine perception of a poet, he sensed the ancient motive, which had been lost in the tendentious narrative, and has merely restored its earlier content to the material.

Sadger (1912) has shown in a penetrating analysis how Hebbel was determined in his choice of material by his own parental complex, and how he came to take the part of the woman so regularly in the struggle between the sexes, and to feel his way into the most hidden impulses of her mind. He also

serves to be included here, in spite of the rather different situation. The lover of an actress who is very experienced in love is dying as the result of an accident. He creates a sort of new virginity for her, by putting a curse of death on the man who is the first to possess her after himself. For a time the woman with this taboo upon her does not venture on any love-affair. However, after she has fallen in love with a singer, she hits on the solution of first granting a night to the Freiherr von Leisenbogh, who has been pursuing her for years. And the curse falls on him: he has a stroke as soon as he learns the motive behind his unexpected good fortune in love.

quotes the motives which the poet himself gives for the alteration he has made in the material, and he rightly finds them artificial and as though intended to justify *outwardly* something the poet himself is unconscious of, while at bottom concealing it. I will not dispute Sadger's explanation of why Judith, who according to the Biblical narrative is a widow, has to become a *virgin* widow. He refers to the purpose found in childish phantasies of denying the sexual intercourse of the parents and of turning the mother into an untouched virgin. But I will add: after the poet has established his heroine's virginity, his sensitive imagination dwells on the hostile reaction released by the violation of her maidenhood.

We may say, then, in conclusion that defloration has not only the one, civilized consequence of binding the woman lastingly to the man; it also unleashes an archaic reaction of hostility towards him, which can assume pathological forms that are frequently enough expressed in the appearance of inhibitions in the erotic side of married life, and to which we may ascribe the fact that second marriages so often turn out better than first. The taboo of virginity, which seems so strange to us, the horror with which, among primitive peoples, the husband avoids the act of defloration, are fully justified by this hostile reaction.

It is interesting that in one's capacity as analyst one can meet with women in whom the opposed reactions of bondage and hostility both find expression and remain intimately associated with each other. There are women of this kind who seem to have fallen out with their husbands completely and who all the same can only make vain efforts to free themselves. As often as they try to direct their love towards some other man, the image of the first, although he is no longer loved, intervenes with inhibiting effect. Analysis then teaches us that these women, it is true, still cling to their first husbands in a state of bondage, but no longer through affection. They cannot get away from them, because they have not completed their revenge upon them, and in pronounced cases they have not even brought the impulses for vengeance to consciousness.

THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC VIEW OF PSYCHOGENIC DISTURBANCE OF VISION

(1910)

DIE PSYCHOGENE SEHSTÖRUNG IN PSYCHOANALYTISCHER AUFFASSUNG

(*a*) GERMAN EDITIONS:

1910 *Ärztliche Fortbildung*, supplement to *Ärztliche Standeszeitung*, **9** (9), 42–4 (May 1).
1913 *S.K.S.N.*, **3**, 314–21. (2nd ed. 1921.)
1924 *G.S.*, **5**, 301–9.
1943 *G.W.*, **8**, 94–102.

(*b*) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

'Psychogenic Visual Disturbance according to Psycho-Analytical Conceptions'

1924 *C.P.*, **2**, 105–12. (Tr. E. Colburn Mayne)

The present translation, with a different title, 'The Psycho-Analytic View of Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision', is a new one by James and Alix Strachey.

This was written as a contribution to a *Festschrift* in honour of Leopold Königstein, a well known Viennese ophthalmologist, who was one of Freud's oldest friends. He described it in a letter to Ferenczi, written on April 12, 1910, as being a mere *pièce d'occasion* and of no value (Jones, 1955, 274). It contains one passage at least, however, of very special interest. For it was here that for the first time he made use of the term 'ego-instincts', explicitly identified them with the self-preservative instincts and ascribed to them a vital part in the function of repression. Some account of the development of Freud's views on the instincts will be found in the Editor's Note to 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915*c*) in Volume XIV of the *Standard Edition*. It is also worth remarking that in the later paragraphs of this paper (p. 217 f.) Freud expresses with particular definiteness his belief that mental phenomena are ultimately based on physical ones.

THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC VIEW OF PSYCHOGENIC DISTURBANCE OF VISION

GENTLEMEN, I propose to take the example of psychogenic disturbance of vision, in order to show you the modifications which have taken place in our view of the genesis of disorders of this kind under the influence of psycho-analytic methods of investigation. As you know, hysterical blindness is taken as the type of a psychogenic visual disturbance. It is generally believed, as a result of the researches of the French School including such men as Charcot, Janet and Binet), that the genesis of these cases is understood. For we are in a position to produce blindness of this kind experimentally if we have at our disposal someone who is susceptible to somnambulism. If we put him into deep hypnosis and suggest the idea to him that he sees nothing with one of his eyes, he will in fact behave as though he had become blind in that eye, like a hysteric who has developed a visual disturbance spontaneously. We may thus construct the mechanism of spontaneous hysterical disturbances of vision on the model of suggested hypnotic ones. In a hysteric the idea of being blind arises, not from the prompting of a hypnotist, but spontaneously - by autosuggestion, as people say, and in both cases this idea is so powerful that it turns into reality, exactly like a suggested hallucination, paralysis, etc.

This seems perfectly sound and will satisfy anyone who can ignore the many enigmas that lie concealed behind the concepts of hypnosis, suggestion and autosuggestion. Autosuggestion in particular raises further questions. When and under what conditions does an idea become so powerful that it is able to behave like a suggestion and turn into reality without more ado? Closer investigation has taught us that we cannot answer this question without calling the concept of the 'unconscious' to our assistance. Many philosophers rebel against the assumption of a mental unconscious of this kind, because they have not concerned themselves with the phenomena which compel us to make that assumption. Psychopathologists have found

that they cannot avoid working with such things as unconscious mental processes, unconscious ideas, and so on.

Appropriate experiments have shown that people who are hysterically blind do nevertheless see in some sense, though not in the full sense. Excitations of the blind eye may have certain psychical consequences (for instance, they may produce affects) even though they do not become conscious. Thus hysterically blind people are only blind as far as consciousness is concerned; in their unconscious they see. It is precisely observations such as this that compel us to distinguish between conscious and unconscious mental processes.

How does it happen that such people develop the unconscious 'autosuggestion' that they are blind, while nevertheless they see in their unconscious? The reply given by the French researches is to explain that in patients predisposed to hysteria there is an inherent tendency to dissociation — to a falling apart of the connections in their mental field — as a consequence of which some unconscious processes do not continue as far as into the conscious. Let us leave entirely on one side the value that this attempted explanation may have as regards an understanding of the phenomena in question, and let us look at the matter from another angle. As you see, Gentlemen, the identity of hysterical blindness with the blindness provoked by suggestion, on which so much stress was laid to begin with, has now been given up. The hysterical patient is blind, not as the result of an autosuggestive idea that he cannot see, but as the result of a dissociation between unconscious and conscious processes in the act of seeing, his idea that he does not see is the well-founded *expression* of the psychical state of affairs and not its *cause*.

If, Gentlemen, you complain of the obscurity of this exposition I shall not find it easy to defend. I have tried to give you a synthesis of the views of different investigators, and in doing so I have probably coupled them together too closely. I wanted to condense into a single composite whole the concepts that have been brought up to make psychogenic disturbances intelligible — their origin from excessively powerful ideas, the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental processes and the assumption of mental dissociation. And I have been no more successful in this than the French writers, at whose head stands Pierre Janet. I hope, therefore, that you will excuse not only

the obscurity but the inaccuracy of my exposition, and will allow me to tell you how psycho-analysis has led us to a view of psychogenic disturbances of vision which is more self-consistent and probably closer to the facts.

Psycho-analysis, too, accepts the assumptions of dissociation and the unconscious, but relates them differently to each other. Its view is a dynamic one, which traces mental life back to an interplay between forces that favour or inhibit one another. If in any instance one group of ideas remains in the unconscious, psycho-analysis does not infer that there is a constitutional incapacity for synthesis which is showing itself in this particular dissociation, but maintains that the isolation and state of unconsciousness of this group of ideas have been caused by an active opposition on the part of other groups. The process owing to which it has met with this fate is known as 'repression' and we regard it as something analogous to a condemnatory judgement in the field of logic. Psycho-analysis points out that repressions of this kind play an extraordinarily important part in our mental life, but that they may also frequently fail and that such failures of repression are the precondition of the formation of symptoms.

If, then, as we have learnt, psychogenic disturbances of vision depend on certain ideas connected with seeing being cut off from consciousness, we must, on the psycho-analytic view, assume that these ideas have come into opposition to other, more powerful ones, for which we use the collective concept of the 'ego'—a compound which is made up variously at different times—and have for that reason come under repression. But what can be the origin of this opposition, which makes for repression, between the ego and various groups of ideas? You will no doubt notice that it was not possible to frame such a question before the advent of psycho-analysis, for nothing was known earlier of psychical conflict and repression. Our researches, however, have put us in a position to give us the desired answer. Our attention has been drawn to the importance of the instincts in ideational life. We have discovered that every instinct tries to make itself effective by activating ideas that are in keeping with its aims. These instincts are not always compatible with one another; their interests often come into conflict. Opposition between ideas is only an expression of struggles

between the various instincts. From the point of view of our attempted explanation, a quite specially important part is played by the undeniable opposition between the instincts which subserve sexuality, the attainment of sexual pleasure, and those other instincts, which have as their aim the self-preservation of the individual—the ego-instincts.[1] As the poet has said, all the organic instincts that operate in our mind may

[1] [This seems to have been the first occasion on which Freud used this term. See Editor's Note, p. 210. This may therefore be an appropriate point at which to quote a letter of Freud's of a later date (1923) in which he insisted upon the distinction between the two kinds of instinct. The French translation of his *Five Lectures* (1910) by Yves Le Lay, first appeared in the *Revue de Genève* in December 1920, and January and February, 1921. It was preceded by a long introduction by Professor Edouard Claparède, of Geneva University, giving a general account of psycho-analytic theory. This included a passage which Freud considered misleading, and he wrote to Claparède to protest against it. When, in 1921, the French translation was published in book form, Claparède added an appendix in which he quoted, in a French translation, 'a fragment of this letter'. It is undated but was presumably written early in 1921. What follows is a translation of the French translation, and now appears in English for the first time.—

'On this point I would ask you to allow me to make this criticism—you do me an injustice and give your readers a wrong impression. It is in the following passage: "Il [Jung] admet comme seul et le modèle fondamental de toutes les manifestations de l'activité psychique [S. E.:] libido. The sexual instinct is the fundamental motive force of all the manifestations of psychical activity.—And you add a little later that neither I nor my disciples have ever been clear on this subject. "Mais il faut savoir lire entre les lignes", you say, "et saisir l'esprit et non la lettre de la théorie." [But one must know how to read between the lines and to grasp the spirit rather than the letter of the theory.] I am surprised that this usual misunderstanding should have succeeded in slipping under your pen too. I have on the contrary declared and repeated with the utmost clarity in relation to the transference neuroses that I made a distinction between the sexual instincts and the ego-instincts and that so far as I am concerned, "libido" means only the energy of the former, of the sexual instincts. It is Jung and not I who makes the libido into the equivalent of the instinctual force of all the psychical faculties and who contrasts the sexual nature of the libido. Your account fits neither my conception nor Jung's but is a mixture of the two. From me you borrow the sexual nature of the libido and from Jung its generalized meaning. And it is thus that there is created in the imagination of critics a pan-sexualism which exists neither in my views nor in Jung's. As far as I am concerned, I fully realize the existence of the group of ego-instincts as well as of all that mental life owes to them. The wider

be classified as 'hunger' or 'love'.[1] We have traced the 'sexual instinct' from its first manifestations in children to its final form, which is described as 'normal'. We have found that it is put together from numerous 'component instincts' which are attached to excitations of regions of the body; and we have come to see that these separate instincts have to pass through a complicated development before they can be brought effectively to serve the aims of reproduction.[2] The light thrown by psychology on the evolution of our civilization has shown us that it originates mainly at the cost of the sexual component instincts, and that these must be suppressed, restricted, transformed and directed to higher aims, in order that the mental constructions of civilization may be established. We have been able to recognize as a valuable outcome of these researches something that our colleagues have not yet been willing to believe, namely that the human ailments known as 'neuroses' are derived from the many different ways in which these processes of transformation in the sexual component instincts may miscarry. The 'ego' feels threatened by the claims of the sexual instincts and fends them off by repressions; these, however, do not always have the desired result, but lead to the formation of dangerous substitutes for the repressed and to burdensome reactions on the part of the ego. From these two classes of phenomena taken together there emerge what we call the symptoms of neuroses.

We have apparently digressed widely from our problem, though in doing so we have touched on the manner in which neurotic pathological conditions are related to our mental life as a whole. But let us now return to the narrower question. The sexual and ego-instincts alike have in general the same

public, however, are ignorant of this; it is kept hidden from them. People often behave in the same way when they describe my theory of dreams. I have never claimed that every dream expressed the fulfilment of a *sexual* wish, and I have often asserted the contrary. But this produces no effect, and people continue to repeat the same thing.

With my cordial thanks and sincerest greetings,

Yours, Freud.'

It appears from Claparède's further comments on this letter that in his case at all events, no effect was in fact produced.]

[1] [Schiller, 'Die Weltweisen'.]

[2] [See *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905*d*).]

organs and systems of organs at their disposal. Sexual pleasure is not attached merely to the function of the genitals. The mouth serves for kissing as well as for eating and communication by speech; the eyes perceive not only alterations in the external world which are important for the preservation of life, but also characteristics of objects which lead to their being chosen as objects of love—their charms [1] The saying that it is not easy for anyone to serve two masters is thus confirmed. The closer the relation into which an organ with a dual function of this kind enters with *one* of the major instincts, the more it withholds itself from the other. This principle is bound to lead to pathological consequences if the two fundamental instincts are disunited and if the ego maintains a repression of the sexual component instinct concerned. It is easy to apply this to the eye and to seeing. Let us suppose that the sexual component instinct which makes use of looking—sexual pleasure in looking [scopophilia]—has drawn upon itself defensive action by the ego-instincts in consequence of its excessive demands, so that the ideas in which its desires are expressed succumb to repression and are prevented from becoming conscious; in that case there will be a general disturbance of the relation of the eye and of the act of seeing to the ego and consciousness. The ego will have lost its dominance over the organ, which will now be wholly at the disposal of the repressed sexual instinct. It looks as though the repression had been carried too far by the ego, as though it had emptied the baby out with the bath-water: the ego refuses to see anything at all any more, now that the sexual interest in seeing has made itself so prominent. But the alternative picture seems more to the point. This attributes the active role instead to the repressed pleasure in looking. The repressed instinct takes its revenge for being held back from further psychical expansion, by becoming able to extend its dominance over the organ that is in its service. The loss of conscious dominance over the organ is the detrimental substitute for the repression which had miscarried and was only made possible at that price.

This relation of an organ with a double claim on it—its relation to the conscious ego and to repressed sexuality—is

[1] [In German, '*Reize*', which means both 'charms' and 'stimuli'. Cf. Freud's *Three Essays* (1905*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 209.]

to be seen even more clearly in motor organs than in the eye: as when, for instance, a hand which has tried to carry out an act of sexual aggression, and has become paralysed hysterically, is unable, after that act has been inhibited, to do anything else — as though it were obstinately insisting on carrying out a repressed innervation; or as when the fingers of people who have given up masturbation refuse to learn the delicate movements required for playing the piano or the violin. As regards the eye, we are in the habit of translating the obscure psychical processes concerned in the repression of sexual scopophilia and in the development of the psychogenic disturbance of vision as though a punishing voice was speaking from within the subject, and saying: 'Because you sought to misuse your organ of sight for evil sensual pleasures, it is fitting that you should not see anything at all any more', and as though it was in this way approving the outcome of the process. The idea of talion punishment is involved in this, and in fact our explanation of psychogenic visual disturbance coincides with what is suggested by myths and legends. The beautiful legend of Lady Godiva tells how all the town's inhabitants hid behind their shuttered windows, so as to make easier the lady's task of riding naked through the streets in broad daylight, and how the only man who peeped through the shutters at her revealed loveliness was punished by going blind. Nor is this the only example which suggests that neurotic illness holds the hidden key to mythology as well.

Psycho-analysis is unjustly reproached, Gentlemen, for leading to purely psychological theories of pathological problems. The emphasis which it lays on the pathogenic role of sexuality, which, after all, is certainly not an exclusively psychical factor, should alone protect it from this reproach. Psycho-analysts never forget that the mental is based on the organic, although their work can only carry them as far as this basis and not beyond it. Thus psycho-analysis is ready to admit, and indeed to postulate, that not all disturbances of vision need be psychogenic, like those that are evoked by the repression of erotic scopophilia. If an organ which serves the two sorts of instinct increases its erotogenic role, it is in general to be expected that this will not occur without the excitability and innervation of the organ undergoing changes which will manifest themselves

as disturbances of its function in the service of the ego. Indeed, if we find that an organ normally serving the purpose of sense-perception begins to behave like an actual genital when its erotogenic role is increased, we shall not regard it as improbable that *toxic* changes are also occurring in it. For lack of a better name we must retain the old unsuitable term of 'neurotic' disturbances for both classes of functional disturbances—those of physiological as well as those of toxic origin—which follow from an increase in the erotogenic factor. Generally speaking, the neurotic disturbances of vision stand in the same relation to the psychogenic ones as the 'actual neuroses' do to the psychoneuroses: psychogenic visual disturbances can no doubt hardly ever appear without neurotic ones, but the latter can appear without the former. These neurotic symptoms are unfortunately little appreciated and understood even today; for they are not directly accessible to psycho-analysis, and other methods of research have left the standpoint of sexuality out of account.[1]

Yet another line of thought extending into organic research branches off from psycho-analysis. We may ask ourselves whether the suppression of sexual component instincts which is brought about by environmental influences is sufficient in itself to call up functional disturbances in organs, or whether special constitutional conditions must be present in order that the organs may be led to an exaggeration of their erotogenic role and consequently provoke repression of the instincts. We should have to see in those conditions the constitutional part of the disposition to fall ill of psychogenic and neurotic disorders. This is the factor to watch, as applied to hysteria, I gave the provisional name of 'somatic compliance'.[2]

[1] [See some remarks on the 'actual neuroses' below, p. 224.]

[2] [Cf. the 'Dora' case history (1905*e*), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 40–1 and 52–3.—In the 1910 edition only, the paper concluded with the following words: 'Alfred Adler's well-known writings seek to give that factor definition in biological terms.']

'WILD' PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
(1910)

ÜBER 'WILDE' PSYCHOANALYSE

(*a*) GERMAN EDITIONS:

1910 *Zbl. Psychoan.*, **1** (3), 91–5.
1913 *S.K.S.N.*, **3**, 299–305. (2nd ed. 1921.)
1924 *Technik und Metapsychol.*, 37–44.
1925 *G.S.*, **6**, 37–44.
1943 *G.W.*, **8**, 118–25.

(*b*) ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS:

'Concerning "Wild" Psychoanalysis'

1912 *S.P.H.* (2nd ed.), 201–6. (Tr. A. A. Brill.) (3rd ed. 1920.)

'Observations on "Wild" Psycho-Analysis'

1924 *C.P.*, **2**, 297–304. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)

The present translation, with a modified title '"Wild" Psycho-Analysis', is based on the one published in 1924.

The essential theme of this paper (published in December, 1910) had already been touched on by Freud some six years earlier in a lecture on psychotherapy (1905*a*), *Standard Ed.*, **7**, 261–2. Apart from its main theme, the paper is noteworthy for containing one of Freud's rare later allusions to the 'actual neuroses' coupled with a reminder of the importance of the distinction between anxiety neurosis and anxiety hysteria (p. 224 f.).

'WILD' PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

A FEW days ago a middle-aged lady, under the protection of a female friend, called upon me for a consultation, complaining of anxiety-states. She was in the second half of her forties, fairly well preserved, and had obviously not yet finished with her womanhood. The precipitating cause of the outbreak of her anxiety-states had been a divorce from her last husband; but the anxiety had become considerably intensified, according to her account, since she had consulted a young physician in the suburb she lived in, for he had informed her that the cause of her anxiety was her lack of sexual satisfaction. He said that she could not tolerate the loss of intercourse with her husband, and so there were only three ways by which she could recover her health—she must either return to her husband, or take a lover, or obtain satisfaction from herself. Since then she had been convinced that she was incurable, for she would not return to her husband, and the other two alternatives were repugnant to her moral and religious feelings. She had come to me, however, because the doctor had said that this was a new discovery for which I was responsible, and that she had only to come and ask me to confirm what he said, and I should tell her that this and nothing else was the truth. The friend who was with her, an older, dried-up and unhealthy-looking woman, then implored me to assure the patient that the doctor was mistaken; it could not possibly be true, for she herself had been a widow for many years, and had nevertheless remained respectable without suffering from anxiety.

I will not dwell on the awkward predicament in which I was placed by this visit, but instead will consider the conduct of the practitioner who sent this lady to me. First, however, let us bear a reservation in mind which may possibly not be superfluous—indeed we will hope so. Long years of experience have taught me—as they could teach everyone else—not to accept straight away as true what patients, especially nervous patients, relate about their physician. Not only does a nerve-specialist easily become the object of many of his patients' hostile feelings, whatever method of treatment he employs; he must also

sometimes resign himself to accepting responsibility, by a kind of projection, for the buried repressed wishes of his nervous patients.[1] It is a melancholy but significant fact that such accusations nowhere find credence more readily than among other physicians.

I therefore have reason to hope that this lady gave me a tendentiously distorted account of what her doctor had said, and that I do a man who is unknown to me an injustice by connecting my remarks about 'wild' psycho-analysis with this incident. But by doing so I may perhaps prevent others from doing harm to their patients.

Let us suppose, therefore, that her doctor spoke to the patient exactly as she reported. Everyone will at once bring up the criticism that if a physician thinks it necessary to discuss the question of sexuality with a woman he must do so with tact and consideration. Compliance with this demand, however, coincides with carrying out certain *technical rules* of psycho-analysis. Moreover, the physician in question was ignorant of a number of the *scientific theories* of psycho-analysis or had misapprehended them, and thus showed how little he had penetrated into an understanding of its nature and purposes.

Let us start with the latter, the *scientific* errors. The doctor's advice to the lady shows clearly in what sense he understands the expression 'sexual life'—in the popular sense, namely, in which by sexual needs nothing is meant but the need for coitus or analogous acts producing orgasm and emission of the sexual substances. He cannot have remained unaware, however, that psycho-analysis is commonly reproached with having extended the concept of what is sexual far beyond its usual range. The fact is undisputed, I shall not discuss here whether it may justly be used as a reproach. In psycho-analysis the concept of what is sexual comprises far more; it goes lower and also higher than its popular sense. This extension is justified genetically; we reckon as belonging to 'sexual life' all the activities of the tender feelings which have primitive sexual impulses as their source, even when those impulses have become inhibited in regard to their original sexual aim or have exchanged this aim for another which is no longer sexual. For this reason we prefer to

[1] [An instance of this kind of projection will be found below on p. 236 f., Case B.]

speak of *psychosexuality*, thus laying stress on the point that the mental factor in sexual life should not be overlooked or underestimated. We use the word 'sexuality' in the same comprehensive sense as that in which the German language uses the word *lieben* ['to love']. We have long known, too, that mental absence of satisfaction with all its consequences can exist where there is no lack of normal sexual intercourse; and as therapists we always bear in mind that the unsatisfied sexual trends (whose substitutive satisfactions in the form of nervous symptoms we combat) can often find only very inadequate outlet in coitus or other sexual acts.

Anyone not sharing this view of psychosexuality has no right to adduce psycho-analytic theses dealing with the aetiological importance of sexuality. By emphasizing exclusively the somatic factor in sexuality he undoubtedly simplifies the problem greatly, but he alone must bear the responsibility for what he does.

A second and equally gross misunderstanding is discernible behind the physician's advice.

It is true that psycho-analysis puts forward absence of sexual satisfaction as the cause of nervous disorders. But does it not say more than this? Is its teaching to be ignored as too complicated when it declares that nervous symptoms arise from a conflict between two forces—on the one hand, the libido (which has as a rule become excessive , and on the other, a rejection of sexuality, or a repression which is over-severe? No one who remembers this second factor, which is by no means secondary in importance, can ever believe that sexual satisfaction in itself constitutes a remedy of general reliability for the sufferings of neurotics. A good number of these people are, indeed, either in their actual circumstances or in general incapable of satisfaction. If they were capable of it, if they were without their inner resistances, the strength of the instinct itself would point the way to satisfaction for them even though no doctor advised it. What is the good, therefore, of medical advice such as that supposed to have been given to this lady?

Even if it could be justified scientifically, it is not advice that she can carry out. If she had had no inner resistances against masturbation or against a liaison she would of course have adopted one of these measures long before. Or does the physician think that a woman of over forty is unaware that one can

take a lover, or does he over-estimate his influence so much as to think that she could never decide upon such a step without medical approval?

All this seems very clear, and yet it must be admitted that there is one factor which often makes it difficult to form a judgement. Some nervous states which we call the 'actual neuroses', such as typical neurasthenia and pure anxiety neurosis, obviously depend on the somatic factor in sexual life, while we have no certain picture as yet of the part played in them by the psychical factor and by repression.[1] In such cases it is natural that the physician should first consider some 'actual' therapy, some alteration in the patient's somatic sexual activity, and he does so with perfect justification if his diagnosis is correct. The lady who consulted the young doctor complained chiefly of anxiety-states, and so he probably assumed that she was suffering from an anxiety neurosis, and felt justified in recommending a somatic therapy to her. Again a convenient misapprehension! A person suffering from anxiety is not for that reason necessarily suffering from anxiety neurosis, such a diagnosis of it cannot be based on the name [of the symptom]; one has to know what signs constitute an anxiety neurosis, and be able to distinguish it from other pathological states which are also manifested by anxiety. My impression was that the lady in question was suffering from anxiety *hysteria*,[2] and the whole

[1] [The 'actual neuroses'—conditions with a purely physical and contemporary causation—were much discussed by Freud during the Breuer period. (The term itself seems to appear first in his paper on 'Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses' (1898).) In his later writings they were not often mentioned—another incidental reference to them will be found above on p. 218—apart from a lengthy passage in his contribution to a discussion on masturbation (1912*f*) and another at the beginning of Section II of his paper on narcissism (1914*c*), in which—as in one or two other places) he suggested that hypochondria is to be regarded as a third 'actual neurosis' along with neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis. In the second section of his *Autobiographical Study* (1925*d*) he commented on the fact that the topic had dropped out of sight, but asserted that he still thought that his earlier views on it were correct. A little later, indeed, he returned to a consideration of the subject at two or three points in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926*d*). See also Lecture XXIV of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916-17).]

[2] [Anxiety hysteria had been introduced by Freud as a clinical entity not long before this, and had been explained by him in connection with the analysis of 'Little Hans' (1909*b*), *Standard Ed.*, 10, 115 ff.]

value of such nosographical distinctions, one which quite justifies them, lies in the fact that they indicate a different aetiology and a different treatment. No one who took into consideration the possibility of anxiety hysteria in this case would have fallen into the error of neglecting the mental factors, as this physician did with his three alternatives.

Oddly enough, the three therapeutic alternatives of this so-called psycho-analyst leave no room for—psycho-analysis! This woman could apparently only be cured of her anxiety by returning to her husband, or by satisfying her needs by masturbation or with a lover. And where does analytic treatment come in, the treatment which we regard as the main remedy in anxiety-states?

This brings us to the *technical* errors which are to be seen in the doctor's procedure in this alleged case.[1] It is a long superseded idea, and one derived from superficial appearances, that the patient suffers from a sort of ignorance, and that if one removes this ignorance by giving him information (about the causal connection of his illness with his life, about his experiences in childhood, and so on) he is bound to recover. The pathological factor is not his ignorance in itself, but the root of this ignorance in his *inner resistances*; it was they that first called this ignorance into being, and they still maintain it now. The task of the treatment lies in combating these resistances. Informing the patient of what he does not know because he has repressed it is only one of the necessary preliminaries to the treatment.[2] If knowledge about the unconscious were as important for the patient as people inexperienced in psycho-analysis imagine, listening to lectures or reading books would be enough to cure him. Such measures, however, have as much influence on the symptoms of nervous illness as a distribution of menu-cards in a time of famine has upon hunger. The analogy goes even further than its immediate application; for informing the patient of his unconscious regularly results in an intensification of the conflict in him and an exacerbation of his troubles.

Since, however, psycho-analysis cannot dispense with giving

[1] [In the 1910 edition only the following sentence appears at this point: 'This may easily be attributed to his lack of knowledge.']

[2] [Cf. p. 142 above and Editor's footnote.]

this information, it lays down that this shall not be done before two conditions have been fulfilled. First, the patient must, through preparation, himself have reached the neighbourhood of what he has repressed, and secondly, he must have formed a sufficient attachment (transference) to the physician for his emotional relationship to him to make a fresh flight impossible.

Only when these conditions have been fulfilled is it possible to recognize and to master the resistances which have led to the repression and the ignorance. Psycho-analytic intervention, therefore, absolutely requires a fairly long period of contact with the patient. Attempts to 'rush' him at first consultation, by brusquely telling him the secrets which have been discovered by the physician, are technically objectionable. And they mostly bring their own punishment by inspiring a hearty enmity towards the physician on the patient's part and cutting him off from having any further influence.

Besides all this, one may sometimes make a wrong surmise, and one is never in a position to discover the whole truth. Psycho-analysis provides these definite technical rules to replace the indefinable 'medical tact' which is looked upon as some special gift.

It is not enough, therefore, for a physician to know a few of the findings of psycho-analysis; he must also have familiarized himself with its technique if he wishes his medical procedure to be guided by a psycho-analytic point of view. This technique cannot yet be learnt from books, and it certainly cannot be discovered independently without great sacrifices of time, labour and success Like other medical techniques, it is to be learnt from those who are already proficient in it. It is a matter of some significance, therefore, in forming a judgement on the incident which I took as a starting-point for these remarks, that I am not acquainted with the physician who is said to have given the lady such advice and have never heard his name.

Neither I myself nor my friends and co-workers find it agreeable to claim a monopoly in this way in the use of a medical technique. But in face of the dangers to patients and to the cause of psycho-analysis which are inherent in the practice that is to be foreseen of a 'wild' psycho-analysis, we have had no other choice. In the spring of 1910 we founded an International

Psycho-Analytical Association, to which its members declare their adherence by the publication of their names, in order to be able to repudiate responsibility for what is done by those who do not belong to us and yet call their medical procedure 'psycho-analysis'.[1] For as a matter of fact 'wild' analysts of this kind do more harm to the cause of psycho-analysis than to individual patients. I have often found that a clumsy procedure like this, even if at first it produced an exacerbation of the patient's condition, led to a recovery in the end. Not always, but still often. When he has abused the physician enough and feels far enough away from his influence, his symptoms give way, or he decides to take some step which leads along the path to recovery. The final improvement then comes about 'of itself', or is ascribed to some totally indifferent treatment by some other doctor to whom the patient has later turned. In the case of the lady whose complaint against her physician we have heard, I should say that, despite everything, the 'wild' psycho-analyst did more for her than some highly respected authority who might have told her she was suffering from a 'vasomotor neurosis'. He forced her attention to the real cause of her trouble, or in that direction, and in spite of all her opposition this intervention of his cannot be without some favourable results. But he has done himself harm and helped to intensify the prejudices which patients feel, owing to their natural affective resistances, against the methods of psycho-analysis. And this can be avoided.

[1] [This Association had been founded at the Second Psycho-Analytical Congress, at Nuremberg, at the end of March, 1910.]

SHORTER WRITINGS
(1910)

CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCUSSION ON SUICIDE[1]

I. Introductory Remarks

Gentlemen,—You have all listened with much satisfaction to the plea put forward by an educationalist who will not allow an unjustified charge to be levelled against the institution that is so dear to him. But I know that in any case you were not inclined to give easy credence to the accusation that schools drive their pupils to suicide. Do not let us be carried too far, however, by our sympathy with the party which has been unjustly treated in this instance. Not all the arguments put forward by the opener of the discussion seem to me to hold water. If it is the case that youthful suicide occurs not only among pupils in secondary schools but also among apprentices and others, this fact does not acquit the secondary schools; it must perhaps be interpreted as meaning that as regards its pupils the secondary school takes the place of the traumas with which other adolescents meet in other walks of life. But a secondary school should achieve more than not driving its pupils to suicide. It should give them a desire to live and should offer them support and backing at a time of life at which the conditions of their development compel them to relax their ties with their parental home and their family. It seems to me

[1] ['Zur Selbstmord Diskussion.' First published in *Diskussionen des Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereins*, 1 [1912], 'Über den Selbstmord, insbesondere den Schülerselbstmord [On Suicide, particularly among Schoolchildren]', 19 and 59. Wiesbaden: Bergmann. Reprinted *G.S.*, 3 (1925), 321, *Neurosenlehre und Technik* (1931), 309, *G.W.*, 8 (1943), 62. The present translation, probably the first to English, is by James Strachey. The discussion to which these are contributions took place in the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on April 20 and 27, 1910. The proceedings had been opened with an address by a Latin scholar, a Professor Ernst Oppenheim, who appeared in the published version under the pseudonym of 'Unus Multorum'. He was in fact at that time a member of the Society and later collaborated with Freud in an unpublished paper on dreams in folklore (Freud, 1957*a*). The debate which followed was begun and ended by Freud. The report of only one other such discussion was similarly published—that on masturbation (1912*f*).]

indisputable that schools fail in this, and in many respects fall short of their duty of providing a substitute for the family and of arousing interest in life in the world outside.[1] This is not a suitable occasion for a criticism of secondary schools in their present shape; but perhaps I may emphasize a single point. The school must never forget that it has to deal with immature individuals who cannot be denied a right to linger at certain stages of development and even at certain disagreeable ones. The school must not take on itself the inexorable character of life: it must not seek to be more than a *game* of life.

II. Concluding Remarks

Gentlemen, I have an impression that, in spite of all the valuable material that has been brought before us in this discussion, we have not reached a decision on the problem that interests us. We were anxious above all to know how it becomes possible for the extraordinarily powerful life instinct to be overcome: whether this can only come about with the help of a disappointed libido or whether the ego can renounce its self-preservation for its own egoistic motives. It may be that we have failed to answer this psychological question because we have no adequate means of approaching it. We can, I think, only take as our starting-point the condition of melancholia, which is so familiar to us clinically, and a comparison between it and the affect of mourning. The affective processes in melancholia, however, and the vicissitudes undergone by the libido in that condition, are totally unknown to us. Nor have we arrived at a psycho-analytic understanding of the chronic affect of mourning. Let us suspend our judgement till experience has solved this problem.[2]

[1] [Some further remarks on the position of schools at this critical point in a boy's development will be found in 'Some Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology' (1914*f*), *Standard Ed.*, **13**, 233.]

[2] [The comparison between mourning and melancholia forms, of course, the main basis of one of Freud's metapsychological papers (1917*e* [1915]), in which he also returns to the problem of suicide. The comparison had in fact already been indicated in a posthumously published memorandum written on May 31, 1897 (Freud, 1950*a*, Draft N), which will be found quoted in the Editor's Note to the metapsychological paper just mentioned.]

LETTER TO DR. FRIEDRICH S. KRAUSS ON *ANTHROPOPHYTEIA*[1]

My dear Dr. Krauss,

You have asked me what scientific value can in my opinion be claimed by collections of erotic jokes, witticisms, funny stories, etc. I know you have not felt any doubt of being able to justify the making of such collections. You merely wanted me to bear witness from the standpoint of a psychologist to the fact that material of this kind is not only useful but indispensable.

There are two points upon which I should principally like to insist. When all is said and done, the erotic quips and comic anecdotes that you have collected and published in *Anthropophyteia* have only been produced and repeated because they gave pleasure both to their narrators and their hearers. It is not difficult to guess which components of the sexual instinct (compounded as it is from so many elements) find satisfaction in this manner. These tales give us direct information as to which of the component instincts of sexuality are retained in a given group of people as particularly efficient in producing pleasure; and in this way they give the neatest confirmation of the findings reached by the psycho-analytic examination of neurotics. Allow me to indicate the most important example of this kind. Psycho-analysis has led us to assert that the anal region—normally and not only in perverse individuals—is the

[1] ['Brief an Dr. Friedrich S. Krauss uber die *Anthropophyteia*.' First published *Anthropophyteia*, **7** (1910), 472. Reprinted *Sexualprobleme*, **7** (1911), 73; *G.S.*, **11** (1928), 242; *Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre* (1931), 240; *G.W.*, **8** (1943), 224. The present translation, the first into English, is by James Strachey. *Anthropophyteia* was a periodical, founded and edited by Dr. F. S. Krauss, which dealt principally with anthropological material of a sexual character. Its first issue appeared in 1904 and thereafter one issue was published each year until the outbreak of the first World War in 1914, after which it seems to have ceased publication. In addition to its regular issues, a number of supplementary volumes appeared, and for one of these a translation of J. G. Bourke's *Scatalogic Rites of All Nations*. Freud wrote an introduction (1913). The paper on dreams in folklore (1957*a*), mentioned in the footnote on p. 231 above, includes many extracts from *Anthropophyteia*.]

site of an erotogenic sensitivity, and that in certain ways it behaves exactly like a genital organ. Doctors and psychologists, when told of there being an anal erotism and an anal character derived from it, have been highly indignant. At this point *Anthropophyteia* comes to the help of psycho-analysis by showing how universally people dwell with pleasure upon this part of the body, its performances and indeed the product of its function. If this were not so, all these anecdotes would be bound to give rise to disgust in their hearers or else the whole mass of the population would have to be 'perverse' in the sense in which the word is used in works dealing with 'psychopathia sexualis' in a moralizing tone. It would not be hard to give other instances of how the material collected by the authors of *Anthropophyteia* has been of value for the researches of sexual psychology. Its value may even be increased, perhaps, by the circumstance (not in itself an advantage) that the collectors know nothing of the theoretical findings of psycho-analysis and have brought together the material without any guiding principles.

Another advantage of a wider character is presented in particular by erotic *jokes*, in the strict sense, just as it is by jokes in general. I have shown in my study of jokes [1905*c*] that the revelation of what is normally the repressed unconscious element in the mind can, under certain provisions, become a source of pleasure and thus a technique for the construction of jokes. In psycho-analysis to-day we describe a congeries of ideas and its associated affect as a 'complex'; and we are prepared to assert that many of the most admired jokes are 'complexive jokes' and that they owe their exhilarating and cheerful effect to the ingenious uncovering of what are as a rule repressed complexes. It would carry me too far afield if I were to bring forward instances here in proof of this thesis, but I can assert that the outcome of such an examination of the evidence is that the jokes, both erotic and of other sorts, which are in popular circulation provide an excellent auxiliary means of investigating the unconscious human mind—in the same way as do dreams, myths and legends, with the exploitation of which psycho-analysis is already actively engaged.

It is therefore safe to hope that the psychological importance of folklore will be more and more clearly recognized, and that

the relations between that branch of study and psycho-analysis will soon become more intimate.

I remain, dear Dr. Krauss, yours very sincerely,

FREUD

June 26, 1910

TWO INSTANCES OF PATHOGENIC PHANTASIES REVEALED BY THE PATIENTS THEMSELVES[1]

A

A SHORT while ago I saw a patient, about twenty years of age, who gave an unmistakable picture (confirmed by other opinions) of a dementia praecox (hebephrenia). During the initial stages of his illness he had exhibited periodic changes of mood and had made a considerable improvement. While he was in this favourable condition he was removed from the institution by his parents and for about a week he was regaled with entertainments of every kind to celebrate his supposed recovery. His relapse followed immediately upon this week of festivities. When he was brought back to the institution, he said that the consulting physician had advised him 'to flirt with his mother a little'. There can be no doubt that in this delusory paramnesia he was giving expression to the excitement which had been provoked in him by being in his mother's company and which had been the immediate provocation of his relapse.

B

More than ten years ago, at a time when the findings and hypotheses of psycho-analysis were known to only a few people, the following events were reported to me from a trustworthy source. A girl, who was the daughter of a medical man, fell ill of hysteria with local symptoms. Her father denied that it was hysteria and arranged for various somatic treatments to be initiated, which brought little improvement. One day a woman friend of the patient's said to her: 'Have you never thought of consulting Dr. F.?' To which the patient replied: 'What good would that be? I know he'd say to me: "Have you ever had the

[1] ['Beispiele des Verrats pathogener Phantasien bei Neurotikern.' First published over the signature 'Dr. Sigm. Freud', *Zbl Psychoan.*, **1** (1910), 43; reprinted *G.S.*, **11** (1928), 300, *Neurosenlehre und Technik* (1931), 305; *G.W.*, **8**, 228. The present translation, the first into English, is by James Strachey.]

idea of having sexual intercourse with your father?" ' –It seems unnecessary for me to say explicitly that it has never been my practice and is not my practice to-day to ask such questions. But it is worth remarking that much of what patients report of the words and actions of their physicians may be understood as revelations of their own pathogenic phantasies.

REVIEW OF WILHELM NEUTRA'S *LETTERS TO NEUROTIC WOMEN*[1]

It should be taken as an encouraging sign of the awakening interest in psychotherapy that a second edition of this book has been called for so quickly. Unluckily we cannot hail the book itself as an encouraging phenomenon. The author, who is an assistant physician in the Gainfarn hydropathic institute near Vienna, has borrowed the form of Oppenheim's *Psychotherapeutische Briefe*[2] and has given that form a psycho-analytic content. This is in a sense ill-judged, since psycho-analysis cannot be satisfactorily combined with Oppenheim's (or, if that is preferred, Dubois'[3]) technique of 'persuasion'; it looks for its therapeutic results along quite other paths. What is more important, however, is the fact that the author fails to attain the merits of his model—tact and moral seriousness—and that in his presentation of psycho-analytic theory he often drops into empty rhetoric and is also guilty of some misstatements. Nevertheless much of what he writes is neatly and aptly expressed; and the book may pass muster as a work for popular consumption. In a more serious, scientific exposition of the subject the author would have had to indicate the sources of his views and assertions with greater conscientiousness.

[1] *Briefe an nervöse Frauen* by Dr. Wilhelm Neutra. Second Thousand. Dresden and Leipzig: Minden, 1909. [The German original appeared over the signature 'Freud' in *Zbl. Psychoan.*, **1** (1910), 49. It seems never to have been reprinted. The present translation, the first into English, is by James Strachey.]

[2] [Hermann Oppenheim (1906), the celebrated neurologist.]

[3] [Paul Dubois of Berne was well known in the early part of the century for his 'persuasion' treatment of the neuroses.]

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[*Trans.:* 'A Reply to Criticisms of my Paper on Anxiety Neurosis', *C.P.*, **1**, 107; *Standard Ed.*, **3**.]

(1898*a*) 'Die Sexualität in der Ätiologie der Neurosen', *G.S.*, **1**, 439; *G.W.*, **1**, 491. (224)

[*Trans.:* 'Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses', *C.P.*, **1**, 220; *Standard Ed.*, **3**.]

(1900*a*) *Die Traumdeutung*, Vienna. *G.S.*, **2–3**; *G.W.*, **2–3**. (33, 93, 126, 143, 154, 155, 170, 171, 173, 174)

[*Trans.: The Interpretation of Dreams*, London and New York, 1955; *Standard Ed.*, **4–5**.]

(1901*b*) *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens*, Berlin, 1904. *G.S.*, **4**, 3; *G.W.*, **4**. (37, 84)

[*Trans.: The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, *Standard Ed.*, **6**.]

(1904*a*) 'Die Freud'sche psychoanalytische Methode', *G.S.*, **6**, 3; *G.W.*, **5**, 3. (56)

[*Trans.:* 'Freud's Psycho-Analytic Procedure', *C.P.*, **1**, 264; *Standard Ed.*, **7**, 249.]

(1905*a*) 'Über Psychotherapie', *G.S.*, **6**, 11; *G.W.*, **5**, 13. (56, 220)
[*Trans.*: 'On Psychotherapy', *C.P.*, **1**, 249, *Standard Ed.*, **7**, 257.]

(1905*c*) *Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten*, Vienna. *G.S.*, **9**, 5; *G.W.*, **6**. (30–1, 170)
[*Trans.*: *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*, *Standard Ed.*, **8**.]

(1905*d*) *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, Vienna. *G.S.*, **5**, 3; *G.W.*, **5**, 29. (42, 43, 100, 101, 117, 136, 178, 189, 215, 216)
[*Trans.:* *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, London, 1949; *Standard Ed.*, **7**, 125.]

(1905*e* [1901]) 'Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse', *G.S.*, **8**, 3; *G.W.*, **5**, 163. (87, 218)
[*Trans.*: 'Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria', *C.P.*, **3**, 13; *Standard Ed.*, **7**, 3.]

(1906*a*) 'Meine Ansichten über die Rolle der Sexualität in der Ätiologie der Neurosen', *G.S.*, **5**, 123, *G.W.*, **5**, 149. (56)
[*Trans.:* 'My Views on the Part played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses', *C.P.*, **1**, 272; *Standard Ed.*, **7**, 271.]

(1907*a*) Antwort auf eine Rundfrage *Vom Lesen und von guten Büchern*, Vienna. (59)
[*Trans.:* Contribution to a Questionnaire on Reading, *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **32**, 319; *Standard Ed.*, **9**.]

(1908*b*) 'Charakter und Analerotik', *G.S.*, **5**, 261; *G.W.*, **7**, 203. (106)
[*Trans.*: 'Character and Anal Erotism', *C.P.*, **2**, 45; *Standard Ed.*, **9**.]

(1908*c*) 'Über infantile Sexualtheorien', *G.S.*, **5**, 168, *G.W.*, **7**, 171. (79, 92, 95, 170, 171)
[*Trans.*: 'On the Sexual Theories of Children', *C.P.* **2**, 59, *Standard Ed.*, **9**.]

(1908*d*) 'Die "kulturelle" Sexualmoral und die moderne Nervosität', *G.S.*, **5**, 143; *G.W.*, **7**, 143. (178)
[*Trans.:* '"Civilized" Sexual Ethics and Modern Nervous Illness', *C.P.*, **2**, 76; *Standard Ed.*, **9**.]

(1908*f*) Preface to Stekel's *Nervose Angstzustände und ihre Behandlung*, *G.S.*, **11**, 239, *G.W.*, **7**, 467. (180)
[*Trans.*: *Standard Ed.*, **9**.]

(1909*b*) 'Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben', *G.S.*, **8**, 129, *G.W.*, **7**, 243. (43, 79, 87, 95, 96, 142, 224)
[*Trans.*: 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy', *C.P.*, **3**, 149; *Standard Ed.*, **10**, 3.]

(1909*c*) 'Der Familienroman der Neurotiker', *G.S.*, **12**, 367, *G.W.*, **7**, 227. (171)
[*Trans.*: 'Family Romances', *C.P.*, **5**, 74; *Standard Ed.*, **9**.]

(1909*d*) 'Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose', *G.S.*, **8**, 269; *G.W.*, **7**, 381. (183)
[*Trans.:* 'Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis', *C.P.*, **3**, 293; *Standard Ed.*, **10**, 155.]

(1910*a* [1909]) *Über Psychoanalyse*, Vienna. *G.S.*, **4**, 349, *G.W.*, **8**, 3. (56, 171, 178, 214,
[*Trans.*: 'Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis', *Amer. J. Psychol.*, **21** (1910), 181; *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 3.]
(1910*c*, *Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci*, Vienna. *G.S.*, **9**, 371; *G.W.*, **8**, 128. (170)
[*Trans.*: *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood*, *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 59.]
(1910*d*) 'Die zukünftigen Chancen der psychoanalytischen Therapie', *G.S.*, **6**, 25; *G.W.*, **8**, 104. (123)
[*Trans.*: 'The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Therapy', *C.P.*, **2**, 285; *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 141.]
(1910*e*) '"Über den Gegensinn der Urworte"', *G.S.*, **10**, 221; *G.W.*, **8**, 214.
[*Trans.*: '"The Antithetical Sense of Primal Words"', *C.P.* **4**, 184; *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 155.]
(1910*f*, Letter to Dr. Friedrich S. Krauss on *Anthropophyteia*, *G.S.*, **11**, 242; *G.W.*, **8**, 224.
[*Trans.*: *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 233.]
(1910*g*) 'Zur Selbstmord-Diskussion', *G.S.*, **3**, 321; *G.W.*, **8**, 62.
[*Trans.*: 'Contributions to a Discussion on Suicide', *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 231.]
(1910*h*) 'Über einen besonderen Typus der Objektwahl beim Manne', *G.S.*, **5**, 186, *G.W.*, **8**, 66 (47, 143)
[*Trans.*: 'A Special Type of Choice of Object made by Men', *C.P.*, **4**, 192; *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 165.]
(1910*i*) 'Die psychogene Sehstörung in psychoanalytischer Auffassung', *G.S.*, **5**, 310; *G.W.*, **8**, 94.
[*Trans.*: 'The Psycho-Analytic View of Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision', *C.P.*, **2**, 105 *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 211.]
(1910*j*) 'Beispiele des Verrats pathogener Phantasien bei Neurotikern', *G.S.*, **11**, 300; *G.W.*, **8**, 228. (222)
[*Trans.*: 'Two Instances of Pathogenic Phantasies Revealed by the Patients Themselves', *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 236.]
(1910*k*) 'Über "wilde" Psychoanalyse', *G.S.*, **6**, 37, *G.W.*, **8**, 118.
[*Trans.*: '"Wild" Psycho-Analysis', *C.P.*, **2**, 297; *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 221.]
(1910*m*) Review of Wilh. Neutra's 'Briefe an nervöse Frauen', *Zbl. Psychoan.*, **1**, 49.
[*Trans.*: *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 238.]
(1912*d*, 'Über die allgemeinste Erniedrigung des Liebeslebens', *G.S.*, **5**, 198; *G.W.*, **8**, 78.
[*Trans.*: 'On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love', *C.P.*, **4**, 203, *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 179.]
(1912*f*) 'Zur Onanie-Diskussion', *G.S.*, **3**, 324; *G.W.*, **8**, 332. (224, 231)
[*Trans.*: 'Contributions to a Discussion on Masturbation', *Standard Ed.*, **12**.]

(1912–13) *Totem und Tabu*, Vienna, 1913. *G.S.*, **10**, 3; *G.W.*, **9**. (193, 197, 200)
[*Trans.: Totem and Taboo*, London, 1950; New York, 1952; *Standard Ed.*, **13**, 1.]
(1913*c*) 'Weitere Ratschläge zur Technik der Psychoanalyse: [1] Zur Einleitung der Behandlung', *G.S.*, **6**, 84; *G.W.*, **8**, 454. (142)
[*Trans.*: 'On Beginning the Treatment (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis, I)', *C.P.*, **2**, 342; *Standard Ed.*, **12**.]
(1913*e*) Preface to Steiner's *Die psychischen Störungen der männlichen Potenz*, *G.S.*, **11**, 247; *G.W.*, **10**, 451. (180)
[*Trans.*: *Standard Ed.*, **12**.]
(1913*j*) 'Das Interesse an der Psychoanalyse', *G.S.*, **4**, 313; *G.W.*, **8**, 390. (56)
[*Trans.*: 'The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest', *Standard Ed.*, **13**, 165.]
(1913*k*) Geleitwort zu J. B. Bourke *Der Unrat in Sitte, Brauch, Glauben und Gewohnheitsrecht der Völker*, *G.S.*, **11**, 249; *G.W.*, **10**, 453. (233)
[*Trans.*: 'Preface to J. G. Bourke's *Scatalogic Rites of all Nations*', *C.P.*, **5**, 88; *Standard Ed.*, **12**.]
(1913*m* [1911]) 'On Psycho-Analysis' [in English], *Aust med. Congr.* (Transactions of the Ninth Session, held in Sydney, New South Wales, Sept. 1911), **2**, Part 8, 839, *Standard Ed.*, **12**. (56)
(1914*c*) 'Zur Einführung des Narzissmus', *G.S.*, **6**, 155, *G.W.*, **10**, 138. (100, 181, 224)
[*Trans.*: 'On Narcissism: an Introduction', *C.P.*, **4**, 30; *Standard Ed.*, **14**, 69.]
(1914*d*) 'Zur Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung', *G.S.*, **4**, 411; *G.W.*, **10**, 44. (4, 9, 56, 145, 204)
[*Trans.*: 'On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement', *C.P.*, **1**, 287; *Standard Ed.*, **14**, 3.]
(1914*f*) 'Zur Psychologie des Gymnasiasten', *G.S.*, **11**, 187, *G.W.*, **10**, 204. (232)
[*Trans.*: 'Some Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology', *Standard Ed.*, **13**, 241.]
(1915*c*) 'Triebe und Triebschicksale', *G.S.*, **5**, 443; *G.W.*, **10**, 210. (210)
[*Trans.*: 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', *C.P.*, **4**, 60; *Standard Ed.*, **14**, 111.]
(1915*e*) 'Das Unbewusste', *G.S.*, **5**, 480; *G.W.*, **10**, 264. (142)
[*Trans.*: 'The Unconscious', *C.P.*, **4**, 98, *Standard Ed.*, **14**, 161.]
(1916–17) *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*, Vienna. *G.S.*, **7**, *G.W.*, **11**. (4, 56, 154, 173, 202)
[*Trans.*: *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, revised ed., London, 1929 (*A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, New York, 1935); *Standard Ed.*, **15–16**.]
(1917*b*) 'Eine Kindheitserinnerung aus *Dichtung und Wahrheit*', *G.S.*, **10**, 357; *G.W.*, **12**, 15. (84–5)

[*Trans.*: 'A Childhood Recollection from *Dichtung und Wahrheit*', *C.P.*, **4**, 357; *Standard Ed.*, **17**, 147.]

(1917*c*) 'Über Triebumsetzungen insbesondere der Analerotik', *G.S.*, **5**, 268; *G.W.*, **10**, 402. (205)

[*Trans.*: 'On Transformations of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Erotism', *C.P.*, **2**, 164; *Standard Ed.*, **17**, 127.]

(1917*e* [1915]) 'Trauer und Melancholie', *G.S.*, **5**, 535; *G.W.*, **10**, 428. (232)

[*Trans.*: 'Mourning and Melancholia', *C.P.*, **4**, 152; *Standard Ed.*, **14**, 239.]

(1918*a*) 'Das Tabu der Virginität', *G.S.*, **5**, 212; *G.W.*, **12**, 161. (185)

[*Trans.*: 'The Taboo of Virginity', *C.P.*, **4**, 217; *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 193.]

(1919*a* [1918]) 'Wege der psychoanalytischen Therapie', *G.S.*, **6**, 136; *G.W.*, **12**, 183. (140, 145)

[*Trans.*: 'Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy', *C.P.*, **2**, 392; *Standard Ed.*, **17**, 159.]

(1920*a*) 'Über die Psychogenese eines Falles von weiblicher Homosexualität', *G.S.*, **5**, 312; *G.W.*, **12**, 271. (101, 175)

[*Trans.*: 'The Psychogenesis of a Case of Female Homosexuality', *C.P.*, **2**, 202; *Standard Ed.*, **18**, 147.]

(1920*g*) *Jenseits des Lustprinzips*, Vienna. *G.S.*, **6**, 191; *G.W.*, **13**, 3. (70)

[*Trans.*: *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, London, 1950, *Standard Ed.*, **18**, 3.]

(1921*c*) *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse*, Vienna. *G.S.*, **6**, 261; *G.W.*, **13**, 73. (123, 199)

[*Trans.*: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, London, 1922; New York, 1940; *Standard Ed.*, **18**, 67.]

(1921*e*) Extract from a Letter to Claparède [in French], in Freud's *La psychanalyse* [French translation of 1910*a*], Geneva.

[*Trans.*: Included in 1910*i*, *Standard Ed.*, **11**, 214.]

(1922*a*) 'Traum und Telepathie', *G.S.*, **3**, 278, *G.W.*, **13**, 165 (174)

[*Trans.*: 'Dreams and Telepathy', *C.P.*, **4**, 408; *Standard Ed.*, **18**, 197.]

(1922*b*) 'Über einige neurotische Mechanismen bei Eifersucht, Paranoia und Homosexualität', *G.S.*, **5**, 387, *G.W.*, **13**, 195. (101)

[*Trans.*: 'Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality', *C.P.*, **2**, 232; *Standard Ed.*, **18**, 223.]

(1923*a*) '"Psychoanalyse" und "Libido Theorie"', *G.S.*, **11**, 201; *G.W.*, **13**, 211. (56)

[*Trans.*: 'Two Encyclopaedia Articles', *C.P.*, **5**, 107; *Standard Ed.*, **18**, 235.]

(1924*f*) 'A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis' [published as 'Psychoanalysis: Exploring the Hidden Recesses of the Mind'], Chap. 73, Vol. 2 of *These Eventful Years*, London and New York; *Standard Ed.*, **19**. (56)

[*German Text:* 'Kurzer Abriss der Psychoanalyse', *G.S.*, **11**, 183; *G.W.*, **13**, 405. German original first appeared in 1928.]

(1925*d* [1924]) *Selbstdarstellung*, Vienna, 1934. *G.S.*, **11**, 119; *G.W.* **14**, 33. (4, 56, 224)

[*Trans.: An Autobiographical Study*, London, 1935 (*Autobiography*, New York, 1935); *Standard Ed.*, **20**.]

(1925*g*) 'Josef Breuer', *G.S.*, **11**, 281; *G.W.*, **14**, 562. (9)

[*Trans.*: 'Josef Breuer', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **6**, 459, *Standard Ed.*, **19**.]

(1926*d*) *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*, Vienna. *G.S.*, **11**, 23; *G.W.*, **14**, 113. (173, 224)

[*Trans.: Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, London, 1936 (*The Problem of Anxiety*, New York, 1936), *Standard Ed.*, **20**.]

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[*Trans.: The Question of Lay Analysis*, London, 1947; *Standard Ed.*, **20**.]

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[*German Text:* 'Psycho-Analysis', *G.S.*, **12**, 372; *G.W.*, **14**, 299. German original first appeared in 1934.]

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[*Trans.: Civilization and its Discontents*, London and New York, 1930; *Standard Ed.*, **21**.]

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[*Trans.*: 'Some Elementary Lessons in Psycho-Analysis', *C.P.*, **5**, 376; *Standard Ed.*, **23**.]

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[*Trans.*: *The Origins of Psycho-Analysis*, London and New York, 1954. Partly, including 'A Project for a Scientific Psychology', in *Standard Ed.*, **1**.)]
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G.S. = Freud, *Gesammelte Schriften* (12 vols.), Vienna, 1924–34

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S.K.S.N. = Freud, *Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre* (5 vols.) Vienna, 1906–22

S.P.H. = *Selected Papers on Hysteria and Other Psychoneuroses*, New York, 1909–20

Neurosenlehre und Technik = Freud, *Schriften zur Neurosenlehre und zur psychoanalytischen Technik* (*1913–1926*), Vienna, 1931

Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre = Freud, *Kleine Schriften zur Sexualtheorie und zur Traumlehre*, Vienna, 1931

Technik und Metapsychol. = Freud, *Zur Technik der Psychoanalyse und zur Metapsychologie*, Vienna, 1924

GENERAL INDEX

This index includes the names of non-technical authors. It also includes the names of technical authors where no reference is made in the text to specific works. For references to specific technical works, the Bibliography should be consulted.—The compilation of the index was undertaken by Mrs. R. S. Partridge.

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